Chapter 2

Multilateral Processes, Global Commissions, and Global Governance

For much of the past century, the history of global governance has been the history of intergovernmental processes. These processes have been organised around exclusive deliberations of officials and politicians with similar backgrounds—whether initiated by clusters of governments, intergovernmental agencies, or distinguished individuals. The outcomes were targeted at governments and international agencies, which were considered the only legitimate actors on the global stage.

At the same time, over the past two decades there has been an unprecedented growth of actors in civil society extending and building alliances and coalitions that transcend national boundaries. In the countries of the less industrialised world, civil society mobilisation grew as the post-colonial nation-building euphoria gave way to disillusionment with the capacity of state regimes to vigorously pursue policies of social transformation in favour of historically less privileged and marginalised peoples. Some of this mobilisation extended across national boundaries in response to adverse social, economic, and ecological impacts of the policies of multilateral financial institutions and the economic, political, and military activities of governments.

The emergence of civil society at the global level has both been facilitated by the telecommunications revolution that accompanied globalisation, and been spurred by the challenge of effective governance in a globalising world.[1] These alliances and coalitions have spawned on a diverse bed of issues—from land mines to nuclear weapons, from the global trade in animal skins to the control and ownership of genetic resources. Of particular relevance to this assessment, civil society alliances have also formed around development projects and the accountability of international institutions. Often, debate over these issues has led to the creation of regional or global fora, which have taken the form of commissions, tribunals, and working groups.

In reaction to the increasing number of actors active in shaping public policymaking, national governmental agencies and intergovernmental bodies have become more open to including non-state actors in a more structured manner. A popular approach has been to establish "multi-stakeholder processes," or "MSPs," that provide space for dialogue among a range of actors from various sectors of society, as part of a decision-making or advisory process.

Over time, the international system has been compelled to recognise emergent voices from civil society.

The formation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) draws from a history of global commissions in the last quarter of the 20th century, from the expanding role of civil society actors as agents of change at the global level, and from the emergence of MSPs. In this sense, it is a step forward in the history of multilateral policymaking. In this chapter, we briefly review the contemporary history of global governance to illustrate both the exclusiveness of state-led international governance and the inroads made by civil society. Next, we trace the impact of transnational civil society organisations on setting agendas at the international level. We then discuss emergent forms of

governance, MSPs, and the implications of these forms for effective compliance with norms of international governance. Finally, we locate the WCD process within these diverse strands.

From State-Centred Multilateralism to Multi-stakeholder Processes

Eminent figures dominate the history of global governance through the second half of the 20th century. In most cases, these people drew their credibility from positions of political power within national governments and international bureaucracies or their national or global moral stature. Based on their credibility and often backed by the authority of intergovernmental bodies, statesmen and stateswomen established a series of commissions to deliberate on the weighty issues of the day.

In this section, we describe the gradual opening of global discussions to embrace the views and participation of a broader set of actors. In telling this story, we also trace the shifting scope of concerns around global governance. In particular, we trace the emergence of concerns around environmental issues, and the progressive interweaving of environment with development and justice concerns.

Formation of the United Nations and Early Patterns of Public Participation

The architecture for current forms of global governance was established in the World War II years through a series of conferences and conversations among leaders of the Allies.[2] In the post-war period, the United Nations (UN), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established.[3] In addition, agreements and institutions in the areas of food, culture, and education were also discussed, leading to the creation of such influential agencies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This period also saw the the fledgling United Nations General Assembly formulate and adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Although the UN was conceived as, and remains, predominantly a forum for inter-governmental engagement, it also provided space from its inception for consultation with non-state actors. Article 71 of the UN Charter allows the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to establish "suitable arrangements for consultation," but only with "international" NGOs.[4] The ECOSOC created a three-part categorisation for NGOs in 1950, subsequently refined in 1968, based on the perceived degree of expertise of the NGO with the issues on the ECOSOC agenda. These rules applied progressively more stringent criterion for participation, from the "general" to the "special" to the "roster" category of ECOSOC consultative status,[5] and governed participation in UN meetings for the first half-century of the UN. It was only after the considerable NGO interest in, and engagement with, the series of UN-sponsored conferences in the 1990s that these rules were modified in 1996 to allow national NGOs to be eligible for consultative status with ECOSOC.[6]

Among post-World War II institutions, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN—now called the World Conservation Union) was significant both for its focus on environmental concerns and for its broad membership. IUCN was established by Julian Huxley, the first director of UNESCO. A joint initiative of UNESCO, the government of France, and the Swiss League for Nature Protection, IUCN is one of the few international institutions that formally bring together stakeholders from within and outside government. From its inception when it started with 80 members, IUCN now brings together 78 states, 112 government agencies, 735 NGOs, 35 affiliates, and some 10,000 scientists and experts from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership. IUCN members rejected a proposal in 1994 to include a membership category for "industry groups."[7] IUCN's historical focus has been on conservation of species and ecosystems, which has recently expanded to include related human development issues. It has had considerable success in promoting conservation, spearheading several key international agreements in the 1970s and 1980s. Of central relevance to this study, IUCN was also one of the two convenors—the World Bank was the other—of the WCD process.

Currents of Change: Economic Injustice and the Limits and Use of Nature

The 1960s and early 1970s saw two separate currents of change that developed from national contexts to become global phenomena. Several countries had emerged from colonialism in the

Box 2.1

Chronology of major global commissions and conferences

1945	United Nations formed
1968–69	Commission on International Development (Pearson Commission)
1972	Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
1977–79	Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission)
1980–82	Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament Issues (Palme Commission)
1983–87	World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission)
1987–90	South Commission
1992	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit)
1992–95	Commission on Global Governance
1995–98	World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development
1995–98	Independent World Commission on Oceans
1998–2000	World Commission on Water

1950s and 1960s, with high aspirations for their people. Yet, many countries remained mired in poverty, spurring the UN to declare the 1960s a "Decade of Development." At the same time, Western Europe, the United States, and Japan were enjoying a period of unprecedented prosperity. The 1969 Pearson Commission, established by the World Bank to investigate Third World poverty, noted an "atmosphere of decreasing interest for development assistance" in the industrialised world and "signs of dejection and growing impatience" in the developing world. The Commission called for trade measures that favoured developing countries, promotion of foreign direct investment to those countries, and an increase in development assistance to 0.7 percent of donor country GNP.[8] Increasingly impatient, in 1974 the developing countries in the UN—the Group of 77 (G77)—called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on a rise in raw material prices, debt reduction, and more favourable conditions for the transfer of technology.[9] Questions of economic justice and development were firmly on the agenda by the early 1970s.

