THE OUTCOMES OF JOHANNESBURG:
ASSESSING THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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This article analyzes the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South Africa from late August to early September 2002. Convened ten years after the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, the WSSD was an attempt to move forward with sustainable development efforts by setting implementation strategies, answering questions of accountability, and forming partnerships that go beyond traditional boundaries. The Summit succeeded in achieving some of its goals, such as setting a time-bound sanitation target and recognizing the rights of communities in natural resource management. Yet it also had its share of failures, including the failure to address climate change and to reform global environmental governance. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the extent and diversity of civil society engagement in the process set forth the challenge of overcoming divisions among governments, within civil society, and between governments and civil society to find a path to common solutions.

From August 26 to September 4, 2002, eighty-two Heads of State and Government, thirty Vice-Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers, seventy-four ministers, royalty and other senior officials, and thousands more official representatives came together with observers from civil society, academia, the scientific community, local communities, and the private sector at the Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). In addition to the more than 20,000 participants in the official summit, thousands of others from all over the world participated in parallel events—summits in their own right—organized to coincide with the WSSD.

Together, the many summits of Johannesburg tell different narratives: of a world community confronted with immense poverty and serious environmental problems, struggling to find common solutions in pursuit of sustainable development; of governments divided by competing visions of development and globalization, and paralyzed by lack of political will; and of civil society, including indigenous peoples and local communities, asserting their right to participate meaningfully in environmental and development decisions, increasingly holding governments accountable for the consequences of such decisions, and implementing sustainable development on the ground, with or without official sanction.

Despite low expectations, the WSSD achieved a series of successes. Though it also had its share of failures, including the possibility that many of the gains in the official process could be rendered meaningless by governments’ failure to adopt effective governance and implementation mechanisms, the presence of the parallel civil society summits demonstrated the increased groundswell of support for sustainable development. Aligning the interests of civil society and government will be the primary challenge for sustainable development going forward.

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I. The Outcomes of the Official Summit

The official summit was a whirl of seven thematic Partnership Plenaries, statements by non-state entities, four high-level Round Tables, addresses by heads of state and other senior officials, and a multi-stakeholder event. An intergovernmental negotiating process, which began in New York in early 2002, ran in parallel with these events. Governments negotiated and adopted two main documents: the Plan of Implementation and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development. These documents, together, are intended to frame the official approach to sustainable development in the foreseeable future.

Unlike the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992, which produced four major environmental agreements and Agenda 21, the international blueprint for sustainable development, the WSSD was never intended to develop new conventions or to renegotiate Agenda 21. Rather, the WSSD was given the mandate of implementing existing promises and commitments, such as those made in Rio and in the Millennium Development Goals. The Plan of Implementation was designed to generate a set of targets and timetables, concrete action plans that would make sustainable development happen.

The Plan of Implementation is a political document and, therefore, is not legally binding on governments. Like Agenda 21, however, the Plan of Implementation is designed to guide development, financial, and investment decisions by governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders.

II. Successes in the WSSD

The official summit achieved seven main successes: a sanitation target; the acceptance of the need to delink economic growth from environmental degradation; the reaffirmation of the principle of access to information, participation and justice; the launching of some key initiatives and partnerships on sustainable development; the recognition of community and indigenous people’s rights; acknowledging the importance of ethics; and the promotion of greater corporate responsibility and accountability.

The Sanitation Target

The most important of the WSSD’s successes, as it is the most concrete, was the adoption of a new basic sanitation target of halving the proportion of people unable to reach or afford safe drinking water or without access to basic sanitation by 2015. However, a few powerful countries opposed this clearly achievable target throughout most of the negotiations, giving the impression that the health of millions was being held hostage to gain a political advantage over another set of negotiations, in particular that of the negotiations on targets for renewable energy. While no evidence exists of a trade-off between
these issues, the perception that such a tradeoff was being considered became a source of cynicism and tainted the achievement of the sanitation target.\(^5\)

Achieving this milestone will require a great deal of investment in both effort (labor and intellectual commitments) and capital. Meeting the 2015 target means nearly doubling the amount of new people getting sustainable access to safe water every five years from 2005 (210 million) to 2015 (880 million),\(^6\) and requires an increase of 1.6 billion people (32%) served by water supply and 2.2 billion people (59%) served by sanitation.\(^7\) Adding to the investment of effort, estimates of how much the water target would cost to implement range from $19 billion to $34 billion, while implementation of the sanitation target would require approximately $12 billion.\(^8\) Though these numbers might seem prohibitive, many delegates acknowledge they are clearly achievable and agree that reaching this target would make an enormous difference in the lives of millions of the world’s poor, especially the nearly two million people who die each year from diseases linked to lack of clean drinking water and basic sanitation services.\(^9\)

