


# Steering Community Driven Development? A Desk Study of NRM Choices



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2005

Report to the Natural Resource Management Thematic Group  
Agriculture and Rural Development Department

The World Bank

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**REPRESENTATION, EQUITY AND ENVIRONMENT**

**WORKING PAPER 38**

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The paper was completed and circulated at the World Bank in 2005, we are including it in this working paper series in 2008 due to wide demand for copies. We are keeping the original 2005 publication date on the cover.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND FOREIGN TERMS

### Acronyms

APL	Adaptable Program Lending
BDCDD	Bank Driven Community Driven Development
CAP	Community Action Program/Plan
CCC	Mali, Centre de Conseils Communale
CDD	Community Driven Development
CR	Communauté Rurale
CRDS	Mexico, Regional Sustainable Development Council
DFID	UK, Department for International Development
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ICARDA	Egypt, International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Agency
INDAP	Chile, Agricultural Development Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
GEF	Global Environment Facility
LDC	Chile, Local Development Committee
LKMD	Mexico, Village Council
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OPA	Mexico, Agricultural Producers Organization
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PGRN	Mali, Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles
PMO	Project Management Organization
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RSDF	Rumania, Rumanian Social Development Fund
SAGAR	Mexico, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development
SAP	Staff Appraisal Reports
TTL	Task Team Leader
UKDP	Indonesia, Council of Village Heads
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UTP	Chile, Project Technical Unit

### Foreign Terms

<i>Ailaa</i>	Egypt, sub-tribal sub-groups
<i>Barangay</i>	Philippines, lowest administrative unit
<i>Caisse unique</i>	Mali, define [single/general fund?]
<i>Collectivité</i>	Mali, local elected authorities
<i>Communa</i>	Romania, large villages that small villages depend on
<i>Commune</i>	Administrative unit; in Niger, comprising 100 villages
<i>Douar</i>	Morocco, pre-existing non-administrative social group
<i>latifundia</i>	Chile, large farming estates
<i>Mandoubeen</i>	Egypt, traditional community spokesperson
<i>Secano</i>	Chile, drylands
<i>Sous-préfet</i>	Niger, appointed member of central government
<i>Terroir</i>	Niger, village use area

# Steering Community Driven Development? A Desk Study of NRM Choices

## INTRODUCTION

The potential gains of CDD are undoubtedly large: the allocation of development funds in a manner that is more responsive to the needs of the poor; better targeting of poverty programs; more responsive government and better delivery of public goods and services; better maintained community assets, and more informed and involved citizenry, capable of undertaking self-initiated development activity.

Mansuri and Rao 2003:2.

Community Driven Development (CDD) is among the fastest-growing development assistance mechanisms of the World Bank (Mansuri and Rao 2003:2). Under CDD programs, the World Bank lent over \$5.6 billion during fiscal years 2000-2002, and this figure is expected to grow significantly (Kumar 2003:vii).<sup>1</sup> Estimates considered conservative by the CDD Anchor (Wassenich and Whiteside 2003:1) are that CDD investments will grow to \$2 billion per year in 2003.<sup>2</sup> While the term CDD is very recent, first appearing in Narayan and Ebbe (1997—cited in Mansuri and Rao 2003:4), CDD follows a long tradition of community-oriented and participatory approaches to development. CDD is described as representing a shift in World Bank approaches from an emphasis on consultation to a focus on empowerment (Kumar 2003:9-11). Given the importance of CDD in the rural development investment landscape, this review examines CDD practice to better understand its potential effects on local representation and participation in natural resource management. This report examines how communities are “driving” or participating in development decisions in CDD projects and what factors shape their subproject<sup>3</sup> choices. In particular, it explores how natural resource investments figure in community decisions and how the project approach structures or influences such decisions.

### Objective of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the state of practice in World Bank community driven-development (CDD) projects that address natural resource management (NRM) concerns. The study aims to answer two overarching questions:

- 1) Do CDD projects establish conditions for communities to drive decision making?
- 2) Why and when do communities choose natural resource management under CDD projects?

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<sup>1</sup> For the Sahel, participatory programs (CDD and community based development) of The Bank constituted 21 percent of total lending in 1996 and is expected to attain 47 percent in 2003 (Kumar 2003:vii).

<sup>2</sup> According to the CDD team of the World Bank (personal communication to Moeko Saito, July 2004), the amount of commitment for CDD components has increased significantly from FY00 to FY03 (US\$ 1 billion in FY00, US\$ 2.3 billion in FY01, US\$ 1.9 billion in FY02, and US\$1.9 billion FY03).

<sup>3</sup> A sub-project is any project funded by the CDD project.

To arrive at the study's conclusions, the following concerns are addressed:

- To what extent are communities driving decisions under CDD?
- To what extent and under what conditions do communities choose NRM as an activity under CDD projects?
- How have CDD projects been structured to encourage the choice of NRM activities?
- When is CDD an appropriate approach for addressing NRM concerns?
- How can the CDD approach be improved to enhance the quality and impacts of CDD projects for NRM?

The study queries CDD through a NRM lens. The findings: 1) apply to CDD overall as approach, and 2) identify both problems and opportunities for promoting improved NRM within CDD projects.

### **Analytic Frame for Evaluating CDD and for Evaluating Environmental Choices**

Are CDD projects establishing the institutional arrangements that would be necessary for communities to drive development? Understanding CDD in the first place requires taking account of:

- how community is defined—so we know *who* is driving CDD,
- how communities are represented in decision making processes—so we know *how* they drive CDD, and
- which decisions communities are driving—so as to know *what* is being driven in CDD.

The framework used in this study focuses on three elements of representation in local decision making: 1) who are the *actors* making decisions, 2) what are their decision making *powers*, and 3) how are they held *accountable* to or made to represent the “community”? This analysis, therefore, uses what Agrawal and Ribot (1999) have called an *actors, powers and accountability* framework to evaluate whether community-driven development is structured in a manner that might lead to the outcomes that its promoters predict (see Annex A for more details).<sup>4</sup> Examining these variables provides an indication of the degree to which CDD helps to establish an infrastructure for systematic community inclusion/representation in decision-making.

CDD promoters also cite a need for enabling-environment reforms and support for civil society. This study does not look at the broader enabling-environment reforms—which were rarely explicitly addressed by the projects we evaluated. Nor does the study separately explore the civil society support aspects of CDD, as these aspects were usually

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<sup>4</sup> Ribot (2004), following Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999), has suggested that the framework should be reduced to an evaluation of representation, which is composed of the accountability and responsiveness of leaders. Accountability encompasses the forms of positive and negative sanctions that people have over their leaders; responsiveness encompasses the power of those leaders to respond effectively to the signals produced through sanctions.

conflated with aspects of participation and representation that form the core of this study. Civil society interventions were usually seen by World Bank staff as the equivalent of “supporting local institutions.” Hence the actors, powers and accountability framework captures measures that staff believed, by their very nature, to support civil society.

To understand environmental subproject choices made by community actors, the study examined the options presented to communities in CDD project documents and the actual choices made by communities. The study then examined documents and interviewed Task Team Leaders (TTLs) about why they felt communities made the choices they made and how they thought the project encouraged the making of choices that would result in or include natural resource investments.

## Methods

The study was conducted in five steps:

1. Bank staff conducted a review of The World Bank CDD portfolio to identify CDD projects that explicitly included NRM.<sup>5</sup>
2. Bank staff conducted a general review of Project Assessment Documents (PADs) and, for older projects, Staff Appraisal Reports (SAPs) to identify NRM projects for further study.
3. Of the projects reviewed, thirty-one that included NRM in their subproject menu were chosen, taking into account the geography and age of project for a Project Assessment Document (PAD) analysis. Upon further inspection, at least nine of the projects could not be considered CDD, and were instead classified as participatory projects. A sub-set of twenty-two CDD projects remained. The PAD analysis of these focus on (a) subproject choices, and (b) incentive/disincentive mechanisms for communities to choose certain sub-projects (see Annex B for analysis questions and Annex C for a list of project documents studied).<sup>6</sup>
4. Of the thirty-one projects that were selected for the original PAD analyses, nine were selected for interviews with project personnel. Twelve TTLs and

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<sup>5</sup> The project list was provided by the Community Based Rural Development (CBRD) team of the World Bank. It was taken from the online Environmentally Socially Sustainable Development database for “community based rural development” ([http://esd.worldbank.org/coredb/home\\_LdbRpt.cfm?Class=RC](http://esd.worldbank.org/coredb/home_LdbRpt.cfm?Class=RC)). The selection criteria for the Community-Based Rural Development projects were that projects should have at least two of the following characteristics: elements of local participation; elements of decentralization to the local level; capacity building for local development; implementation through community driven subprojects. Since the project list provided by CBRD included all the rural development projects (agriculture, NRM etc), Jaime Webbe assisted the our team by selecting projects which had NRM components. Prior to FY2000, there were neither formal definitions nor lending figures for CDD projects. The CDD typology developed by the CDD team of the World Bank can be found on the web at: <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/09ByDocName/CommunityDrivenDevelopment>.

<sup>6</sup> In the nine participatory projects, participation of communities through consultation is encouraged at many stages, but governments, NGOs, or The Bank take the active role in decision making and project design. Of the nine participatory projects, six projects have NRM as the only subproject choice and three projects have NRM related infrastructure investment in addition to NRM activities. Accordingly, the remaining twenty-two projects were used for this analysis.

managers for the nine projects were interviewed about their experience of project design and implementation. These interviews queried the CDD projects and their predecessor projects. (See Annex D for a list of projects for which interviews were conducted.)