In the 1960s, the ecological limits and costs of the singular pursuit of economic growth were becoming increasingly apparent in the North, while the South was beginning to recognise the integral role that the environment played in the subsistence of its peoples. The publication of *Silent Spring*[10] in 1962, which carefully and eloquently documented the effects of pesticide pollution, is considered a founding event of American environmentalism.[11] In both Germany and the UK, this period witnessed the formation of Green Parties.[12] The early 1970s also saw the publication of the Club of Rome's (COR)[13] path-breaking report, *Limits to Growth*,[14] and *The Ecologist*'s "Blueprint for Survival."[15] Based on computer simulations, these reports warned of dire effects from continued exponential growth in five interconnected trends of global concern—industrialisation, population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of renewable resources, and ecological damage.

Although the industrialised world focussed on concerns from pesticide pollution to the finiteness of natural resources, in the less industrialised world, there was growing concern over the inequity in access to and control over productive natural resources.[16] In a burgeoning "environmentalism of the poor", these concerns were perhaps best illustrated by the Chipko movement against logging in India and the rubber tappers' mobilisation in the Brazilian Amazon in the early to mid-1970s.[17]

Both economic and ecological concerns were brought into stark relief by the Arab nations' 1973

oil embargo. Within a year, the price of crude oil tripled, causing an increase in the prices of other raw materials and goods and services. The recession and inflation that followed fuelled widening recognition of the vulnerability of industrialised and less industrialised country economies both in their sources of energy and in the finiteness of their non-renewable resources. By demonstrating the destabilising effects of sharp shifts in natural resource prices and the importance of control over natural resources, the embargo also focussed and polarised debates over North-South economic justice. The stage was set for a series of charged global deliberations on the twin, but as yet rarely connected, issues of economic justice and environmental concerns.

Change from Above?

Based on its dismal findings, the Pearson Commission concluded with a call for a second, more effective UN-led "Decade of Development." In response, in the early 1970s, the UN organised a series of conferences: on environment in 1972; on population and food in 1974; and on women in 1975.[18]

The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (1972) marked the international coming of age of environmental concerns, but also was suffused with the North-South conflicts of the time.[19] The agenda primarily reflected Northern concerns of scarcity and pollution. Southern countries were deeply suspicious that the environmental agenda would force them to slow down their processes of industrialisation and economic development. In the memorable, if misguided, words of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, the Southern countries argued that "poverty is the greatest polluter." In echoes of the concurrent debates over the international economic system, they argued that the economic order did not grant them economic independence to complement the political independence won through hard-fought anti-colonial struggles. Despite these tensions, the Stockholm Conference not only placed an important set of issues at the intersection of environment, development, and justice on the international agenda, but also established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to carry the environmental agenda forward.

In addition, the Conference was notable for the high level of non-governmental participation and interest. A total of 255 NGOs were accredited to the Conference.[20] Many of these had no prior connection to the UN and used their access to provide immediate and often critical commentary on the process to the outside world, establishing a tradition that has been carried on by environmental organisations at international meetings ever since.[21] Yet, during this period, most NGO participants were from the North; Southern NGOs accounted for only 10 percent of the NGOs present.[22]

Eminent figures dominate global governance through the 20th century.

The tension between environment and development continued to occupy a prominent place on the global agenda, fuelled by the Stockholm Conference and promoted by the newly created UNEP. In 1974, UNEP and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) jointly sponsored a symposium in Cocoyoc, Mexico on the "Pattern of Resource Use, Environment, and Development." The symposium's Declaration highlighted the need for greater self-reliance by poor countries and called for changes in the international order to enable this. The Declaration further stated that "Human beings have basic needs… Any process of growth that does not lead to their fulfilment—or even worse, disrupts them—is a travesty of the idea of development."[23] As with Stockholm, the environment and development debate was suffused with North-South concerns over economic justice.

Not all the international fora organised at this time were characterised by the same degree of openness as Stockholm. At the same time as United Nations organisations were initiating several processes, other more closed and elite-led efforts at global coordination were also evident. A brief detour through the formation of the Trilateral Commission indicates the tenor of parallel efforts at shaping global trends. The Trilateral Commission was the brainchild of David Rockefeller, who had in mind "a private organisation, whose primary objective…would be to bring the best brains in the world to bear on the problems of the future." This group of leading private citizens from Europe, the

United States, and Japan came together in 1973 to deliberate on leading issues of the day, including international trade and investment, environmental problems, crime and drugs, population control, and assistance to developing countries.[24] The influence of the Commission was based on its ability to assemble the "highest level unofficial group possible."[25] In this it was successful, with successive Commissions (which continue to be convened on a triennial basis) consisting of senior government officials and corporate leaders, all acting in their personal capacities. The model for change implicit in the Trilateral Commission is that it provides a vehicle to directly shape the opinions, and hence the actions, of those with political power.[26]

The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment marked the international coming of age of environmental concerns but was suffused with North-South conflicts.

By contrast, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, established in 1977 and headed by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, was firmly rooted in the formal system of international governance embodied in the United Nations. At the same time, it conformed to past practice in its dependence on participation of eminent persons for both legitimacy and content. Although the Commission was established on the recommendation of World Bank President Robert McNamara, the Secretary-General of the UN expressed support for the work of the Commission. In terms of its scope, the Brandt Commission was the direct descendant of the Pearson Commission and the NIEO discussed at the UN in 1974. The Commission's mandate was "to study the grave global issues arising from the economic and social disparities of the world community" and "to suggest ways of promoting adequate solutions to the problems involved in development and in attacking absolute poverty."[27]

The Commission's 19 members were carefully balanced between North (9) and South (10) by the Chairperson, who was "anxious that the Third World members…not be in a minority position."[28] Its ranks were filled with dignitaries, including three former prime ministers, one former president, seven former ministers, and other ambassadors and senior members of national and international governmental bodies. In keeping with common practice for such commissions, each commissioner acted in his or her individual capacity. Aside from one Commissioner with media experience and a few with some background in the private sector, the Commission lacked representation from non-governmental actors. The work of the Brandt Commission was organised around a roster of eminent persons—statesmen or noted intellectuals—who were invited to testify or submit their views for consideration to the Commission. In addition, members travelled to capital cities to meet with presidents, prime ministers, and heads of regional and international organisations.

The Commission published two reports, *North–South: A Program for Survival* and *Common Crisis,* in which it made comprehensive proposals. The Commission's recommendations are startling in their scope. They include: a World Development Fund to which communist nations would have access; a tax on trade, minerals from the sea, and weapons sales, with proceeds going to poorer countries; an agreement on the production, pricing, supply, and conservation of oil; and a transfer of resources to the South by increasing development aid to 1 percent of GNP of donor countries by 2000 and by expanding the capital flowing through the World Bank and the IMF.[29] Despite the breadth and comprehensiveness of its exercise, most governments remained indifferent to the Commission's recommendations. Nonetheless, the Commission marked a change in the international community's response to global issues. It gave space to such ideas as human needs, self reliance, respect for local cultures, and the extension of participation and representation to communities. Ecological issues were only minimally acknowledged.