**Delinking Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation**

The Plan of Implementation encourages and promotes the development of a 10-year framework of programs to support regional and national initiatives that accelerate the shift towards sustainable consumption and production and promote development within the carrying capacity of ecosystems.\(^10\) The text calls for new, science-based policies and consumer information tools that would facilitate financial and technical assistance for developing countries. These initiatives are intended to delink economic growth from environmental damage by improving efficiency and sustainability in resource allocation and production, thus reducing resource degradation and pollution.

Should the financial and technical resources become available, this decision could have enormous consequences in changing unsustainable patterns of consumption and production. While the agreed text is much weaker than many stakeholders had hoped—watered down with qualifications and reservations—the very acceptance of the idea that economic growth must be divorced from environmental degradation represents an important forward step.

**Access to Information, Participation and Justice**

The Plan of Implementation commits governments to ensuring access at the national level to environmental information and judicial and administrative proceedings in environmental matters, as well as public participation in decision making. The Rio Earth Summit set a groundbreaking precedent in 1992 with Principle 10, which empowered individuals by promoting these three access principles. The WSSD failed to further Principle 10 by pledging resources or expanding its implementation. Most notably, the Summit rejected a paragraph calling for global guidelines on the access principles—a step that could have been the basis for a multilateral convention on environmental
procedural rights. Yet the Summit did provide an important reaffirmation of the importance of information, public participation, and access to justice (i.e., opportunity to seek redress or remedy through citizen suits, alternative dispute resolution, or other means) for individuals.

In the absence of global leadership on the implementation of Principle 10, a coalition of civil society organizations, governments, and international organizations launched a voluntary partnership called the Partnership for Principle 10 (PP10). PP10’s objective is to provide a vehicle for joint government/civil society efforts to identify priorities for policy reform that will deliver information to citizens, open up participatory processes, and ensure that citizens have the opportunity to seek redress or remedy when these rights are violated. By connecting developing country governments not only to civil society but also to donors, international organizations, and developed-country governments, the Partnership aims to build on the comparative advantages of each to ensure that these priorities are met, whether through technical assistance, funding, or capacity building. The Partnership for Principle 10 received wide support at the Summit and provides an example of how civil society organizations can mobilize to promote the implementation of sustainable development, even when governments are constrained from doing so in a multilateral context. The partnership was one of the 220-odd partnerships that were submitted to the WSSD Secretariat as “Type-2 Outcomes” of the Summit.

Partnerships and Initiatives

One of the Summit’s most significant outcomes was a new recognition of voluntary partnerships as official outcomes of the Summit. While partnerships have for years been the de facto implementing mechanism for sustainable development, their critical role was now recognized in a multilateral context for the first time. This new development highlights a transition from traditional multilateral diplomacy to a voluntary approach towards implementation. In many ways, the need for partnerships is emblematic of the stagnation at the heart of multilateral negotiations: in the absence of forward-looking government consensus, civil society, business, international organizations, and even some governments must fill in the gap and come together to make sustainable development happen.

In December 2001, the WSSD Secretariat issued a short paper describing the anticipated outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. While the Summit would result in traditionally negotiated outcomes between governments, it would also result in a new type of outcome, described as a “series of commitments, targets, and partnerships made by individual governments or groups of governments... with involvement of or among major groups,” including the private sector. These voluntary partnerships soon became known as “Type-2 Outcomes,” as distinguished from “Type-1 Outcomes,” which refer to negotiated political and/or legally binding decisions among governments. Type-2 Outcomes provide a way for governments and
other stakeholders to overcome the impasse of many government negotiations. They also provide a direct route towards working with the private sector.

By May 2002, when the final preparatory meeting (PrepCom IV) convened in Bali, the politics of partnerships became a crucial issue for civil society and governments alike. Concerns about partnerships focused on four themes:

- Partnerships could be used as a substitute for intergovernmental commitments, thus allowing governments to abdicate from responsibilities that are properly a function of the state and threatening multilateral negotiations and cooperation.