5. Reviews were also conducted of Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) for the projects whose TTLs were interviewed.

The findings from the PAD analyses, interviews and ICR review are presented in this report.

### **Limits to the Study**

Desk studies are limited by available data, for which PADs were our main source. PADs generally serve as project design tools that also outline financing requirements. These functions are not entirely consistent with the aims of this study. PADs alone do not offer a level of detail that could guide effective project implementation. As financing proposals, PADs must be brief and terse. Most PAD documents are formulated to secure funding, not to provide detailed guidance for implementation. It is difficult, therefore, to derive from the PADs more nuanced and particular information such as how communities are defined and how they are represented in decisions.

Interviews of TTLs also have significant limitations. The TTLs' principal function is to develop the project in the form of a PAD, to navigate the proposed project through the approval process, and to oversee the disbursement of funds for project implementation. While a good portion of the TTLs interviewed had a remarkably detailed and sensitive grasp of the projects they oversee, many knew a considerable amount about design but less about implementation. Their knowledge of the project was often necessarily limited to the contents of the PAD. After funding, TTLs' attention is more focused on the next project than on the implementation process for a previously approved project that has since begun. Hence, while informative, these interviews were also a limited tool for understanding the details of how communities are defined and represented in practice.

Additionally, this study could not meaningfully evaluate CDD project outcomes. The majority of CDD projects covered by this study are too recent to have measured outcomes or Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs). ICRs were only available for projects that pre-date CDD. We did include older projects in our sample, and consulted the ICRs where available to complement the information derived from SAPs, PADs, and interviews. While many of these older projects have been retroactively categorized as CDD, it would be unfair to assess CDD overall using outcomes recorded for older, non-CDD projects. It is also important to remember that, while significant insights into community involvement in World Bank projects can be derived from these documents, ICRs are a form of self-evaluation. While ICRs contain vital information, they must be considered as biased in favor of the project. Therefore, while some reported outcomes are described and discussed, it is difficult to establish if or how these outcomes are the result of CDD. The study thus does not evaluate the impact of CDD. Rather, it explores the

question of whether the institutional arrangements required by a CDD framework will in future enable communities to drive their own development.

The six weeks allocated for this study allowed for fewer PAD analyses and fewer interviews than would have been desirable. In particular, having a sample of early CDD PADs to compare to PADs written in the current year would have given us a sense of how learning is progressing at the World Bank, and whether and how new ideas are being integrated into PADs produced today.

While CDD projects should involve enabling-environment interventions, few such interventions are covered in the PAD documents. They are therefore not discussed in this report. CDD projects often cite the enhancement of social capital as one of their activities, but the documents are rarely specific on what measures are, or could be, involved. In interviews, TTLs usually refer to the mode of participation being used as their social capital intervention. Hence, the report focuses mainly on the two principal elements of CDD: 1) powers (decisions) in which people are involved, and 2) means by which they are involved. The report also examines how NRM has been encouraged in CDD projects.

## **Findings**

### *Defining communities*

Depending on project objectives, projects defined “community” as all *residents* or as targeted *beneficiaries*. Residency-based definitions of community are more inclusive, since, under this definition, whole populations make decisions over the public goods and services that development agencies bring. Beneficiary-based definitions organize community or inclusion in decision making around a specific objective or benefit. Each approach offers certain advantages, while posing particular risks: residence-based approaches may reduce Bank control over who receives benefits and how, while beneficiary-based approaches may produce or exacerbate divisions among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.<sup>7</sup>

### *Representing community*

Community participation is most common in the sub-project choice stage. Despite their importance as a defining aspect of CDD, the representation mechanisms inherent to CDD projects are rarely detailed in project documents. The project documents contain no explicitly formulated standards or guidelines for creating mechanisms by which

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<sup>7</sup> Communities were targeted by projects based on overlapping criteria. Of the projects examined, 64 percent included poverty level, 50 percent used ecological criteria, and 27 percent targeted farmers. Communities were then defined as all *residents* (everyone in the population) or as *beneficiaries* (a targeted sub-group in the population). Residents were defined as people living in a geographic area defined by either ecology or political-administrative jurisdiction. Beneficiaries were often targeted by need (as in poverty or income enhancement), objective of project (as in agricultural production or forest management), or parties interested in the objective of the project (as in user groups or parent-teacher associations).

communities can drive development. Project constituents and their TTLs choose institutions to represent local populations based mainly on immediate project objectives.

Seven of the twenty-two CDD projects<sup>8</sup> identified elected local government officials to serve as project interlocutors. Eleven projects examined through PADs appeared to use mechanisms that represented only a small portion of the population or relied on indirect mechanisms such as surveys to identify community needs and objectives. Where projects were implemented through democratic local government (as in Brazil), the representative authorities made most project decisions; in other cases (as in Romania and Morocco), interest groups were allowed to propose projects, or participatory processes were used to identify projects for approval by the elected authorities.<sup>9</sup>

In some cases, (as in Egypt and Chile), democratic local government was sidelined. Here, only one member of the local government was included in an oversight committee, and, being a minority on a committee, had no binding powers in decision making; in this case, the democratically elected government was treated as if it were one among many stakeholders, rather than as a representative of all parties concerned.<sup>10</sup> Many projects worked through a mix or coalition of customary authorities (Niger, Morocco, Egypt, Argentina), committees and interest groups (Ghana, China, Mexico). This form of mixed representation is sometimes chosen where elected local government does exist—as in Morocco and Egypt—or where it is not yet established.<sup>11</sup> In some areas, government representatives or project-appointed consultants determine community priorities (India, Chile, Lake Victoria).

After sub-project choices are made, community participation in implementation, monitoring and evaluation declines precipitously. Only in one country (Mali) did the study find that elected local government officials managed implementation funds—if the legal arrangements could be worked out. In all other cases, the funds were managed by members of the local administration (Niger and Senegal) and by project implementation units. In monitoring and evaluation, the PAD analysis did show a general trend toward greater local participation—although it is much less than in the sub-project choice.<sup>12</sup>

#### *What decisions are communities driving?*

Communities can drive development decisions at the levels of list-making, sub-project prioritization, implementation, or monitoring and evaluation. Most decision-making by

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<sup>8</sup> Brazil, Mali, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Niger, Tunisia and Indonesia.

<sup>9</sup> These uses of elected local government were consistent with keeping public development decisions in the hands of public authorities that represent the whole community (a residency based definition). They are also consistent with the reinforcement of local government as an institutionalized mechanism for community to drive decision making.

<sup>10</sup> The projects instead worked with traditional authorities who duplicated and compete with democratic authorities. In China, local elected government was simply left out of the project.

<sup>11</sup> Concern was expressed by TTLs in Niger and Egypt about the reinforcement of traditional authorities having the potential to undermine democratic development and consolidation.

<sup>12</sup> In addition, one project, in Niger, has innovated so as to include “accountability” among its indicators—which can help monitor the degree to which those who speak for community represent community.

publicly accountable local actors in the CDD projects evaluated took place during sub-project prioritization exercises. Over half of this community influence is exerted during the planning exercises that are a frequent part of the sub-project prioritization process.<sup>13</sup> List-making<sup>14</sup> itself usually relies on needs assessments and interviews conducted by project representatives, and does not involve the community directly, while implementation is usually overseen by a variety of management units that are rarely accountable to the local population.<sup>15</sup>

Because sub-project list prioritization is the main moment where communities drive decision-making, what is on the list and how it gets there matters. By the time a list of potential sub-projects is presented to a local group, the study found that the menu of choices has been carefully tailored to take into account the pre-assessed needs of local people, the available resources of donors, the financial and technical means of government, the beliefs of the actors involved, misconceptions of those beliefs and needs by project teams, the expertise available to the project team, the objectives of donors, the objectives of governments, the politics of line ministries, and the historical experience of previous ministry and Bank interventions in the zone.

Several kinds of mismatch between sub-project-list offers and local demand were observed: inappropriate match between list and preferences;<sup>16</sup> mismatches of scale;<sup>17</sup> mismatches of time horizon;<sup>18</sup> mismatches between public and private investments.<sup>19</sup> The problems that emerge in list-making are classic subsidiary problems that frequently arise when public goods and services are at issue. Safeties and procedural rules to promote greater public good and to internalize negative and positive externalities that accrue at different temporal and geographic scales must certainly be set at higher levels of political administrative aggregation. Variations in project objectives at different scales

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<sup>13</sup> Fourteen projects in the PAD analysis used management planning exercises.

<sup>14</sup> There are good reasons to conduct non-community based needs assessments. Surveys and participant observation can reveal many needs and aspirations that will not be expressed in public fora or by political representatives.

<sup>15</sup> Community participation in monitoring and evaluation was not systematically examined in this study; nevertheless, the PAD analysis showed that community involvement is rising in this arena.

<sup>16</sup> 1) In some instances there are differences between the kinds of activities that a team is prepared to support and those that a community sees as a priority—for example, a team with agricultural expertise may not be able to offer support for sewage treatment. 2) In one instance non-agricultural investments were discouraged because the project was characterized as ‘agricultural’. People still wanted other investments.