Perhaps the most significant legacy of the Brandt Commission is that its composition was based on one criterion of representation—equal representation of industrialised and less industrialised governments in global policymaking processes. By some reports, this resulted in a stormy internal North-South dialogue, which was resolved only when a spokesperson from each side assumed responsibility for negotiating a final report.[30]

By the 1980s, several UN agencies collaborated to bring governments on board and open policy processes to civil society and community organisations. In 1980, UNEP launched the World Conservation Strategy jointly with IUCN, the World Wildlife Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and UNESCO and developed a Global Framework for Environmental Education and a Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). The preparation and publication of the World Conservation Strategy popularised the term "sustainable use."[31]

The Rio Summit was inclusive compared to past UN events.

After a two-year Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament led by Olaf Palme between 1980 and 1982,[32] the focus shifted squarely back to environmental concerns. In 1983, the UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) with former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland as the Chairperson. The 23 Commissioners were drawn from senior levels of national government, international organisations, and academia. This time, there was no representation from the private sector or civil society. This absence was striking, since the mandate of the WCED included raising the level of understanding and commitment to action of various sectors of society, including business and voluntary organisations.[33]

However, the WCED distinguished itself from prior commissions with a commitment to an "open, visible, and participatory" process. It put this commitment into practice through a series of public hearings in eight countries involving consultations with hundreds of representatives from governments, scientific research institutes, companies, and NGOs, as well as with the general public.[34] The body of documents studied by the Commission—more than 10,000 pages—was brought together in a Collection of the Archives of Sustainable Development. Copies of this collection were placed in six academic centres throughout the world.[35]

The WCED's report, *Our Common Future*, legitimised the concept of sustainable development as "a form of development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs," and tried to make the links between environment, development, and poverty.[36] The Commission forcefully acknowledged that the interface of environment and development needed the engagement of a wide cross-section of actors—individuals, NGOs, governments, and international organisations. However, the Commission was also criticised for failing to probe the processes that generated poverty in the first place, and for neglecting the fundamental relationship between social equity and sustainable development.[37]

Although the WCED perpetuated the model of global governance from above, dominated by eminent persons, it did acknowledge and put into practice a substantial consultative role for the broader community of stakeholders. In addition to having bequeathed the concept of sustainable development, the WCED's procedural legacy is its comprehensive system of public hearings.

The North-South tensions so apparent in the Brandt Commission and echoed in the Brundtland Commission continued to fester. These tensions included growing disparities among and within nations, the predominance of unequal models of development, and the increasing fragility of natural resources. In 1986, the Non-Aligned Movement announced the formation of a South Commission, which was established in 1987 under the chairpersonship of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. This Commission, consisting exclusively of industrialising countries, started with the belief that eloquent agreements on the common heritage of humankind were not going to change a situation primarily caused by the powerful nations and vested interests. The Commission sought to make a "case for self-reliant, people-centred development strategies."[38]

The South Commission followed the established practice of selecting "distinguished individuals" as Commissioners.[39] However, among these were a sprinkling of individuals from churches, academia, and NGOs. The South Commission also followed the established route for its work programme, creating working groups on topics such as debt, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and North-South relations; forming groups of outside experts to complement its studies; and holding meetings with officials and intellectuals in various

regions. In its report, *The Challenge to the South*, released in 1990, the Commission established a vision for development as a "process that enables human beings to realise their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment." To achieve this vision, the South Commission called for concerted national efforts to harness the potential of citizens, and for greater political and economic co-operation in the form of enlarged South-South co-operation.[40] In addition, the Commission noted that international arrangements for trade, finance, and technology could handicap the South and argued for a cogent Southern stance in North-South deliberations to reform these arrangements. The South Commission stood out from past commissions largely because it was an initiative of, and by, Southern nations. In its structure and functioning, apart from a somewhat greater representation of civil society, it followed the model of commissions before it.

It took a second major conference on environment and development to establish a significantly expanded space for non-state actors in global governance. In its final chapter, the Brundtland report called for an international conference to review progress in sustainable development and create a follow-up structure. Based on a formal resolution by the UN General Assembly, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or Earth Summit, was held in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The Rio Summit was, compared to past UN events, the most inclusive ever. It created new legitimacy and political space for NGOs and peoples' representatives. More than 1,400 NGOs registered for the summit, with more than a third from the South, making it the largest ever face-to-face gathering of Northern and Southern NGOs.[41] The UN created an unprecedented accreditation process that gave NGOs significant access to the formal events.[42] Moreover, several governments had NGO representatives as part of their delegations, although some were sceptical of the "representativeness" of the individuals present.[43] The parallel Global Forum attracted 9,000 groups. Many participated in the International NGO Forum, which drafted 39 "Alternative Treaties" as exercises in direct citizens' diplomacy. The goal was to produce agreements on actions that citizens' groups themselves would undertake.[44] Those who could not physically participate contributed through Econet, a new electronic medium.[45] Arguably even more significant than participation by civil society and the private sector in the meeting was the role these non-governmental actors played in the two-year preparatory process and in shaping the agenda leading up to the Earth Summit.[46]

NGOs enjoyed only limited access to the formal deliberations. Moreover, because the main channel for influence was through participation in national delegations, relatively mainstream organisations that were more likely to be invited on to delegations were at a comparative advantage. More explicitly, political NGOs found fewer opportunities for expression in the technocratic nature of the proceedings, as did "consciousness-raising" NGOs who sought social change through education and empowerment.[47] NGOs mirrored North-South tensions that ran through official government positions.

At the Earth Summit, more than 100 heads of state met to address urgent problems of environmental protection and socio-economic development. The assembled leaders signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, endorsed the Rio Declaration and the Forest Principles, and adopted Agenda 21, a 300-page plan for achieving sustainable development in the 21st century. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was created after UNCED to monitor and report on implementation of these agreements.[48] In addition to these significant outcomes, the Earth Summit marked an important milestone in the inclusion of civil society voices in multilateral processes.

In 1992, there was an explicit attempt to pull together the strands of the various commissions of the previous 20 years in the form of the Commission on Global Governance. Initiated by Willy Brandt, the origins of this Commission were in a meeting attended by former commissioners from the Brandt, Brundtland, Palme, and South Commissions. The decision to set up a Commission on Global Governance, co-chaired by Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister of Sweden, and Sridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, was endorsed by the UN Secretary-General. As with all its predecessors, the Commission was composed of eminent individuals, with only 1 individual among the 26 whose background was not dominated by government service.[49] The

scope of the Commission broadly embraced that of all the commissions before it and included security, democracy and the role of civil society, coordination in economic policy, poverty alleviation, and environment. The goal was to "develop a common vision of the way forward for the world in making the transition from the Cold War and in managing humanity's journey into the twenty-first century."[50]

In addition to organising working groups and requesting research institutes to organise seminars, the Commission held four briefing meetings for NGOs in Geneva. In addition, it set aside time for meetings with NGOs as part of Commission meetings held in New York, Mexico City, Tokyo, and Delhi. These minimal efforts did not signal a significant attempt at inclusion; the Commission on Global Governance remained a closed group of world leaders.