- Corporations, in joining the Type-2 Partnerships, could use them to bring inappropriate corporate money and influence into the United Nations, and develop partnerships that would serve as “greenwash”—superficial instruments of public relations aimed at establishing credibility with little concrete action, or instruments to promote privatization.

- The governance of the partnerships, including accountability mechanisms and provisions for transparency and monitoring, was unclear. Many NGOs demanded external monitoring, transparency, and accountability mechanisms, perhaps through external audits and evaluations as well as strong requirements for access to project documents.

- Partnerships could be financed through existing Official Development Assistance, with no additional funding provided, and thus could actually divert existing and limited resources from those in need of them.

In Johannesburg, the contentious politics of Type-2 Partnerships were more muted. Despite the serious questions that still remained, governments and other stakeholders clearly realized that focusing on partnerships distracted from the higher-stakes political negotiations. It also became clear that, despite the tremendous attention that went into clarifying guidelines and principles for partnerships, the WSSD Secretariat had exercised little quality control, and that governments would not adopt official standards for these partnerships in their negotiations. Indeed, these controversial questions were deferred, perhaps indefinitely, to the Commission on Sustainable Development at the United Nations. Finally, many of the potentially controversial partnerships, particularly those involving corporations, held their meetings on the outskirts of the Summit, fearing bad publicity.

Although the Type-2 Partnerships were controversial and, at least for the time being, lack legal standing, there were important new initiatives launched in Johannesburg. Aside from the Partnership for Principle 10 (discussed above), partnerships on sustainable agriculture, water and sanitation, and renewable energy are examples of what could be an effective way of achieving sustainable development. While NGOs and others have published lists of
partnerships that illustrate the worst aspects of this new form of sustainable development implementation, the following examples are highlights of some of the more robust partnerships launched at the Summit.

The Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development Partnership Initiative (SARD), led by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, brings together governments, farmer and other civil society organizations, and intergovernmental organizations to support farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, and other rural people in realizing sustainable agriculture and rural development. The SARD Partnership Initiative, by establishing a resource center, creating a small-grants funding mechanism, and influencing policymakers with research and lessons learned, aims to result in concrete and measurable improvements in the livelihoods and living conditions of the rural poor over the next five years.

The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All Initiative (WASH), championed by the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, and joined by many governments, NGOs and corporations, aims to deliver safe, affordable and reliable water and sanitation services to those currently without access in both rural and urban areas by 2015.

Not all of the key voluntary agreements or partnerships that emerged from the Summit could be neatly classified as Type-2 Outcomes. For example, after the Summit failed to agree on a target for renewable energy, the European Union announced the launch of a “coalition of the willing,” like-minded countries and regional groups that would increase their use of renewable energy through quantifiable, time-bound targets. The coalition complements a Type-2 Partnership led by the EU, called Energy for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, to which it has committed $700 million.

The Rights of Communities and Indigenous Peoples

The Plan of Implementation provided an unequivocal recognition of community-based natural resource management, including the reaffirmation of the vital role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development. What is most remarkable about this success is that negotiating parties agreed on this principle, which was actively promoted by many stakeholders and a vocal indigenous people’s caucus, as early as the final WSSD preparatory meeting in Bali and without major dissent from governments. The document affirmed the rights of indigenous peoples and communities’ right to participation in decision making in areas as diverse as forest management, renewable energy, disaster impact mitigation, biodiversity, mining, and tourism.

The Importance of Ethics

In the Plan, governments also emphasized the need to consider ethics in the implementation of Agenda 21. This marks the first time that an explicit reference to ethics has been made in any official UN environment or
development document. Incorporating ethics into the sustainable development agenda provides an opening to those who believe that development and environment issues cannot be adequately addressed unless governments, societies, and communities acknowledge the critical role of ethical norms in policy decisions.

**Corporate Responsibility and Accountability**

The call for corporate responsibility and accountability is not treated as a separate heading under any of the sections, indicating the continuing debate over how best to reflect these issues in intergovernmental decisions and whether global processes are the appropriate way to advance this process. Still, the text on corporate responsibility is an important but controversial achievement, with opposing views on the strength of the Summit’s outcomes. Friends of the Earth International, along with a collection of development, environmental, and labor groups, pushed hard for the negotiated text to incorporate binding corporate accountability measures that would include transnational solutions through a multilateral agreement.²¹ These groups sought an agreement that would go beyond a voluntary initiative to address citizen and community rights (including the right to legal redress), market frameworks, ecological debt, and disclosure of environmental and social practices and impacts, among other requirements.