<sup>17</sup> 1) Some communities may not see potential investments that require research and analysis at a higher scale. In China, appropriate technology investments at a higher scale could have provided options that villagers would not know of or choose if not informed. 2) Individuals and small communities may not see it as their job or in their interests to invest in maintaining global or national public goods such as carbon dioxide sequestering, biodiversity habitat, or forest cover. They may not see it as their priority to maintain roads that pass through their jurisdiction.

<sup>18</sup> 1) Many communities preferred short-term economic returns to long-term investments. 2) Some communities did not see environment as a problem because it did not immediately affect their livelihoods.

<sup>19</sup> 1) Others did not want to invest in public natural resource management because the individuals did not believe that the benefits would accrue to them—both in being long term and in yielding diffuse returns on the investments (from which it is difficult to exclude other communities). 2) Romanians wanted to fix up churches and cemeteries. The project did not see this as appropriate public investment and structured the list to avoid these investments.

and differences among the objectives of various different actors give rise to the question: who should enforce imposed rules and/or invest in the infrastructure and maintenance for higher-scale goods and services?<sup>20</sup>

*What do communities choose?*

In most projects where people were given a wide range of investments options, people did not prioritize natural resource management (NRM). This was even the case in instances where environmental education campaigns had been conducted to encourage environmental investments. The reasons given for the low priority placed on NRM were:

- communities were focused on immediate productive needs;
- people were unaware of the possibility of requesting funding for investments at a rangeland or watershed scale;
- people felt that the scale was too large to have a clear impact on their lives;
- people did not place significant importance on environmental issues;
- if NRM were chosen, perceptible benefits would take too long to accrue, or might accrue in an unequal or exclusive fashion;
- the project expected beneficiaries and/or residents to volunteer their labor, but people would not work until or unless they were paid.
- some investments were rejected because they reduced the area of land people could farm;
- high transaction costs could make encouraging collective action over public resources difficult.

To summarize: The protection or collective management of natural resources has diffuse and long-term, often collective, benefits, but people are often far more focused on short-term economic returns. Because the resource may be a public good that participants cannot prevent others from using, people cannot be sure they can harvest the returns on their investment. Furthermore, environmental management is often called for by outsiders who expect local people to work for free. Considering environmental labor to fall outside of the cash economy makes it very difficult to motivate local people's investment in national and international environmental priorities or even in long-term local productive endeavors. Overall, participants' experiences of and doubts about NRM-based projects promote a bias against many conservation-oriented activities and work against the making of longer-term investments in range, water or forest management.

Environmental investments may also be masked by data-collection instruments or missed entirely. Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) require World Bank projects to integrate environmental matters into other interventions. Hence, some environmental

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<sup>20</sup> Clearly, communities must respect higher-scale concerns and must refrain from producing negative externalities where possible. Higher-scale bodies must also ensure that higher-scale values are protected. If communities are to make choices consistent with their own needs *and* with those of higher social and geographic scales, these issues must be sorted out in advance *with* the communities involved. Lists may be constructed differently if those investments that communities do not see as their responsibility are transferred to appropriate authorities at other scales.

interventions may not be immediately visible, or counted, since they are already subsumed under other interventions.<sup>21</sup>

### *Methods for influencing community choice*

Given the above disincentives to and constraints on the consideration of NRM by participants in community projects, new project designs have adopted strategies for encouraging communities to choose natural resource or more broadly environmental investments. Based on the PAD analysis of twenty-two projects, education and training or awareness-raising is the most common method for encouraging communities to choose particular kinds of sub-projects—used in ten of the twenty-two projects examined. Eight of the projects used earmarking of funds for environmental investments to ensure that NRM would inform some aspect of the project. Three used negative lists to steer projects away from particular investments, thereby raising the likelihood of environmental investments.

To encourage environmentally sound choices, for example, the Zimbabwe CDD project required communities to explicitly weigh environmental benefits and costs in all decisions. Several projects used co-financing for sub-projects and created incentives by lowering the amount of the contribution required from communities for environmental investments. The Morocco project incentive paired projects that communities wanted with environmental projects in which communities were less interested.<sup>22</sup> Egypt and Morocco reported that pilot projects or the demonstration effect can also encourage the choice of environmental investments.

### *Scaling up and sustainability*

Scaling up appears to take place either through lateral spread via the demonstration effect and word of mouth, or by building on the institutional infrastructure of local democratic government—which provides a mechanism for community representation in decision making and covers whole national territories. The sustainability of CDD requires continued community representation in public decision making. An assumption of sustainability implies that, after the CDD project is terminated, bodies that speak and work on behalf of community (and that hopefully represent community) continue: 1) to be representative and 2) to hold powers (decisions and resources).

Continuity of representation may be accomplished by institutionalizing decision making in local democratic government. Local government may be structured to be representative and it may also have income generating powers and rights to funds from central agencies. Where there is no guaranteed funding, sustainability can also be fostered by encouraging local decision making bodies to develop direct relations with line ministries and NGOs,

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<sup>21</sup> Environmental interventions such as soil erosion control, water harvesting, wind breaks, water gathering technologies, may be subsumed under agricultural intervention or may be hidden in a fuel substitution program that provides kerosene cook stove but is designed to reduce pressure on wood supplies.

<sup>22</sup> If communities were to choose the downstream agriculture or infrastructure sub-projects they liked, one of the costs would be to also have to choose “upstream” pastureland management sub-projects.

so that they are able, independently, to demand funding and services themselves.<sup>23</sup> Some CDD projects include the option of continued funding beyond the first project cycle through Adjustable Project Loans. These renewable loans, by sustaining funding, can allow projects to grow local roots and take on a life of their own.

## Lessons and Recommendations

### *Institutionalizing community “inclusion”*

While attending to target populations, TTLs should also attend to broader democratic processes. Target populations always belong to a larger population. To reinforce residency-based democratic forms of governance and citizenship, attention should be paid to the position of targeted sub-groups (the poor, water users, forest user groups) within the larger population and polity. TTLs should ensure that sub-group representatives are accountable to broader democratic decision making processes.

1. The Bank should require all PADs to include **A Representation Strategy**—outlining the mechanisms through which communities are to be represented at all stages of the project life cycle.
2. In developing a Representation Strategy, TTLs should first determine whether there is a democratic form of local representation in the local arena.

Many TTLs did not know whether local government was democratic or not. This question should be a starting point for the development of a PAD. TTLs should ask, and provide answers to, the following questions: Are there local governments? Are they elected? Have recent elections been structured to produce representative local authorities?

3. TTLs should develop a strategy to reinforce democratic forms of local representation by working with local authorities and officials on matters that concern public well being, public resources or public decisions.

TTLs should consider the following: How can interventions be designed to strengthen institutionalized forms of local inclusion and representation? How can projects work through elected authorities in a way that reinforces their representative functions?

4. TTLs should develop a strategy for interventions in arenas where there are no democratic local authorities.

What principles should be followed to guide the representation of local people in decision making in the absence of recognizable representative bodies? When

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<sup>23</sup> Where there is no local representative government or where elected local government is not representative (due to electoral structure, corruption or elite capture), Mandondo (2000) noted that application of multiple accountability measures may help ensure representation.

should projects in such areas be funded? Who should represent local people in decision making processes? What inclusion mechanisms are most likely to result in equitable and sustainable interventions?

5. TTLs should have explicit strategies for insuring the representation of traditionally marginalized groups.

Our study found that biases against women, ethnic minorities, the poor, and other marginalized groups remain in a number of current projects.

6. Funding levels should be contingent on whether the country in question has local representative structures. Funding should also be contingent on whether, in those countries or areas without local representatives or local government bodies, there exists a strategy to develop such structures so as to produce an institutional mechanism hospitable to community driven development in the long-term.

#### *Expanding powers that communities drive*

In most projects, communities drive sub-project choice. But it is essential to attend to community inclusion at each stage of CDD design. Better steering mechanisms are needed for: 1) list making (and sub-project prioritization and choice), 2) implementation and 3) monitoring and evaluation. The following guidelines, if adhered to, will serve to improve community representation and influence over CDD projects.

1. List making and sub-project prioritization and choice
  - a. Keep lists as wide open as possible
  - b. Earmark as few funds as possible
  - c. Match items on list to the geographic and temporal scale of communities
    - i. Separate higher-scale public priorities of donors and governments (such as biodiversity management or road development) from priorities that are of immediate concern to local communities (such as health, sanitation, market infrastructure, etc.).
    - ii. Ensure higher-scale values and priorities through higher-scale institutions. These can include rules that require communities to reduce negative externalities (or increase positive ones) with funds to help them do so. Unfunded mandates for higher-scale outcomes are not likely to be respected.
    - iii. Where higher-scale values must be ensured with local community involvement, pay local communities to conduct these activities. Treat natural resource management work as labor.
  - d. Better match the skills of teams to the needs of communities
    - i. Begin with inter-disciplinary teams
    - ii. Be prepared to reconfigure teams after initial assessment of community priorities
    - iii. Provide funds for communities to hire their own experts where the project team is not skilled.

2. Implementation
  - a. Keep implementation units accountable to representative bodies to insure that implementation powers do not only serve project units, private bodies or elite.
3. Monitoring and evaluation
  - a. Involve communities in monitoring and evaluation.
  - b. Include the monitoring and evaluation of the CDD mechanisms—especially representation (accountability and responsiveness)—in overall monitoring and evaluation efforts
    - i. Is list making, sub-project choice, implementation and monitoring and evaluation done by units that are accountable to the community as a whole?
    - ii. Is the unit making these decisions responsive to the community as a whole?
    - iii. Is the community driving development decisions?
    - iv. Do the decisions they are enabled to drive by the project reflect the needs and aspirations of the community as a whole?