In its 1995 report, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, the Commissioners wrote that they were convinced that the world is ready to accept "a set of core values that can unite people of all cultural, political, religious, or philosophical backgrounds. It is fundamentally important that governance should be underpinned by democracy at all levels and ultimately by the rule of enforceable law". UN agencies, such as UNCTAD and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), as well as civil society, criticised the report as being Northern in orientation and weak in its analysis of the social, economic, and ecological costs of the present process of economic development.

From 1995-2000, three sector-specific commissions—on forests, oceans, and water—were established and ran their course, in some cases explicitly following in the footsteps of past commissions. Of these, the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development located itself most directly in the tradition of past debates over environmental concerns. The Commission, established in 1993 out of debates at the Earth Summit,[51] focussed on the political rather than technical issues from those discussions. In addition, it held a series of five regional hearings modelled after the Brundtland Commission. Its 24 members were largely eminent persons. At the conclusion of its work in 1998, the Commission left a legacy of a four-part Forest Trust, composed of a Forest Watch, a Management Council, an Ombudsman, and a Forest Award.[52]

The Independent World Commission on Oceans, established in 1995 by Mario Soares, former President of Portugal, released its report in 1998, timed to coincide with the UN-declared International Year of the Ocean. The Commission's origins were firmly rooted in the UN system. The dauntingly large 43-member Commission included the familiar range of ministers, parliamentarians, and ambassadors, with a sprinkling of academics and technical specialists, and relied largely for its findings on study groups led by experts.[53]

The environment arena has increasingly been influenced by debates over development and justice.

The World Commission on Water (described in further detail in Chapter 6) was established in 1998 by the World Water Council, and ran concurrently with the WCD. Its 28 members included some NGOs and research organisations, in addition to professional associations, government representatives, and international organisations.[54] In this sense, the Commission's composition was arguably less centred on international eminence than past processes and more guided by practitioners, albeit with a heavy representation of international aid and water bureaucracies. The Commission was tied to a concurrent World Water Vision process aimed at developing a vision for addressing global water scarcity. The vision was developed through a multi-stakeholder consultative process organised around regions and sectors. NGOs critical of the process charged that this process tended toward expert participation with little inclusion of civil society, and that aid agencies controlled the effort.[55]

What emerges from this review of focal points of global governance during the last third of the century? First, the structure of commissions left little space for engagement with non-governmental actors. The space that did exist was far larger and more genuinely consultative in discussions around environment and development issues than around economic justice. By the late 1990s, the structure of regional hearings, first established by the Brundtland Commission, had become accepted practice, as illustrated by the commissions on forests and water. Second, although debates over

international economic justice have remained unconcerned with environmental questions, the environment arena has increasingly been influenced by debates over development and economic justice. Third, the global fora described above—with the exception of the Trilateral Commission—were designed to affect the actions of world institutions and structures.

Yet, the impact of most global commissions has been slight. The Brandt and South Commissions came out with concrete recommendations that were not implemented. The Brundtland Commission succeeded in popularising the term "sustainable development" and raising popular awareness of issues at the environment and development interface, but resulted in few concrete changes. The Stockholm and Rio Conferences were more successful. The first resulted in a new and important UN agency, and the second served as a catalyst for a series of important global environmental negotiations, whose future is still not assured. The three recently concluded sectoral commissions, on forests, oceans, and water, have yet to demonstrate any lasting effects.

Finally, distinguished individuals have dominated global commissions, with eminence being almost synonymous with high-level experience in government and intergovernmental bodies. Indeed, the same individuals have served on many of these commissions, as a few examples illustrate. Willy Brandt chaired his own commission and established the Commission on Global Governance. Maurice Strong was Secretary-General of the Stockholm and Rio Conferences, first Secretary-General of the UN Environment Programme, and served on the Brundtland Commission and the Commission on Global Governance. Sridath Ramphal was Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, a member of the Brandt, Palme, Brundtland, and South Commissions, and co-chaired the Commission on Global Governance. The focus on eminent individuals from government and the predominance of the same individuals across commissions calls into question whether "freshness and innovation in global governance," one of the aims of the Commission on Global Governance, can be achieved with the model described here.

The Growth of Transboundary Alliances

Even as these global commissions were being established, attempts to resolve contentious issues were increasingly shifting from state-centred efforts to those involving non-governmental actors, with civil society organisations as well as corporate and other market actors helping to create private or semi-public regulation. "Multilateralism," understood as relations among states, was increasingly being re-constituted to become "multi-stakeholder."[56] Although earlier efforts were among representatives of governments, a shift was taking place in the plurality of actors engaged in the process of influencing both the global and the national policy process. In this section, we describe how non-governmental actors have gained growing representation in international meetings and institutions and have even become instrumental in establishing international regimes that provide regulation or norm setting where governments were either unwilling or absent.[57]

Civil society organisations became adept at influencing official agendas.

Over the past decade and a half, the range, diversity, and awareness of issues that transcend national borders and disciplinary boundaries have expanded: the polarisation of wealth and the increasing disparities within and between nations; social inequities; the adverse impacts of the present trading regimes; debt; and the politics of natural resource use and defence spending. Not surprisingly, this complexity has led to more transboundary networks, national and local movements, and international organisations. These networks have pushed the boundaries of the conventional agendas of international intervention from those minimal processes of consultation to transnational networks playing a role in agenda setting, influencing official discourse and specific policies, and changing the behaviour of governments.[58] In the process, transnational alliances have played a growing role in redefining who should sit at the table and what the agenda should be.

Of considerable relevance to the WCD is the history of civil society organising to increase multilateral development banks' (MDBs) accountability to civil society in both borrower and donor countries.[59] From the early 1980s, this "MDB

Campaign" has deployed a range of tools, including media education, protests in donor and borrower countries, lobbying key officials (senior politicians, administrators, and World Bank Executive Directors), and hearings in European parliaments and the U.S. Congress. Instrumental to the successes achieved by the campaign have been the links between NGOs in donor and borrower countries. Northern NGOs used their leverage and advocacy with donor governments to push for reform at the MDBs. Advocacy for this reform was based on local project information from Southern NGOs and the political legitimacy their participation provided.[60] The resultant reforms were intended to encourage borrower governments to respond to social and environmental concerns and create political space for Southern NGOs to engage their own governments.[61]

The independent review of the Sardar Sarovar Dam was central to civil society's campaign against multilateral development banks.