The final text of the Political Declaration simply called on governments to “promote corporate responsibility and accountability and the exchange of best practices in the context of sustainable development.” Further, the push of the EU and the G-77/China for new text on corporate responsibility in the section on “Sustainable Development in a Globalizing World” resulted with the inclusion on an interpretive statement from the contact group on globalization, proposing the issue be dealt with through existing agreements.²² The Political Declaration also included the statement, “We agree that there is a need for private sector corporations to enforce corporate accountability. This should take place within a transparent and stable regulatory environment.”²³

While the resulting text fell short of the NGO demand for a binding convention on corporate accountability and liability,²⁴ the decision to promote corporate responsibility and accountability based on the Rio principles, including “the full development and effective implementation of intergovernmental agreements and measures,” is an important sign of progress. The references to corporate responsibility and accountability in both the Plan and the Political Declaration may actually result in future intergovernmental processes that would enable civil society to push for the creation of an international regulatory framework for corporations. This small opening is significant enough that the United States delegation provided an interpretation, shared by only a few governments, that “intergovernmental agreements” refer only to existing agreements and not to the development of new instruments, though the word “existing” was stricken from the final text.²⁵
III. The Failures of WSSD

Governments in Johannesburg looked at the world, recognized the world’s immense development and environmental problems, acknowledged they need to do more to respond to these challenges, and then concluded weakly by ratifying existing efforts and approaches that have been found wanting. The absence of new commitments and innovative thinking, particularly on global environmental issues and how they threaten development in all countries, is probably the most significant weakness of the Plan of Implementation. This stagnation is exemplified by governments’ inadequate approach with respect to time-bound targets and the challenges of globalization. It is further illustrated by the failure of delegates to break new ground in the two most important sections of the Plan—the sections on “Means of Implementation” and “Institutional Mechanisms.”

The Inadequate Progress on Time-bound Targets

The strong focus on time-bound targets during the negotiations was refreshing, although the UN Millennium Development Goals had previously been agreed upon in 2000. Important new targets were set in the areas of sanitation, fisheries and biodiversity, but not without controversy. Many question the meaningfulness of a 2010 target to achieve a significant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity loss given the lack of accurate estimates of the existing rate of global loss. Others question the sustainability of the fisheries target because it is based on the contentious concept of maximum sustainable yield. A more ambitious and stronger set of development targets with firm timelines could have made a major difference in the years to come. Unfortunately, the WSSD clearly failed to provide such targets.

Renewable Energy

The final sticking point in the negotiations was the failure to reach an agreement on time-bound targets for increasing the contribution of renewable energy’s share in the global energy mix. There were multiple proposals for time-bound targets—the EU advocated 15 percent by 2010, for example, and Brazil proposed 10 percent by 2010—but the parties failed to agree on any of them. A group of largely European countries (the EU, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Iceland, Tuvalu and Poland) supported these targets, while the G-77/China, with OPEC-member Venezuela as its head, opposed the proposal, saying it detracted attention from ensuring energy access for the poor. The United States, Australia, Canada, and Japan expressed concern over the all-encompassing approach, calling for something more flexible. The negotiations resulted in the adoption of text that addresses the diversification of the energy supply through technology, and stresses “a sense of urgency” with regard to increasing global use of renewable energy, but dropped all mention of a timeframe. The failure to incorporate a time-bound target into the text frustrated many governments and other stakeholders because such
targets would have been the only place in the Plan where climate change was addressed in a meaningful way.

Climate Change

As with the renewable energy issue, negotiators at the WSSD had the opportunity to take a considerable step forward on the issue of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, but fell short of concrete progress. These negotiations followed a contentious path through the Vienna setting,\textsuperscript{31} to small group consultations, and finally to Johannesburg. Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, the EU, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Namibia, Norway, and Uganda pushed for the inclusion of a statement urging all countries that had not already ratified the Protocol to do so in a timely manner, with a strong statement of support from Samoa that highlighted the vulnerability of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to climate change.\textsuperscript{32} Despite strong opposition from the United States to the wording, the Plan of Implementation adopted the statement calling on governments to ensure the Protocol’s entry into force. But negotiators missed the opportunity to insert text urging the United States specifically to ratify the Protocol.