*Incentives for choosing environmental investments*

TTLs should carefully consider the degree to which incentives for choosing NRM investments might coerce local communities to make choices that, in actuality, outsiders are driving. Incentive mechanisms should only be used to internalize externalities, overcome public goods problems, information gaps, or alleviate long-term investment problems. What kinds of incentives, then, are consistent with CDD principles? Some incentives that prior projects have used are listed below.

1. Environmental education on the benefits of NRM and its links to the improvement/reinvigoration of other sectors can encourage the choice of NRM sub-projects. TTLs can conduct education campaigns prior to list making or sub-project choice.
2. Choice of project sites where communities are more likely to invest in natural resource management may predispose the project to success in terms of the prioritization of NRM. TTLs can select environmentally sensitive areas or “hot spots” or choose to locate project activities where previously successful NRM programs have been implemented.
3. Payment for environmental labor can be an important incentive for participants choosing NRM activities over other goals. TTLs can treat environmental work as labor so that people see an immediate return for the environmental management investments they make.
4. Open-ended earmarking that requires use of funds for public goods versus private goods or long-term versus short-term projects can steer funds toward public investments such as NRM.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> TTLs can use negative list investments where the returns are primarily private.

5. Lower co-payments for NRM. TTLs can lower community contributions to NRM sub-projects relative to other sectors, to make NRM more immediately attractive.
6. Pair NRM with non-NRM projects. TTLs can require NRM investments as part of non-NRM investments that may be more popular.

### *Scaling up and sustainability*

Projects are most likely to be sustainable when many people know about them. When knowledge about projects is geographically widespread and stakeholders exist at many levels of representation, popular interest in current and future projects is likely to increase. The following steps can be taken to scale projects up and foster project sustainability:

1. Seek geographically extensive representational infrastructure
  - a. Seek to work with representative local government,
  - b. Encourage lateral spread through demonstration effect and word of mouth.<sup>25</sup>
2. Seek long-term funding mechanisms
  - a. Work with permanent representative institutions such as democratic local government where possible and encourage central government to put permanent financing mechanisms in place (revenue generation and transfers).
  - b. Encourage bodies that represent communities to develop independent funding relations with line ministries and NGOs,
  - c. Use Adaptable Program Lending (APL) to give projects a long time horizon for the establishment of enduring local institutions and practices

Organization of the report: The section above broadly outlined the methods, data and some findings of our inquiry into CDD projects, and offered basic recommendations for the improvement of PAD design and CCD projects in general. Sections two through five elaborate the issues raised above in detail, linking the specific findings to particular projects and situations the research team examined. Our main interest is to identify and improve on existing procedures for the establishment and implementation of a CDD project. Every step of a CCD project involves decision making, ideally by a fairly represented ‘community.’ Section two, WHO DRIVES CDD AND WHAT DECISIONS DO THEY DRIVE?, explores who drives which decisions at each step, starting with the definition of community and then following the process from the choice of communities through to implementation and evaluation. Section III, ARRANGEMENTS FOR INFLUENCING COMMUNITY CHOICES—REASONS AND INCENTIVES, focuses on the arrangements made by TTLs for promoting and certain kinds of community choices—in particular, the use of incentives for choosing NRM-type sub-projects. Section four, CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES IN CDD, examines a number of cross-cutting problems in CDD design and implementation, and Section five, LESSONS AND

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<sup>25</sup> Encouraging sharing across borders among districts within and outside of the project area can lead to extension of the area covered.

RECOMMENDATIONS, concludes the report with a discussion of lessons learned, and presents further recommendations for ensuring CCD project success.

## WHO DRIVES CDD AND WHAT DECISIONS DO THEY DRIVE?

How are communities chosen and represented in CDD projects? CDD projects are organized around a procedure that first identifies the target population, then pre-schedules when and in what decisions local communities will have the opportunity to intervene. The points at which communities could potentially intervene in a CDD project include: choosing target sub-communities and beneficiaries, establishing positive and negative lists (menus of included and excluded sub-project options), prioritizing sub-projects, sub-project implementation and management of funds, and monitoring and evaluation. This section describes and discusses these pivotal points of potential community intervention.

The stages of community involvement in the project cycle are important indicators of the degree to which CDD projects are “community driven.” Table 1 shows the stages when communities were included in the 22 projects that we considered to be CDD-type projects. Table 2 shows the stages when communities were included in all projects examined (31). CDD projects showed slightly more inclusion (41 per cent) in all three major project stages than all the projects when considered jointly (CDD and non-CDD) (39 percent). At the stages of design and implementation, CDD-type projects also showed a higher rate of inclusion (41 vs. 32 percent).

**Table 1: Community inclusion in CDD type projects (N=22)**

Project Selection	Design	Implementation	No of Projects	% of total
			9	41%
			9	41%
			4	18%

**Table 2: Community inclusion in all projects (N=31)**

Project Selection	Design	Implementation	No of Projects	% of total
			12	39%
			10	32%
			8	26%
			1	3%

Some caution must be exercised in interpreting these tables: inclusion is not necessarily synonymous with “community” involvement. What is meant by “inclusion” differs from PAD to PAD, and the ways that PADs define inclusion are not necessarily consistent with the notion that community drives decisions. Most implementation, for example, involves local people in some way, but is often carried out by private contractors or executed by a project implementation unit. Discussion of the definition of “community” under a CDD framework is important. This sub-section examines the selection criteria and different

definitions of “community” being used by CDD projects, then looks at how community is represented in each of the steps within the CDD process.

### How are Communities Chosen and Defined?

Based on its objectives, each CDD project must first identify its target community. In order to approach that community, the project organizers must determine who belongs to the community and who can represent it. Choosing and then defining target communities are discussed below.<sup>26</sup>

#### *Choosing target communities*

Thirty-one projects were examined to see which specific criteria are used for choosing the target population. The subset of 22 projects considered to be CDD-type projects were also investigated for the same purpose. In general, projects used the following criteria for community selection: poverty levels, degree of environmental degradation, and presence of farming interests. Table 3 indicates that, in CDD-type projects, poverty level and degree of environmental degradation are the main criteria for choosing target communities. Sixty-four percent of total projects included poverty level and 50 percent included degree of environmental degradation as general criteria. The disaggregated criteria for these same projects are shown in Table 4.

**Table 3: General Criteria for choosing target population**

General Criteria	CDD type Projects	% of total(22)	No. of projects	% of total
Poverty level	14	64%	16	52%
Environmental degradation	11	50%	18	58%
Farming	6	27%	7	23%

**Table 4: General Criteria for choosing target population—detailed**

<i>General Criteria</i>	CDD type Projects	% of total(22)	No. of Projects	% of total (31)
Poverty	5	23%	5	16%
Environment	3	14%	9	29%
Farming	4	18%	4	13%
Poverty and Env.	7	32%	8	26%
Poverty and Farming	1	5%	2	6%
Poverty and Env. and Farming	1	5%	1	3%
Other	1	5%	2	6%
Total	22	100%	31	100%

<sup>26</sup> The projects analyzed cover a variety of communities ranging from large populations in the millions to smaller groups in the thousands, multiple sub-districts to individual villages, and entire regions within a country to specific households headed by women, small farm owners and the landless. Here we are not going to explore the scale of community, but rather the criteria for choice and the definitions employed.

### *General criteria*

To what degree are communities themselves involved in choosing target communities? Is the selection of target groups a community driven decision? The short answer seems to be that in most cases, this decision is made through a survey or needs assessments using a multitude of methods that may solicit input from communities concerning their characteristics—those that are to be targeted by the project—but that the final decisions are not driven by communities themselves. This is not surprising and perhaps should be the case. As the report shows later, some communities in targeted zones are given the opportunity to self select or to opt out of the process of target group selection. The PAD analysis showed that some communities chose not to be involved. In Morocco, for example, the selection of communities was determined by self-reported community interest. The TTLs conducted information campaigns, and then worked with communities that expressed interest in the project's goals

Another way, of dividing up the criteria used by the CDD projects we analyzed is to discuss poverty and needs-based criteria, ecological criteria, and other practical considerations separately.

### Poverty and needs-based criteria

Most TTLs conducted poverty-oriented needs assessments to determine who the target community for the CDD project would be. The Indonesia Kecamatan Development Project, for example, used 26 indicators—most of which were aimed at characterizing the availability of public infrastructure—to determine the poverty status of villages. In this case, the chosen target community was the poor inhabitants of the selected villages.<sup>27</sup> But “need” is not a simple criterion. In Phase I of the Egypt project, for example, chiefs (*mandoubeen*) decided that those who had the most cattle had the most “need.” Their decision suggests that, in local perceptions, “poverty” and “need” do not always go hand in hand. In Phase II, the Egypt project will define “need” differently. The designers of Phase II will begin with a Community Action Plan (CAP) to determine needs “from the bottom up.” They will specify in advance that the poorest members of the community must benefit from the project, and they will conduct a discussion of the criteria for determining and agreeing upon who is “poor.” Rather than working with the *mandoubeen*, the TTLs will work with *Ailaa*, sub-tribal sub-groups. A CAP will be in place for the lifetime of the project as communities will develop a work plan which they will revise annually. Following the composition of action plans, small action grants will be disbursed. These block grants require accountability on the part of recipients. A report of how funds were used must be made at the end of each year. The TTLs will also require that twenty percent of the funds be allocated to women's activities. (Egypt II interview.)