A central moment in this campaign was the World Bank's establishment of an independent review of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project on the Narmada River in India.[62] Faced with extreme pressure from the anti-dam movement in India and their partners in Washington, considerable scrutiny from the media and the U.S. Congress, and fading international credibility, the World Bank appointed Bradford Morse, who had recently stepped down as head of the UN Development Programme, to assess the project with particular attention to resettlement and amelioration of environmental aspects.[63] The Morse Commission legitimised central elements of the NGO coalition's critique of the project, which lent the campaign greater momentum and credibility. The Morse Commission was a precursor of the World Commission on Dams, in terms of its origins in the struggle by citizens' groups and the fact that it was appointed by the World Bank to provide an independent view on a dams-related conflict.

Over the 1980s and 1990s, the MDB Campaign left a considerable imprint on the structure and functioning of the World Bank.[64] The institution adopted policies on involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and environmental assessments. In addition, the World Bank established a new information disclosure policy and instituted an Inspection Panel as an appeals mechanism against World Bank projects in direct response to campaign efforts. Few would argue that practice on the ground has measured up to the promise or that the underlying mission and mandate of MDBs have been transformed. Yet few would also dispute that the campaign has led to better mechanisms of accountability over MDBs.

In addition to propelling reform at existing institutions, civil society organisations have become increasingly adept at participating in and shaping the formation of new international regimes. In the environmental arena, the 1987 negotiation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer marked the beginning of NGO influence.[65] A dozen or more industry groups represented the private sector. Although obstructionist at first, a shift toward co-operation by some companies was critical to success. Only two or three NGO groups followed these highly technical and somewhat esoteric, if critical, negotiations. However, these NGOs played important roles in educating the public, building consumer pressure through threat of boycotts, and lobbying governments during negotiations. By the conclusion of the process, according to the chief U.S. negotiators, proposals were not only discussed among country negotiators, but also with industry and environmental groups.[66]

It was in the subsequent, and more visible, negotiations on a global climate treaty in the run-up to the Earth Summit that NGOs moved from "out of the hallways" to "around the table."[67] NGOs served on delegations, were sometimes allowed into meeting rooms, and played a major role in defining the negotiating strategy of the delegations from some small island nations under threat from climate change. It was NGOs who put the issue on the international agenda, began the process of forging a scientific consensus on the need to address the problem, proposed a structure for the treaty, and mobilised public pressure for action.[68] In the build-up to the Earth Summit, NGOs from North and South were organised under the umbrella of the Climate Action Network. The Network's immediate goal—a treaty to be signed at Rio in 1992—tended to overshadow and pre-empt

discussion of the broader socio-economic context of the climate issue, to the frustration of some Southern NGOs.[69] There was much debate within the Network on the relative merits of a focussed, if narrow, strategy versus one that addressed the larger political issues that shaped the climate debate. Indeed, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) have suggested, this transnational advocacy network, which involved people in structurally unequal positions, became a site "for negotiation over which goals, strategies and ethical understandings are compatible."[70] Thus, the Network not only formed the basis for sharing information and co-ordinating strategy, but also provided a framework for negotiating disputes across North-South lines in a foreshadowing of similar debates within governments. In sum, the climate negotiations comprehensively demonstrated the deep engagement and influence of NGOs in setting agendas and shaping processes that establish global regimes.

As with the ozone negotiations, the private sector was also active in the climate negotiations and at the national level through an umbrella Global Climate Coalition. Industry groups actively sought to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change, influence public opinion on both the science and economic costs of mitigation policies, and engage with delegations of countries sympathetic to their views.[71]

Increasingly, the private sector has also organised itself into broader, less issue-specific networks based on dialogue, rather than advocacy. One such example, the Business Council for Sustainable Development (later to become the World Business Council on Sustainable Development—WBCSD), formed in preparation for the Earth Summit.[72] The WBCSD is a coalition of 50 international companies united by a shared commitment to sustainable development.[73] The organisation pursues this goal via the three pillars of economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity. Members are drawn from more than 30 countries and 20 major industrial sectors.[74] The WBCSD represents an evolution from the more partisan and narrowly-focussed issue networks that characterised the ozone and climate negotiations.

Another significant recent mobilisation, around the issues of trade and investment, comes from the same source as the NIEO and the Brandt and South Commissions—a concern with economic justice. However, although governments drove the economic justice commissions of the 1970s and 1980s, the more recent expressions of concern with North-South issues have been raised by social movements. Economic justice campaigns differ from advocacy around global environmental treaties, which have been dominated by technocratic NGOs. The breadth of organising around issues of trade and economic justice has been considerable. Negotiations around the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stimulated civil society networks in the United States and Mexico on a large scale. The efforts at political organising, the corresponding political clout generated, and the associated research on labour and environmental effects of a free trade agreement contributed to the preparation of side-agreements to NAFTA on environment and labour.[75]

The private sector has increasingly organised into broad networks based on dialogue rather than advocacy.

Through rapid mobilisation and advances in telecommunications, civil society groups were able to halt in 1998 the "Multilateral Agreement on Investment" (MAI), which was being negotiated behind closed doors at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[76] A broad and deep movement was mobilised around the proposed increase in the rights of corporations, and an absence of countervailing obligations. In addition, civil society objected vehemently to the lack of scope for input by public interest groups and the lack of information about the process available to the public. The MAI campaign not only demonstrated the capability of civil society to mobilise rapidly, but also that processes of global governance without public input and participation had little legitimacy and even less chance of success.

In short, although the phenomenal growth of communications and movement across national boundaries has undoubtedly stimulated transnational finance and trade resulting in the marginalisation of entire countries, cultures, and communities,[77] the communications revolution has also created new possibilities for regional and

global networking—a parallel globalisation of mobilisation, aimed at expanding the participation of hitherto excluded voices in the centre of political decision-making. New transnational communities are evolving a globalisation from below. In many cases, we are witnessing the emergence of global advocacy networks and what some have even called "transnational social movements."[78]

The rise in transnational networks brings with it a host of questions about the future of international politics and the role of civil society.[79] Some see this vast outpouring of institutional and political innovation represented by transboundary alliances as messy, chaotic, and fragmented. Those sympathetic to the overall objectives argue for greater central co-ordination, more coherent, if interrelated, strategies and a clearer set of institutions guiding transboundary civil society processes. In response, an important body of analysis examines the internal dynamics of transboundary networks, with particular emphasis on the significant differences between Northern and Southern participants. Indeed, the representativeness and accountability of NGOs themselves is a concern. More sceptical voices offer the possibility that civil society mobilisation will lead to excessive international pluralism, creating a logjam of interests and rendering political systems unworkable.[80] While these are valid concerns, the examples discussed here suggest that networks of civil society organisations have, at a minimum, acted as "tugboats in international channels."[81] They are increasingly capable of influencing, or even setting, agendas. Civil society actors are not simply bringing critical concerns from the grassroots to the table, but are actively participating in the process of governing.