The most significant progress on climate change was in fact achieved outside the negotiations: in their high-level statement, Russia announced that it intends to ratify the Protocol by this fall,\textsuperscript{33} and Greenpeace International and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, setting aside their differences on other issues, issued a joint statement calling upon governments “to be responsible and build the international framework to tackle climate change on the basis of the UN Framework Convention on Climate change and its Kyoto Protocol.”\textsuperscript{34}

Rio Principles

What the Plan of Implementation could have been and what it actually became was often significantly affected by the alteration of a few simple words. Each word and phrase change gradually shifted the Plan from a promising document outlining commitments and obligations to one filled with voluntary options and choices, and may actually have watered down principles affirmed in the Rio declaration. The most striking example of this is the transformation of the Precautionary Principle—the application of precaution in applying regulations for health and trade purposes—into the Precautionary Approach.\textsuperscript{35} References to the precautionary principle’s role in decision-making and its relation to a developing country’s right to exploit its own resources pursuant to its environmental and developmental policies were removed from the negotiated text of the introductory section. Following opposition to the term “principle”\textsuperscript{36} from the United States (in yet another display of disagreement with the EU and Norway) and Japan, the term “precautionary approach” was adopted into the text. While the Johannesburg outcomes reaffirmed the Precautionary Approach\textsuperscript{37} and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,\textsuperscript{38} they did not advance them in any meaningful way.
Governing Globalization

The Plan of Implementation gave unqualified ratification to the Monterrey agreements on financing and development, and to the Doha processes for a new round of trade negotiations. However, despite a call for the examination of the relationship between trade, environment, and development, the WSSD failed to signal how development cooperation and expanding international trade could be directed to serve the goals of sustainable development; it made no mention, for example, of specific actions to lessen or remove trade’s potential negative impacts on sustainable development. While the Plan recognizes both the opportunities and challenges posed by globalization to sustainable development, governments did not provide any direction or guidance from a sustainable development perspective on how these opportunities could be maximized and how the challenges could be overcome. Johannesburg, in this sense, was a missed opportunity for governments to give globalization a sustainable face.

The inability of governments to agree on reform of the existing global environmental governance system, or on how to ensure effective financing of sustainable development, makes meaningful accountability on these issues unlikely. A recurrence of the failures of Rio appears inevitable as these two areas—reform of the governance system and effective financing—crucial for monitoring and implementing commitments did not go beyond their current framework.

IV. Outside of Sandton: The Other “Summits”

The government meeting in Sandton, the official venue of the WSSD, was only one of the many “summits” that took place not only in Johannesburg but also elsewhere in South Africa during and before the official meeting. All these meetings were summits in their own right, and understanding what took place in Johannesburg during the WSSD—its success and failures—requires an appreciation of each. These other summits were convened with the intent of influencing the official process and to send the message that, with or without governments, the work on sustainable development must continue. Summits and conferences addressed issues as wide ranging as responsible tourism, children’s rights, environmental justice, business interests, local governments, and legislators. The largest public demonstration, the Gathering of Landless People, held workshops on land reform, organized rallies, and culminated with a march to Sandton during the final days of the WSSD.
Many of the successes in the official meeting can be directly linked to the efforts of civil society organizations, issue caucuses, and the pressure from these outside summits.

- The achievement of the sanitation target would not have been possible if not for the work of a broad alliance of scientists and advocates from the water and sanitation community.
- Aggressive lobbying by the Community-Based Forestry Caucus in Bali resulted in the recognition of community-based natural resources management, especially in the area of forestry.
- The recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights would not have been gained without the hard work of their caucus and the Kimberley Declaration of the Summit of Indigenous Peoples.
- The reaffirmation of access to information, public participation, and justice is in part a result of efforts by the Access Initiative, a coalition of civil society organizations.
- The concerted campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and other organizations resulted in putting corporate responsibility and accountability on the international agenda.

Each of these “Summits” illustrates how far the world has come toward meeting the challenges of sustainable development. Many stakeholder groups are clearly far ahead of governments in building a local sustainable development movement. Sustainable development, in many places in the world, is not seen as involving primarily environmental or even development dilemmas but one that, at its core, is a human rights and ethical challenge—the demand to ensure that people and the planet deserve better than what we have so far done to each other and to our environment. Hence, social justice, equality, and equity were a common refrain in many summits.