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<sup>27</sup> In this project, the majority of poor people do not live in poor villages even though the number of poor villages accounts for a disproportionate share of poor people. Thus a huge portion of the poor can go unaccounted for. Kecamatan Development Project, Indonesia, 1998, p.5.

Poverty was a criteria used in China and Chile. In China the project targeted the poorest of the poor. The accuracy of this targeting was influenced by the fact that the Chinese collaborators did not have a good sense of where the poor in China are located. In Chile, communities were chosen using poverty mapping.

### Ecological criteria

Ecological criteria were used in Niger and Morocco. In Niger, the choice of geographic area for the CDD project was influenced by where previous bank interventions aimed at NRM had been made (under PGRN<sup>28</sup>). In order to accommodate GEF funders, target communities in Niger were also chosen according to whether they lived in “ecologically sensitive areas.” In Morocco, the Lakhda project targeted a particular watershed. When people in the area were reluctant to carry out the upstream work, the project targeted communities that lived in the areas with the most erosion on the assumption that these would have the most incentive to make upstream investments. In Chile, the project approached the elected communes, but they set up project units that dealt with “micro-catchments.”

In the Philippines and Egypt, CDD project designers used geographic criteria—uplands and coastal areas—to determine project location; the Egypt project was aimed at communities that rely on agriculture for their livelihood, and intentionally excluded tourist settlements from the project, even when such settlements were located within the zone where they were working.

### Practical criteria

In one project, identifiable “communities” that the project could work with did not exist as such until project designers consulted with area administrative authorities to determine an appropriate administrative unit. In Niger, where much of the population lives in villages that, in groups of about 100, form the *commune*, project designers had difficulty identifying target communities. *Communes* were too large to be adequately included in and served by a single project, and single villages were too small. The CDD project worked with *sous-préfets* (appointed members of central government) to identify *grappe des villages*, or groups of villages, which the project could then approach.

#### *Defining community: who is included?*

There is some conceptual confusion about the meaning of the term “community.” Is “community” seen as indicating the project beneficiaries, the affected population, or the public? In CDD, the “community” is the group of people who make sub-project choices, the people who should be driving the program. At the level of project choice communities can be defined and represented in various ways. This sub-section looks at

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<sup>28</sup> The PGRN project in Niger “was one of the World Bank’s first projects in Africa to adopt a community based, or “*gestion de terroir*” approach to NRM” (Niger ICR 2003:10).

who is included in community—how the group of people participating in decisions is constituted.

### Beneficiary-based belonging

The term “community” as it is used in PADs implies that communities include all beneficiaries in the target population chosen by the project designers. If the basis of belonging to the CDD community is that one is a beneficiary, then the community itself is being selected by the criteria of the project for inclusion as a beneficiary. At times, when the project target group is the population of a given area, this selection may map directly and evenly onto residency-based belonging. At other times it maps onto particular sub-sectors of society.

### Residency-based belonging

In Egypt, target groups were defined as the communities living in the project area. Residency defined belonging. The project targeted areas on the coast where agriculture is the dominant activity, and while tourist settlements do exist in the target zone, these were intentionally excluded from project activities. The Chile project set up project units that dealt with “micro-catchments.” The project approached the elected *communes*, which represented residents in a larger geographic area. Both catchments and communes provide basis for residence-based belonging.

In Niger, the *Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles* (PGRN), which preceded the current CDD project, paid more attention to the *terroir* (village use area) as a spatial unit of belonging and action than the later CDD project. According to the ICR, community was defined “...as a group of people recognizing that they share many things in common, usually a land area, history, culture, beyond ethnic and language barriers, and determined, under this project, to share some of their future” (Niger ICR 2003:4) Because the current Niger CDD project is more concerned with decentralization, the TTL explained, “we are going *commune* by *commune*” (TTL interview).

The project in Romania defined a community as a village. But, within villages, the project worked with interested parties that presented themselves in associations. The *communa* mayor must approve the initiation of any project. Thus, while determination of “belonging” was in part residency-based, the project also relied on self-identification (declarations of interest) and on the approval of elected mayors, who have some connection to citizenship via elected authority (TTL interview.)

In Morocco, within the target watershed, the project worked with pre-existing local social units called *Douars*. The *Douar* is not an administrative unit. Each *Douar* is made up of 2-3 hamlets about one kilometer apart and has both bottom lands and uplands. Here, ecological considerations overlapped neatly with residency-based determinations of community. As the team leader said, “They have some sort of ecological identity, living in a valley.” Everyone living in these hamlets was part of the “community.” (TTL interview.)

In the Philippines and Mexico, communities are regions whose residents were identified as poor or have a high proportion of indigenous population.

#### Interest-based belonging—interest, profession and user groups

Interest-based belonging is another possible means of identifying community. The Niger project designer stated that “community is defined as a function of what you aim to achieve. For agricultural production it is producers, for education it is parent-teacher associations.” The institutions that exist also matter. This project first conducted a local-level institutional study, finding that definitions of community differ by “tribe.”

#### Self selection

While interest-based community selection can also be considered a form of self selection, the terms are not synonymous. Self selection cuts across residency- and interest-based belonging. In Morocco’s Lakhda project, the communities were self selected. Within the larger watershed targeted by the project, the project conducted an information campaign to explain the project to the communities in the area, many of whom, in the end, were not interested in the project. Then the project worked with those communities that did express an interest. In Rumania, the community was represented by self-appointed associations of people who took initiative. In Niger, one could also say that there is self selection since “*grappes* must first solicit management plans.” The PAD analysis, overall, indicated that self selection is common. Typically, the project team will conduct educational campaigns followed by an unspecified process by which communities choose to be included in the project or not. The PADs provide no discussion of how community is represented in the defining community itself.

### **How are Communities Represented in Decision Making?**

In each step of CDD project design and implementation, local communities (whatever shape they take) play some role in driving decision making. Understanding how inclusion is structured to enable CDD in each situation is important. The ways that communities can drive decision making cannot be separated from how inclusion is structured. How communities take form depends on the mechanisms used to represent them in project practice. The mechanisms of list making, sub-project choice, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and the ways that these mechanisms influence community representation are discussed below.

#### *In list making*

Most projects begin with some form of needs assessment based on interviews or PRA. Needs assessment and interview results can play a big role in shaping sub-project menus. In China, the effort to assess local needs was extensive. The TTL went to a sample county with his team, and “fanned out to villages to ask people what they needed.” Indirect community influence on list making was also exerted when the project team

asked practitioners and program personnel who had worked or were working on poverty reduction projects what they had learned from their experiences. The principal lesson was that “if farmers don’t want it, it will not work.” Their findings informed the project design. The China team was enabled to use this extensive needs assessment approach by a one million dollar preparatory grant from the Japanese government.

The Egypt project, Phase I, was less focused on the list-making/needs assessment element of CDD project design. The project came with pre-determined project components that did not match what people themselves wanted. Performance indicators for the meeting of goals had been pre-set in cubic meters of water and hectares of land. “So, the people were really asked *where* they wanted x and y, not *if* they wanted it or *whether* they wanted it.” (Egypt II interview.)

### *In sub-project choice*

The PADs, while yielding variable information that is sometimes vague, do give us some insight into how projects define, and who represents, communities. The clearest inferences can be made by examining how local populations were represented when sub-project choices were made. Documents for twelve projects in eleven countries indicated broadly that “community” was represented through non-democratic processes (i.e. stakeholder representation or representation through surveys or through non-elected authorities who speak for the “community”). Seven projects made efforts to represent a cross-section of society at the local level. The entries below demonstrate the range of ways that inclusion was structured at the level of sub-project choice.

### Non-democratic processes of inclusion in sub-project choice

- India: In India (1—PAD) the Government “will appoint consultants...to train staff of participating states in interactive planning, assist them in preparing such initial plans and advise on the formation of a village organization”; in India (2) farmers will be divided into water user groups that will also include non-direct beneficiaries such as teachers, members of women’s groups, NGOs and other “influential” people.
- Egypt: Egypt (1—PAD) community groups (small, socially coherent and manageable planning units) will select sub-projects; Egypt (2), the community will be involved through the development of community action plans.
- Chile (PAD): with technical assistance from local consulting firms, universities, NGOs and the UTP, beneficiaries will design and execute micro-regional NRM and agricultural development programs.
- Uganda (Lake Victoria PAD): consultants visited communities, women’s groups, projects of community based organizations and NGOs and conducted stakeholder workshops and (with the government working groups) to incorporate a community focus through finding out the local needs, concerns, etc.
- Panama (PAD): the document states that sub-projects are chosen by “community” however, elsewhere, the document explains that 10 formal workshops and seminars held with the attendance of 360 stakeholders (community representatives, NGOs, foundations, national, regional and local organizations) and 25 community-level

workshops were “performed” and multiple informal consultations in the towns and in the indigenous communities—indigenous people were also included in the formulation of an Indigenous Peoples Development Plan to address their specific unique needs.