The Rise of Multi-Stakeholder Processes and the Challenge of Compliance

The emergent forms of conflict and dialogue described above among governments and international organisations, social movements, NGOs, and the private sector is beginning to redefine the form and content of global governance. At the international level, the consent of other governments is no longer enough for governments to secure legitimacy and act unhindered. In the era of economic globalisation, governments have become weaker in controlling capital flows and corporate investment, with a consequent loss of sovereignty over decisions and processes from outside their boundaries that impact the lives of the citizenry within.[82] Meanwhile, governments are proving inadequate in ensuring governance that facilitates and respects the deepening of democracy and justice.[83] In fact, governments can be causes of continuing social, cultural, and ecological costs, leading to disillusionment with their performance and role.[84] How can diverse actors creatively explore the complex process of governance without government? And what kinds of organisations or organisational arrangements are necessary to manage and administer diverse social, economic, and ecological systems? Can transboundary networks, then, creatively occupy this vacuum and participate in the definition of new norms of global governance?[85]

States have become weaker in controlling capital flows and corporate investment,with a consequent loss of sovereignty.

For their part, the private sector has long been perceived as an influential and even essential voice in policy formulation, perhaps because of state dependence on private sector profitability for jobs and taxes, and, therefore, for domestic and international stability.[86] As the examples above suggest, civil society voices are also increasingly indispensable to legitimate process and are well placed to fill the space occupied by retreating governments. And yet, there are few models of global governance that provide channels for direct participation of all these groups.[87]

In this transformed global context of multiple players, there has been increasing attention to and interest in structuring international governance processes around the participation of multiple actors—multi-stakeholder processes. Much of the prior experience with MSPs has been at the national level. For example, in Canada MSPs have been organised at the river basin level and on the intersections between the environment and the economy at the provincial and national levels.[88]

A recent effort at deriving a systematic framework for MSPs focussed at the global level suggests that they have the potential to promote better decision-making and to increase the chances of implemen-

tation.[89] In this view, MSPs convene actors with a breadth of perspectives, many of whom are often left out of state-centred decision-making process. Moreover, MSPs help integrate these diverse subjective viewpoints, resulting in better decisions. Finally, since inclusion in decision-making processes helps build constituencies for implementation, decisions are more likely to be carried out. Thus, MSPs, when well designed and implemented, provide for inclusion of previously excluded views, enrich decision-making, and increase the probability of implementation.

Multi-stakeholder processes help integrate diverse viewpoints.

It is important to recognise that the term "MSP" allows for considerable heterogeneity. Thus, these processes may vary in the objectives they promote, which include informing decision-making, providing an opportunity for dialogue, and monitoring implementation. MSPs can also range widely in their definition and categorisation of stakeholders. Although some processes use a simple trilateral formulation of civil society, private sector, and government, others have more fine-grained categories, such as the nine categories developed for Agenda 21 of the 1992 Earth Summit. Moreover, the scope and timeline of MSPs must be tailored to the issue at hand.

Although there is growing enthusiasm for such processes, the underlying assumptions about what and how they contribute to policymaking also differ widely. In a study of global public policy networks, a concept not dissimilar to MSPs, Reinicke and his colleagues suggest that these processes can bridge both a "participatory gap" that precludes effective participation in decision-making and an "operational gap" in information, knowledge, and tools in a world of economic and political liberalisation.[90]

Even if these gaps are bridged, however, a critical determinant of MSPs' effectiveness is how the outcomes of such dialogues link to decision-making. MSPs often lack formal authority or linkage to decision-making and, other than seeking to build stakeholder buy-in to a process, have few tools with which to implement their results. By contrast, governments still retain various mechanisms for policy enforcement and there are very few transnational social movements that significantly influence state behaviour or corporate or financial capital. Indeed, the lack of ability to ensure compliance is one reason why some civil society groups mistrust MSPs.

Despite the lack of formal mechanisms of compliance, non-governmental actors can play a useful role in forging good governance through the promotion of norms. Indeed, there is a long history of effective social change brought about as norms emerge, gain mainstream currency, and cascade through society, in part as nations and societies re-fashion political identities around these norms. Over time, norms may be internalised in political and institutional systems through laws and bureaucratic regulations.[91] This process is well illustrated by the progressive adoption of women's suffrage and, more recently, the anti-personnel land mine ban. In the case of the latter, a working partnership between the Canadian government and a coalition of over 350 humanitarian and arms-control NGOs from 23 countries acted as "norm entrepreneurs."[92] Over time, social pressures of identity have brought about an emulation or a cascade effect.[93] Norm creation and promotion offers a complementary approach to traditional forms of compliance through legal sanction.

The WCD in Historical Context

The concerns, emergence, structure, and functioning of the WCD draws from diverse strands in the history of global governance—global commissions, growing civil society influence, and the growing acceptance of multi-stakeholder processes. In terms of the concerns that motivated it, the WCD is located at the intersection of the debates over environment and development, on the one hand, and economic justice on the other, that motivated the series of UN-sponsored commissions of the 1970s and 1980s. Built as engineering marvels to provide water and electricity and to control floods, dams have come under increasing criticism for their destruction of the environment and communities and for their contribution to unfair development. These competing images of boon and blight place the debate at the locus of concerns of past commissions. The WCD was designed to illuminate the intersection of environment, development, and justice by shining a spotlight on the very process of planning, design, and implementation

of large projects, to ask whether and how economic, social, cultural, and economic costs were the likely result of the existing framework.

That the WCD came into existence is due to a long history of struggle in many countries and by many community groups and NGOs.[94] The mobilisation around large dams suggests that local actors are thinking and acting at both local and global levels. While working for change in their own contexts, these actors have built political pressure for a process of change at the global level. The WCD is, then, firmly rooted in the growing strength of transnational networking and, in particular, in the campaign to reform the MDBs.

With regard to structure and functioning, the WCD marked a departure from past commissions based on eminent persons and exclusive processes. As Chapters 3 and 4 will make clear, the WCD was based on representation of stakeholders rather than on eminence, usually defined as a distinguished career in government. Moreover, this shift in emphasis toward representation was due to the forceful role that civil society organisations played in the formation of the WCD. In the move toward bringing diverse actors to the table, the WCD was emblematic of the growing interest in MSPs, with the potential for dialogue, development of constituencies for implementation, and norm creation that these new vehicles promise. In its operation, the WCD was firmly in the tradition of past commissions and processes in seeking to forge an independent path. Moreover, in its attempts at establishing an inclusive process, it took its cue from the Brundtland Commission's efforts to solicit a broad range of views, as Chapters 5 and 6 describe. However, it went further than past processes in its explicit commitment to transparency as a means of supporting its claims to legitimacy.

In bringing all these elements together and in applying them to a focussed issue area that had been the subject of contention, the WCD had no direct comparators. Although rooted in historical context, it was an experiment that sought to take significant steps beyond the collective past of global governance. The remaining chapters tell the story of how far the experiment succeeded in meeting the expectations it generated.