The diversity of voices and interests seeking to be heard on sustainable development issues was striking. Unlike Rio, where the global environment movement principally led civil society engagement, Johannesburg put a different face on global civil society: one that was neither singular nor homogenous, and certainly not a synergy of shared experiences. The environmental NGOs, development groups, workers, indigenous peoples, farmers, businessmen, women, religious and spiritual leaders, scientists, policy researchers, local officials, youth, and children: all these and many others came to Johannesburg from the cities and villages, from the mountains and islands of all the continents of the world—and to no one’s surprise, only rarely did they speak in one voice.

The diversity of voices and faces of those in the many summits of Johannesburg should be celebrated. It represents the success of sustainable development as an idea, that people around the world recognize it as an imperative. At the same time, however, this diversity will pose a difficult challenge over the next decade: that of finding common ground and therefore forging common strategies and positions on sustainable development.
V. Conclusion

Johannesburg is a story of many summits. It is an inspiring story. Despite low expectations, the official meeting achieved concrete gains, successes that could be directly linked to efforts by stakeholder groups. The diversity of voices and faces in the other summits is significant and should be celebrated. But the story of Johannesburg is also disturbing. The failure of governments to adopt and agree on effective means of implementation (including on financing issues) and institutional mechanisms, make it likely that the successes of the summit could be rendered meaningless. Above all, the divisions among governments, within civil society, and between governments and civil society, will continue to be an obstacle for progress in dealing with development and environment concerns perhaps for years or even decades to come. How to overcome this and find a path to common solutions so that diversity becomes a strength and not a weakness is a challenge for all those who believe that sustainable development is essential for people, planet and prosperity.
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NOTES


9 Geoffrey Lean and James Palmer, "Earth Summit—After days of intense negotiations, leaders settle on a blueprint to keep the plant alive,” The Independent (UK), 3 September 2002.


16 See Friends of the Earth website at <http://www.foe.org/WSSD/pdfs/PAB-29-02(2).pdf> for a set of partnerships that were highly criticized by Friends of the Earth (22 November 2002).


30 Stas Burgiel et al., 18.

31 The Vienna Setting is one of the negotiation fora at the WSSD. It was responsible for negotiations of the Main Committee and primary negotiators/national delegates during the last week of the Summit. Other fora included The Johannesburg Setting (ministerial consultations) and Contact Groups.

32 Stas Burgiel et al., 18.

33 At the Summit, Russia announced its intention to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The ratification will likely not happen until sometime in 2003. First, Russia’s Federal Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring Agency will develop a report on the impact that entry into the Protocol will have on the country, which will be given to the government for approval.


35 Means of Implementation signifies the financial resources and mechanisms needed to achieve the identified goals of the Implementation Plan.

36 The term “approach” is referenced in Rio Principle 15, while the term “principle” has been used in many international agreements, including the Biosafety Protocol, that have been agreed upon since the Rio reference, giving more weight to the term “principle."

37 The precautionary approach states that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing action.

38 “Common but differentiated responsibilities” refers to the idea that developed countries, because of their historical role in causing global environmental problems and because of their access to financial and technological resources, should take the lead in responding to environmental concerns.

39 A document that focuses on mobilizing financial resources for development by covering six policy areas: mobilization of domestic financial resources; mobilization of international resources such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private flows; international trade as the engine of economic development; increasing international financial and technical cooperation; external debt; systemic issues such as enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems; and, in addition, the follow-up process. See Michael Hofmann and Rolf Dresher, "The Monterrey Consensus: A New Development Partnership" <http://www.dse.de/zeitschr/de402-3.htm> (22 November 2002).

40 World Trade Organization talks that resulted in a declaration which highlights "the urgent necessity for the effective co-ordinated delivery of technical assistance with bilateral donors, in the OECD Development Assistance Committee and relevant international and regional intergovernmental institutions, within a coherent policy framework and timetable.” See Organization For Economic Co-Operation And Development, “Trade for Development: Monterrey Consensus and Doha Declaration Highlight Importance of Capacity Building” <http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-12-26709-0,00.html> (22 November 2002).

41 Stas Burgiel et al., 18.


43 For a sampling of civil society positions on key issues during the WSSD, see the Eco-Equity bulletins released during the summit at <www.greenpeace.org or www.rio10.dk>.