- Zambia (PAD): the project organized collaboration among the government, community representatives, NGOs and donors to produce a national environmental action plan and to design the proposed Environmental Support Program. Central to the program’s implementation are mechanisms to foster the exchange of ideas, as well as coordination and active participation by stakeholders at all levels, with a particular emphasis on involving and empowering communities and strengthening districts.
- Morocco (PAD): villages will create, with the help of facilitators (both male and female), a Village Development Plan outlining chosen projects, their rationale and project contracts.
- China (PAD): community groups (represented through the Farmers Association and Water Association) will be involved in all aspects of the project. Beneficiary villages and households participated in the determination of a “menu” of alternative land and farmer development component activities, and they will play the key role in the actual selection of these activities during implementation.
- Ghana (PAD): beneficiary groups are required to have formed an association that will propose projects to the fund committee.
- Argentina (PAD): a local management unit will be composed of “indigenous promoters” nominated by traditional authorities and selected by the project management unit on the basis of previously-approved terms of reference and selection criteria. The National Indian Affairs Agency Director will also chair an Advisory Council for the project comprised of two indigenous representatives.
- Mexico (PAD): a Regional Sustainable Development Council (CRDS) will be established representing the members of communities and “ejidos” (communal lands), producer organizations, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Rural Development (SAGAR), the State Government, relevant public institutions, with the option of including NGOs recognized by producers and institutions. Its president would be a representative of the State. The CRDS would coordinate either with the correspondent Coffee Councils at regional level, where they exist, or with representatives of coffee producers.

All of these descriptions are insufficient to determine whether the whole community in a given territory is represented or if the beneficiaries are those who have an influence on the process. The information offered is insufficient to determine the degree of influence communities exert on sub-project choice. Further interviews with TTLs (see below) revealed that the above descriptions from appraisal documents were not always adequate. Nevertheless, since these projects are presumably—and should be—driven by community, the mechanisms by which community does the driving must be more clearly spelled out in the PADs.

### Some form of local democratic representation

- Brazil (PAD): to ensure that the beneficiaries' demands continue to drive the project, participatory methods and periodic consultation mechanisms will be used to publicize the project, organize beneficiary groups, and identify and plan project activities. Elected Municipal Councils identify sub-project proposals and review and recommend for approval smaller social investment proposals.
- Mali (PAD): the project asks the local government to identify villages that will participate. In these villages the project creates a Village NRM Group to designate delegates to meetings and consultations held outside the village. The Village NRM Group would include representatives of the village's various sub-sectoral groups (farmers, herders, forest users, women, etc. Elected local government is involved in village identification and an attempt is made to represent different segments or interest groups within local society in a decision making body (although the method used is not necessarily democratic or broadly representative, nor are these members necessarily elected).
- Philippines (PAD): community organizers will be provided by elected municipality representatives and trained by the project to work with communities to identify their needs, priorities, strengths, opportunities and resources to prepare and implement viable sub-projects; the community organizers then produce community development plans to be approved by elected *Barangays* which are the lowest administrative units of government.<sup>29</sup>
- Zimbabwe (2—PAD), Rural District Council (an elected body) will approve sub-project proposals (up to US\$50,000) based on standardized technical, economic, environmental, and institutional parameters. Here the council will presumably prioritize based on incoming proposals (While this appears to a more administrative than decision making role, it nevertheless involves an elected council in sub-project choice):
- Niger (PAD): Local Councils for NRM will be elected by village communities (as was done in the predecessor project, Niger PGRN). Election procedures will be transparent, clearly defined in advance in accordance with Niger's prevailing laws, and endorsed by the Municipal Council when the latter exists or by the District Council. This project sets as one of its objectives ensuring “capable and accountable local governance.” The innovation that the new CDD project has made since the previous project is to also subject these committees to the endorsement of elected local government councils—bringing the program under the tutelage of elected local government (where it exists).<sup>30</sup> As we will see below, like its predecessor, this project also empowers customary authorities at the district level.

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<sup>29</sup> The project document does not tell us that these bodies are elected. This information was provided through personal communications with Tony La Vine, June 2004.

<sup>30</sup> In the PGRN Project that preceded the CDD project, each participating community elected a local NRM council (*Conseil de Gestion du Terroir—CGT*) and established “Specific action groups.” The representation “...on CGTs was proportional for ethnic minorities (e.g. Fulany herders), but under-representative for women, who composed about 20 percent of committee members” (Niger ICR 2003:4).

- Tunisia (PAD): sub-projects will be chosen by village-level groups made up of elected village representatives.
- Indonesia (PAD and ICR): the sub-projects are chosen by a council of village heads (UDKP) from proposals submitted by each village council (LKMD). For purposes of transparency, the meetings of the UDKP will also be attended by three members from each village (two women and one man) who will be selected through village elections.

These seven projects all attempted to base inclusion in sub-project choice on some form of democratic representation with universal suffrage. In each case, interviews with TTLs provided much more detail on the structure of community representation in sub-project choice than did the PADs alone.

#### Niger: Chiefs and local governments

In Niger, the previous PGRN project worked with individual villages and their *terroir* (village use area). The new project rejected the *terroir* approach because they “...wanted the basis of the intervention to be decentralization.” “We therefore needed to use the *commune* [the smallest territorial unit of local government]. We wanted to be consistent with existing administrative units. *Terroir* is not an administrative unit, it is a use area” (TTL of Niger CDD project).

Niger is composed of eight administrative regions, each of which comprises a number of *communes*. The project identified *grappes* [bunches] of villages in each *commune*. Within these *grappes*, the Niger project worked through village chiefs, although the TTL expressed some ambivalence about this approach. The leader of the previous Niger PGRN had also expressed doubts about this shift to dependence on customary authority. The concern that chiefs might turn project activities to their own ends was expressed in this way by the TTL: “Chiefs could hijack projects, but [it’s] better to have them on board because they have a lot of power.” In any case, the *grappes* were approached by the project facilitator. The project facilitator worked with the village chiefs to constitute a committee: scaled to a chief’s jurisdiction—where that worked. They used PRA to approach the groups.

The NRM District Councils established under the prior PGRN project were composed of local authorities, traditional leaders, representatives of local NGOs and community associations, as well as community delegates. The NRM District Councils’ purpose was to review and approve the local council’s plans. The new CDD project chose to continue this practice despite the fact that PGRN project leaders had experienced resistance from entrenched constituencies such as district-level chiefs and government officials and problems with procrastination (Niger ICR 2003:13).

“Micro-finance pertains to projects that only serve sub-groups of this size. *Grappes* must first solicit management plans. Each *grappe* writes a plan in which it makes demands for funds. Some funds are managed by the *commune* [currently the *sous-préfet*], others will be managed by the project. In one region, we divided the *communes* into those that would

be managed by the *commune* and those that would be managed by the project. In this case of about twenty *communes*, two *grappes* were managed by *communes*, four by the project, and the rest were not beneficiaries. In cases managed by the *communes*, the *sous-préfet* (and *commune* committee made up of line-ministry personnel) distributed funds to the *grappe*.”

In Niger, local governments have been set up, but there have been no local elections. The project is anticipating commune-level elections. They are working with UNCDF in order to scale up their operation over time. When elected authorities are set up, the *grappe* committees will have to apply to commune-level elected authorities for funding. The *sous-préfet*'s role is changing. He does not know how this will change. If elections never happen they will continue as they are now operating.

In sum, Niger's CDD project first organizes local communities through committees organized with local chiefs. The plans and projects these committees request must be approved and funded by the local project-designated authority. In some areas that authority is the project unit; in others it is the *sous-préfet*. Ultimately, the project's intention is to work through elected *commune* authorities when they exist.

#### Romania: Representation via self-organized village committees

The project in Romania defined community as a small village, and chose to work with this unit. Large villages constitute an administrative entity called a *communa*, which has an elected local council and a mayor. Surrounding villages not large enough to be considered *communas* depend on the *communa* in their area. Because the few resources available tend to be concentrated in the *communa* villages, the smaller surrounding villages are often comparatively poorer. *Communas*, having larger populations, tend to have a greater voice in decisions about the allocation of funds. For this reason the project in Romania decided not to work with the elected local authorities, focusing instead on smaller, poorer village units.

In the villages, the TTL said, “We work directly with the community. Not the mayor, not the council. In order to be eligible, the mayor has to issue a paper that states that people have come together and that there are minutes to the meeting where people signed.” In Rumania, “the community is represented by associations of people who take initiative. In the community there are always opinion leaders. They bring people together in the school, church or pub. They come together and have to agree what their priorities and needs are. They need to be a lot of people—the whole community.”

The Romania ICR (2002:10) indicates that passivity of poor communities was a barrier to their participation. The indicated that these communities could be served by using skilled facilitators to mobilize them.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The Romania ICR (2002:14) also says that taking community members out of their passive mode produced community members who were more engaged in civic activities.

In sum, the Romania project allows villages to organize themselves into associations that must be approved by the elected mayor. These associations prioritize sub-projects.

#### Chile: Elected officials on a project committee

In Chile, working at the Commune level, the project approached elected Commune officials.<sup>32</sup> Due to the unitary state, technical line ministry departments have little independence. It was therefore difficult to decentralize project activities. Decentralization in Chile mostly takes the form of deconcentration. Local authorities have few tax collection powers. Nevertheless, the elected local officials could represent people in project matters.

In Chile, the Commune created a Local Development Committee (LDC) for the project. The LDC included the mayor and other ‘worthies’ ostensibly elected to the committee. However, the TTL could not say by whom or how these ‘worthies’ were elected. When working with the private development assistance companies who provided assistance to the LDC, each commune created two development plans, one for on-farm development and one for off-farm development. The on-farm plan outlined how individual farmers would invest in productive activities. The off-farm plan involved groups of people and covered public sector projects, group activities. How the LDC meetings proceeded depended on personalities involved: the Mayor, Farmer group representatives...etc.