Endnotes

1. The literature on the current phase of economic globalisation is vast. The following books provide a useful introduction to its depth and complexity and are relevant for the discussions here: Ulrich Beck, *What is Globalisation?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); J. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome. Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); *Globalisation and the Welfare State* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999); and Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
2. This architecture was pre-dated by the formation of the League of Nations after World War I. The League of Nations set the stage for global governance on which the post World War II institutions were built.
3. The United Nations and associated organisations were conceptualised and given a firm identity during conversations at Bretton Woods in July 1944 and Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944.
4. Andrew E. Rice and Cyril Ritchie. 1995. "Relationships between International Non-governmental Organizations and the United Nations." Originally published in *Transnational Associations* 47(5): 254-265. Online at: www.uia.org/uiadocs/unngos.htm (28 September, 2001).
5. United Nations. 21 December 1984. Document ST/SGB/209, Secretary-General's Bulletin. Online at: www.un.org/partners/civil_society/document/sgb_209.htm (28 September 2001).
6. Global Policy Forum. "NGO Review – November 1996. An Analysis by NGLS – the UN's Non-Governmental Liaison Service." Online at: www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/nglsnv96.htm (28 September 2001).
7. E-mail communication with IUCN staff, October 2001.
8. Global Policy Forum. 1998. "The Coffers are Not Empty: Financing for Sustainable Development and the Role of the United Nations." Online at: www.igc.org/globalpolicy/socecon/global/paul.htm (28 September 2001).
9. Samir Amin, ed. *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure* (United Nations University Press, 1990). Online at: www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu32me/uu32me06.htm (28 September 2001).
10. Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
11. Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000).
12. Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes, *The Green Challenge: The Development of Green Parties in Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995).
13. The Club of Rome is a global think tank and research centre. It brings together scientists, economists, businesspersons, international civil servants, and present and former heads of state from across the world who are convinced that a humane future can be shaped by bold collective research and action. Club of Rome website, www.clubofrome.org/ (28 September 2001).
14. Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).
15. The Ecologist. 1972. "Blueprint for Survival," *The Ecologist* 2(1): 1-43.
16. Ramchandra Guha and Juan Martinez-Alier, *Varieties of Environmentalism. Essays North and South* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
17. Guha, 2000.
18. "Official Aid—A Brief History," *New Internationalist* (November 1996). Online at: www.oneworld.org/ni/issue285/history.html (28 September 2001).
19. Ken Conca. September 1995. "Greening the United Nations: Environmental Organizations and the UN System," *Third World Quarterly* 16(3): 441-57.
20. Tanja Brühl and Udo E. Simonis. 2001. "World Ecology and Global Environmental Governance," Berlin: WZB paper (FS II 01-402). Online at: http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2001/ii01-402.pdf (28 September 2001).
21. Rice and Ritchie, 1995.
22. Conca, 1995.
23. United Nations Environment Programme, *In Defence of the Earth: The Basic Texts on Environment: Founex • Stockholm • Coycoyoc*, Executive Series 1 (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 1981).
24. David Rockefeller, credited with the idea of the Trilateral Commission, quoting from his own remarks in March 1972 during a speech on the occasion of the Trilateral Commission U.S. Group's 25th anniversary, 1 December 1998. Online at: www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/98/1201rockflr.htm (28 September 2001).
25. Trilateral Commission website, www.trilateral.org/about.htm (28 September 2001).
26. In recent times, the Commission's composition has broadened geographically to embrace the Asia-Pacific region, Mexico, and various European countries with the expansion of the EU. Its composition has also broadened to include media, academia, labour unions, and NGOs. Trilateral Commission website, www.trilateral.org/about.htm (28 September 2001).
27. Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North-South: A Program for Survival. The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).
28. Independent Commission on International Development, *North-South: A Program for Survival. The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).
29. Leonard Downie Jr., "New Ideas on Global Co-operation Unveiled," *The Washington Post* (19 December 1979); and "The Brandt Commission's Proposals for Survival," *The Economist* (22 December 1977).
30. Downie Jr., 1979.
31. Sustainable use is defined as "…the integration of conservation and development to ensure that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and well-being of all people." IUCN/UNEP/WWF/FAO/UNESCO, *World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource*

Conservation for Sustainable Development (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1980).

32. In between the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions, the Palme Commission, or the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, was established under UN auspices to chart a course toward disarmament. The Palme Commission completed its work between 1980 and 1982, and, as with past commissions before it, was composed of statesmen and women chosen for their "broad political experience." While the Commission did rely heavily on submissions by experts, it did also attempt to maintain contact with NGOs, and dedicated one secretariat staff member to this task (Rockefeller Brothers Fund website, www.rbf.org/pws/palme1.html, 25 June 2001). Since the Palme Commission focussed on security issues, and not on either economic or environmental themes, the focus of this review, we do not address it further here.
33. World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
34. World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987.
35. Pascale D. Morand Francis, *Geneva at the International Crossroads of Environment and Development* (Geneva: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). Online at: http://geneva-international.org/GVA3/WelcomeKit/Environnement/chap_5.E.html (28 September 2001).
36. D. Reid, *Sustainable Development: An Introductory Guide* (London: Earthscan, 1995). For a history, see Richard Sandbrook, "From Stockholm to Rio - Earth Summit 1992," *The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. J. Quarrie, ed. (London: Regency Press, 1992). For a historical critique of the term "sustainable development" and the Rio Summit, see Wolfgang Sachs, *Planet Dialectics* (London: Zed Books, 1999).
37. J. Gardner and M. Roseland. 1989. "Thinking Globally: The Role of Social Equity in Sustainable Development," *Alternatives* 16(3): 26-34.
38. South Centre website, www.southcentre.org (28 September 2001).
39. South Commission, *The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
40. South Commission, 1990.
41. Brühl and Simonis, 2001.
42. Peter Haas, Marc Levy and Edward Parson. October 1992. "Appraising the Earth Summit: How Should we Judge UNCED's Success?" *Environment*, 34(8): 6-11, 26-33.
43. Mark Valentine, "Twelve Days of UNCED," U.S. Citizens Network, Tides Foundation, July 2, 1992.
44. Lamont C. Hempel, *Environmental Governance: The Global Challenge* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996).
45. However, inequitable access to the electronic world remained an outstanding issue. Many groups and movements who were not linked into these networks sought to moderate claims that communication technology is "emboldening people in ways that have profound implications for the process of democratisation." See Sheldon Annis, "Giving Voice to the Poor," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 84 (Fall 1991): 93-106.
46. For a critical and exhaustive review of the Earth Summit, see Pratap Chatterjee and Matthais Finger, *The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World Development* (New York: Routledge, 1994).
47. Matthias Finger, "Environmental NGOs in the UNCED Process," in *Environmental NGOs in World Politics*. Finger and Princen, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
48. UNCSD website, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csdgen.htm (28 September 2001).
49. Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Online at: www.cgg.ch/ (28 September 2001).
50. Commission on Global Governance, 1995.
51. Although established in 1993, the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development was formally launched in 1995.
52. WCFSD website, http://iisd1.iisd.ca/wcfsd (28 September 2001).
53. Independent World Commission on the Oceans, *The Ocean, Our Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
54. World Water Council, *World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody's Business* (London: Earthscan, 2000). Online at: www.worldwatervision.org/reports.htm (28 September 2001).
55. "Old Water in a New Bottle: World Water Vision is Chronically Short-sighted." Written by International Rivers Network (USA), International Committee on Dams, Rivers, and People, and Both Ends (Netherlands), and endorsed by 16 non-governmental groups from Brazil, England, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand, 17 March 2000.
56. Ruggie describes conventional multilateralism as "an institutional form that co-ordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct." J.G. Ruggie. 1992. "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution." *International Organization* 46(3): 561-598.
57. While non-state actors have gained growing relevance on the international scene, there is also a long history of significant past international interventions by NGOs. Charnovitz traces international activity by NGOs back to 1775. Since then, NGOs have played a significant role in the abolition of slavery, free trade, human rights, women's rights, and a host of other issues. Steve Charnovitz. Winter 1997. "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 18(2): 183-286. Also see UNRISD, *Civil Society, NGOs, and Social Development: Changing the Rules of the Game*, Occasional Paper No. 1, January 2000.
58. For a useful analytical framework along these lines to assess the impact of transnational networks, see M. Keck and K. Sikkink, *Activists across Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