The LDC called together everyone in the catchment to discuss potential group activities. “Activity groups were organized by inviting everyone in the catchment to meet. They had endless meetings.” The LDC, however, created the priority list of sub-projects. In conjunction with the project unit, technical specs were drawn up and the project unit managed the funds.<sup>33</sup>

In short, the Chile project worked through a committee on which the elected local authority sat. It is not clear who the other members of this committee were, or whether the procedures used by the committee, and the committee’s structure, combined to give the mayor the final say. More information is needed in order to determine how representative the LDC was.

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<sup>32</sup> The team leader did not know if there were independent candidates.

<sup>33</sup> The Chile ICR (2001:26) suggested that the project’s support specialists be moved from the project unit to the municipal government. The Chilean partner implementing agency of the central government, however, commented: “We disagree with the statement that the impacts of the project would have been greater if the PAMs [the project support specialists] had been incorporated into the structure of the municipalities. In such a case, the UTP [project technical unit] would not have been able to count on staff to implement the project or establish a team with motivation and a technical program improved by feedback from expertise in the field. ...this would have simply added to the bureaucratic structures of the municipalities and making use of resources even less agile.” Clearly, the government views the project as a way of implementing its own programs, and does not view local government as a channel for demand for sub-projects.

## Morocco: Custom and committees with post-hoc rural council approval and participatory evaluations

The Morocco project initially approached communities (*Douars*) via *Douar* chiefs. Later in the project process, the plans developed by *Douars* were subject to the approval of the president of the commune's rural council.<sup>34</sup> The president of the rural council was required to sign off on development plans developed by *Douars* along with the project committee. The TTL said that "*Douar* plans had to be signed off on by the president of the rural council...mainly to keep the president informed." However, the degree to which the inclusion of the rural council president can be considered representation, or whether the project gave the rural council president a controlling role in decision making, is unclear.

The project first informed *Douars* about the project and conducted information (*sensibilisation*) campaigns to inform people about NRM and watershed management. *Douars* that expressed interest were then selected. After being selected, *Douar* members went through a process of training to become informed about what the project was and how it worked. The TTL said "They tell people that they will return in a week or so. When they return they ask the community to organize."

- The project approaches the *Douar* via chiefs and some leaders who emerge.
- At the first meeting, typically half the heads of households come.
- Women are requested to participate and sometimes a few come. Sometimes none come.
- The *Douar* forms a committee.

Together they work out a five-year investment plan called "Plan de Développement de Douar."<sup>35</sup> The annual investment program must be signed by the project staff and the committee and the president of the rural council.

It is not clear that the signing committee was representative, although it was held accountable to the community in several ways. First, the president of the rural council (which regrouped five to twenty *douars*) was required to sign off on the plan. Other means of accountability included an annual participatory evaluation that involved the whole community and supervision by facilitators for the project and the technical specialists. People could also bring complaints to the project or to the governor of the region. In Morocco, the TTL emphasized that because there is no formal channel of recourse, the informal strategy people use is to "complain."

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<sup>34</sup> The TTL did not know if the rural council president is elected or appointed or if there are independent candidates in elections if the president is elected. In Egypt, they are elected.

<sup>35</sup> The *Douar* committee produces a development plan. It is produced jointly between the committee and project personnel. This plan is costed by the project unit with respect to the priorities expressed by the community. If the investment is skewed among the three areas on the positive list, between downstream and upstream, agriculture, women, infrastructure, an attempt is made to arrive at a balance among projects.

In sum, the Morocco project approached communities via customary chiefs, then formed a committee that articulated community issues and procured the signature of the rural council president once community priorities had been established. The president was brought in at the last moment. Additional accountability measures to enhance representation included the process of participatory evaluation complaints to the project unit.

Mali: Elected rural councils and committees of interested groups—with prefect signoff

The Mali mission is setting up two kinds of investment funds: a public goods fund that will be under the authority of the elected rural councils, and a “community development fund,” a kind of collective productive private goods fund, to be managed by a committee. For the public goods fund, people will be represented by the rural council in a process that involves extended consensus-building and the development of a three-year management plan. For the elaboration of three-year management plans, the local elected government authorities are required to work with “all the local actors.” The prefect has no control over the budget, but they must sign the plan to assure that it was elaborated in a legal manner. If everyone is not involved, the prefect can refuse to sign. A single village can sign. Villages are represented in this process by the elected local councils, their chiefs and village councils. They are supposed to convene the whole village to discuss matters. The prefect must sign off on each plan to assure that it is consistent with the existing laws. Each *cercle* (administrative district above the commune) has *Centre de Conseil Communal* (CCC). The CCC is there to aid the elected local authorities. It can give them technical assistance.

The community investment fund is targeted at productive private investments that are to be made by private collectives. The organizations that can apply are Agricultural Production Organizations (OPA—including cooperatives, economic interest groups called GIE, and associations) within the rural community (*communauté rurale*, or CR). To determine who is eligible for the community investment funds, The Bank has created a “*Cadre de Consultation*,” made up of members from all OPAs in the CR. This group must approve all proposals. They will be asked to judge the proposals on eight criteria, one of which is Environmental Effects. Then the project will be co-funded. Different projects will be eligible for different levels of co-funding. The Bank representative in Bamako explained that The Bank created the fund in this way so that it would not be under the control of the elected rural councils. When asked if the President of the CR might be present on the committee, The Bank representative said no. However, the three year plans developed by the CR cover these private collective investments. The Bank has not yet identified a means for reconciling the contents of the plan with the decisions of this committee. The desire to keep elected local officials out of this process seems questionable in the light of their representative nature and the public nature of the funds (despite the private nature of the investments) that will be invested.

In short, communities in Mali are represented by their elected local authorities in public investment matters and they are represented by business interest groups in collective private investments.

### China: Representation through interviews and surveys despite existence of elected local authorities

In the China project, the only way communities were represented in the project was through interviews and surveys. According to the project manager, “Nobody represents people in the local arena.” Although elected administrative village heads exist, they were not considered by the project team to represent local needs and aspirations.

### Egypt: Traditional ambassadors

In Egypt, Phase I of the project began with the intention of working with traditional community spokespersons, *mandoubeen* (meaning representative or ambassador) rather than with elected authorities. The area was divided into thirty-eight “communities” based on geographic boundaries and on tribal areas defined in conjunction with the communities. In each of the communities, a *mandoub* was selected, although the project team ultimately expressed doubts about the selection process (which was, according to the TTL, “supposedly by the people”). Project personnel intervened when disagreements arose or when some selections of particular *mandoubeen* were considered dubious (Egypt interview 1.). The Egypt ICR (2003:15) noted that in the next phase of this project, MRMP II, “the selection of *mandoubeen* will be revalidated to ensure their accountability to their constituency.”

In Egypt, the project did not work closely with elected authorities. Elected local governments in the projects areas were involved in so far as they were part of the local community. The local coordination committee included local government representatives. “The committee has a structure and function. [The] number of elected local people is too small. The area is large, the number of representatives is too small. Population is not dense enough. There are both party list and independent candidates in local election.” (Egypt interview 2.)

In the second phase of the Egypt project, the TTL will shift the project’s focus away from *mandoubeen*, who sometimes “duplicate action of local government [and...] compete and become a shadow for local government.” While local governments are funded to provide electricity, health and education, the local government’s work is not carried out under the project but through a different mechanism. In these domains *mandoubeen* are not competing with local governments. The problem with local governments is that while their jurisdiction includes everyone in a given area, they are located in small towns and in practice end up representing only the towns. The project intends to transfer public service to local government over time as local government capacities grow. (Egypt interview 2.)

### *In implementation—who manages funds?*

Overall, only a few projects worked through elected local government offices. Some worked with local line ministry authorities and other administrative authorities. Most worked through project-defined or project-established units.

#### Local government fund management

In Mali, The Bank intends funding to reach the Rural Community (the most local level of local government) directly, but legalities must still be worked out. The Bank must ascertain whether granting the funds directly to the Rural Community is legal under the *caisse unique* system. For the community projects, the money will go to a bank. The regulations are therefore not a problem. When the committee approves a project, it will be able to allocate the funds to those who proposed it. “With communality we can move the money closer to the community. The project unit used to pay the implementation, now it will be the commune that will manage the funds.”

#### Local administrative authorities

In Niger, the project is allocating funds through the project unit and through prefects. When Local Government are elected and ready, projects will then work through local governments in fund allocation.

In the Senegal project (which is participatory but pre-CDD), foresters are responsible for the program. They manage the teams in Dakar and have budgets. GIEs have no operational budgets, only revenues from charcoal sale.

#### Project units

In Chile, a project unit located at the micro-catchment level works with the elected *commune*. The project unit manages funds and also hires private contractors to provide assistance to the local development committees, etc. Consultants are paid by contract.

The project created the *Secano* (Drylands) project unit. “If successful we’ll change how INDAP works.” INDAP already has their own units at a higher level. We created one unit per commune. With the communes these units deal with micro-catchment areas. INDAP had their own activities in the area. The *Secano* project unit parachuted in and this created conflict with the existing units. The *Secano* project unit worked in the commune. The INDAP project unit comes from Santiago.