59. This struggle has spawned a voluminous commentary. For a small but insightful selection, see Barbara Bramble and Gareth Porter, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of US International Environmental Policy," in *The International Politics of the Environment*. A. Hurrell and B. Kinsbury, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994); Jonathan Fox and L. David Brown, eds. *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements* (Boston: MIT Press, 1998); Robert Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-1995," in *The World Bank: Its First Half-Century.* Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1997); Paul J. Nelson, *The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Apolitical Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
60. As Fox and Brown, 1998, note, using the leverage of the Bank for reformist ends did arouse sovereignty concerns among Southern groups. Moreover, whether Southern groups were equal partners with a voice in strategic decisions, or whether their role was limited to project information and political cover was an open question during the early years of the campaign. See Navroz K. Dubash, "The Birth of an Environmental Movement: The Narmada Valley as Seed-Bed for Civil Society in India." A.B. Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, April 1990.
61. Fox and Brown, 1998, pp. 6-7.
62. For the World Bank's role in the Narmada dam projects, see William Fisher, ed. *Toward Sustainable Development? Struggling over India's Narmada River* (ME Sharpe, 1995).
63. Bradford Morse and Thomas Berger, *Sardar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent Review* (Ottawa: Resource Futures International, 1992). Also see Smitu Kothari, "The Narmada Movement, Transnational Alliances, and Democracy," in *Transnational Civil Society*. Kathryn Sikkink, Sanjeev Khagram, and James Riker, eds. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, forthcoming 2001).
64. Fox and Brown, 1998.
65. Discussion of the Montreal Protocol is drawn from Richard Benedick, *Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
66. Benedick, 1991, p. 204.
67. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997): 50-51.
68. In addition, during negotiations, NGOs lubricated dialogue by providing back channels for communication and produced a daily newspaper, ECO, which was used by negotiators as a credible information source and a way of testing ideas to break deadlocks. Mathews, 1997.
69. Navroz Dubash and Michael Oppenheimer, "Modifying the Mandates of Existing Institutions: NGOs," in *Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses*. Irving Mintzer, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
70. Keck and Sikkink, 1998.
71. David L. Levy and Daniel Egan. 1998. "Capital Contests: National and Transnational Channels of Corporate Influence on the Climate Change Negotiations," *Politics and Society* 26(3): 335-359.
72. As Errol Meidinger has usefully observed about environmental regulation, "Private organizations have recently established numerous programs aimed at improving the environmental performance of industry. Many of the new programs seek to define and enforce standards for environmental management, and to make it difficult for producers not to participate in them. They claim, explicitly and implicitly, to promote the public interest. They take on functions generally performed by government regulatory programs, and may change or even displace such programs. Private environmental regulatory programs thus have the potential to significantly reshape domestic and international policy institutions by changing the locus, dynamics, and substance of policy making." E.E. Meidinger. 2000. "'Private' Environmental Regulation, Human Rights and Community," *Buffalo Environmental Law Journal* 7(1).
73. The WBCSD was formed in January 1995 through a merger between the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) in Geneva and the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE), an initiative of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in Paris. Those two parent bodies had been active in evolving business's response to the challenges arising from the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
74. For full list of members and details of policy oriented activities, as well as a full profile, see World Business Council for Sustainable Development website, www.wbcsd.ch (28 September 2001).
75. Raul Hiojosa-Ojeda, "Institution Building within the NAFTA Context: An Evaluation of Policy Initiations from the Transnational Grassroots," Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, Working Paper 95, July 1999. Also see Mathews, 1997.
76. See UNCTAD, "Lessons from the MAI", *UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements* (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 1999); D. Henderson, *The MAI Affair: A Story and its Lessons* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1999); *Lokayan Bulletin*, Special Issue on the MAI, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1998.
77. Manuel Castells has called those who are marginalised by dominant processes of economic development (particularly in this age of globalisation) as "structurally irrelevant." Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996).
78. Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht, eds. *Transnational Social Movements* (London: Macmillan, 1999). Also see Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds. *Transnational Social Movements in Global Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
79. The discussion in this chapter is drawn from a range of recent articles on the role of civil society in global environmental politics: Keck and Sikkink, 1997; Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tujl. 2000. "Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy," *World Development* 28(12): 2051-2065; Michael Edwards, *Future Positive: International Co-operation in the 21st Century* (London: Earthscan, 2000); Michael Edwards, "NGO Rights and

Responsibilities." *New York Times* op ed piece, 2001. Online at: www.futurepositive.org/NYT.doc (28 September 2001); Robert O'Brien et al., *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

80. Mathews, 1997. Yet others go further to argue that many NGOs are politically naïve, as well as unaccountable and non-representative, and are manipulated by dominant powers into accepting marginal changes as progress. See, for example, Hugo Slim, "To the Rescue: Radicals or Poodles?" *The World Today,* vol. 53 (Aug/Sept 1997): 209-212.
81. Ann Marie Clark. Winter 1995. "Non-governmental Organisations and their Influence on International Society." *Journal of International Affairs* 48(2): 507-525.
82. P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
83. S. Strange, *The Retreat of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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87. An exception is the International Labour Organization, which gives voting rights to labour unions and the private sector, in addition to governments. See P.J. Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs", *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1998): 82-96.
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