Projects are funded from a special account in **the** central bank. The project unit draws on that account (Paying consultants, 3 bids brought by LDC and Project unit, Project unit approval required, Project unit paid for implementation). Commune, community, group

managing sub-project were involved. They provided inputs in kind. No matching funds were required.

In Egypt (1), the project set up a project coordination unit—under the government. It had five sub-regional centers. They handled the funding and implementation, monitoring and follow up. The communities received extension and funding of specific projects. Implementation was contracted out. Construction and other things went to local contractors. The beneficiaries would select the contractors (as represented through the mandoubeens).

### *In monitoring and evaluation*

Information on monitoring and evaluation comes primarily from the PAD analysis; these aspects of CDD did not feature significantly in the interviews. The findings from the PAD analysis show a general trend toward greater local participation in monitoring and evaluation. In earlier projects, monitoring and evaluation were conducted by the representatives of the central governments. More recent projects have put considerable provisions in place for the integration of local beneficiaries into the evaluation process. The Brazil, Mexico and Niger projects, especially, made great headway in bringing local actors into the evaluation process. The most innovative approach was found in the Niger project's Community Action Program (CAP)(2003). Most recent CDD projects monitor poverty reduction, community inclusion and production (see Annex H), but the Niger CAP has added accountability as a new indicator.

The Niger project included a poverty and environmental monitoring component that served as the Monitoring and Evaluation system (M & E). One of the component's objectives was to strengthen local communities' ability to analyze and manage their own integrated local development/ecosystem planning process. This component required the carrying out of a "Community-based M & E." A community-chosen Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, with support from a community development agent, determined the indicators to be used in monitoring CAP micro-projects and assessed the effect of the CAP on the community. The Committee was in charge of data collection and primary data analysis. Community development agents communicated some of these data to the decentralized project implementation units.<sup>36</sup> The functions of the State services as they related to M & E were mainly supervisory, verifying whether micro-projects were in accordance with rules and regulations and if necessary offering assistance to communities during the implementation of micro-projects.

The Chile ICR (2001:23) notes that "supervision of the firms [paid by the project unit to implement sub-projects] was supposed to come from the client (i.e., the beneficiaries, mainly small and poor farmers) and the UTP [project technical unit]. In reality, these farmers are hardly in a position to question the quality of the services provided, and usually only complained when promised goods and equipment were not delivered." The ICR goes on to explain that the UTP was relatively weak, and therefore the supervision

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<sup>36</sup> Niger, p. 18.

was weak. This observation indicates the need for participation to be mediated by representative authorities who may be more likely to speak on behalf of small farmers, since farmers may be intimidated by the private firms delivering services and may not want to question or demand better quality for what they perhaps perceive as a gift.

### **What Decisions are Communities Driving—in What Decisions are they Represented and Why?**

CDD project design and implementation is shaped by input from local people and by many other factors. By the time a list of potential sub-projects is presented to a local group, the menu of choices has been carefully tailored to take into account the pre-assessed needs of local people, the available resources of donors, the expertise available to the project team, the objectives of donors, the objectives of governments, the politics of line ministries, and the historical experience of previous ministry and Bank interventions in the zone.

In the design phase, local target-population participation is limited to needs assessments and to the knowledge brought into the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) development process from experience that Bank staff and consultants have acquired through previous interventions in the area. The design phase results in a list of potential projects from which target populations can choose. The most systematic participation of target populations takes place at the stage of sub-project selection. Here local people are brought into a process of prioritizing potential investments, costing them out and making a final decision as to which sub-projects the community will receive.

At the implementation stage, the form of participation changes drastically. Here, many projects contract implementation out to third parties. Local authorities may or may not be represented in or have control over this portion of the project lifecycle.<sup>37</sup> In the Armenia case, the use of third parties was noted to be problematic for maintaining community participation.<sup>38</sup>

In short, despite indication from the PADs that participation is greater during implementation, most control by publicly accountable local actors appears to take place during sub-project prioritization exercises. Fourteen of the twenty-two CDD projects in

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<sup>37</sup> This fact was noted in the Armenia ICR (2001:5) where the report states: “Local communities were involved in the initial identification of micro-projects, and in the collection of community contribution for the project. The demonstrated level of community commitment and contribution was very high. One issue of concern, however, was that community participation in bid evaluations, implementation and maintenance, was less significant, as was noted during the project Mid-term review carried out in April 1998.”

<sup>38</sup> In Armenia, the Social Investment Fund project faced problems in transferring responsibilities to the Implementing Agency (IA). “The IA’s role was never fully developed and ASIF staff continued to play a major role in several key tasks which should have been delegated to IAs, including appraisals, bid evaluations and supervision of construction works” (Armenia ICR 2001:10). This failure to transfer responsibilities occurred despite the project “staff’s diligent efforts to ensure community participation...” (Armenia ICR 2001:18).

the PAD analysis used management planning exercises. List making itself requires needs assessments and interviews, while implementation is managed through a variety of units but is ultimately contracted out.

Sub-project prioritization based on lists or menus presented to the community is the central point at which communities are able to drive decision making. Therefore, what is on the lists, and why, matters deeply. In this section we discuss some of the factors that influence list making.

### *Shaping lists, shaping choices*

Negative lists can be very specific. The China project forbade resettlement activities due to concerns about the environmental impacts of resettlement. The China project also forbade large road investments because they were beyond the funding scale of the project. In Mali, the project forbade investments in political parties and religious organizations. Romania forbade investments in religious arenas such as cemeteries and churches. In Egypt there was an understanding that the project was agricultural, so non-agricultural investments were discouraged. Housing was explicitly on the negative list.

Positive lists tend to be very general. In Mali, the proposed positive list included: all legal prerogatives of the commune (elected local government); social investments; cultural investments; and natural resource investments.

When asked how positive and negative lists were derived, TTLs interviewed discussed the influence of history of national history, national priorities, previous projects, the influence of donors, the beliefs of different actors involved, team composition, and the demonstration effect. These are discussed briefly below.

Negative lists can have environmental implications in two ways. They may be constructed to avoid projects with negative environmental consequences. Or, they can free up monies that communities may choose to invest in environmental management endeavors.

### National priorities matter

Government priorities can have negative and positive effects on the construction of a positive list. In Mali, the mission worked with the Government to identify needs. They identified two areas for intervention: 1) capacity building of elected local authorities, communities, businesses, decentralized state service providers; and 2) support for Rural Council Three-year Development Plan development. The Bank staff added private productive local investments as a third element on the list.

In China, as the project manager pointed out, appropriate technology for uplands is very important. 100 million people reside in uplands. But while research has been done on appropriate technology for lowland environments, research on the uplands is inadequate. The lack of research and national commitment to developing appropriate technologies for

the uplands precludes local people from having them. Farmers know they need higher yields, but they cannot do the research themselves. The lack of research made it difficult for the project to identify sub-projects that could serve these local needs. The project did not know what to put on the list.

In Rumania, based on a needs assessment and negotiations with government, the project developed a positive list consisting of infrastructure, income generation and community based social services. This positive list was chosen because when communities were asked what they wanted, most wanted to fix up their churches and cemeteries. The positive list was shaped to avoid these kinds of interventions.

### Different donors, different objectives

Often times, donors have a great influence on the contents of a project and the potential investments it can make. In Morocco, the lists were drawn up between the forest and the agriculture ministries prior to the approach to villages. But these lists were based on these two ministries' experiences. In Egypt (1), the second phase of the CDD project pushed for environmental investments. The TTL said: "This round we have GEF funding. Hence, we have specific environmental objectives." The project had already been addressing soil erosion and land degradation. Many of these interventions are requested by the communities. In these cases GEF is supportive of these. In phase 1, ICARDA (International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas)—provided technical assistance through a sub-contract. Their participation shaped many of the choices.

In the case of Niger's Community Action Program (CAP), IDA and GEF were the two main donors. GEF wanted to assure that, if it contributed to the project, NRM interventions would occur (they were using OP12 funding that requires land, water and biodiversity management [check if this is exactly what is under OP12]). One of the project designers explained: "GEF felt that if you want four million bucks, they want to see land and water projects done." The project designers at The Bank argued that communities should be able to decide the project's focus. This debate led to an agreement in which a number of incentives for NRM choices were built into the process. So, while the list was open, the donors attempted to drive the choices through incentives (see below). In the Niger project, the tension between donors with different objectives challenged the fundamentals of CDD. It raised the question of how to conduct CDD while assuring long-term sustainability if communities do not choose to invest in the long-term management of the resource base.

### Team composition and mix of ministries

The composition of the team carrying out the pre-project appraisal mission and the team that formulates the project helps to set the limits on the kinds of sub-projects that will be suggested or available to communities—whether or not the projects are on the positive list. In China, a multi-disciplinary team scoped out the situation and then designed the project. The team's expertise shaped the kinds of projects suggested to local populations, the kinds of educational and preparatory discussions prior to community project

selection, and the ways in which project personnel were trained and presented options to local communities. Hence, the choices local people made after being informed of their options were shaped by the composition and orientation of the team.

In Morocco, the project had problems getting the teams for the project together. The Ministry of Agriculture was not cooperative,<sup>39</sup> in part because, while the Ministry of Agriculture managed the project funds, the Ministry of Forestry was designated as the lead agency for the project. The reasons for this situation were twofold: first, the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge of the institutional arrangements for managing the funds, and, second, because the Ministry of Forestry was not trusted in the rural areas, its representatives would not have been able to approach people easily. The TTL said, “They [the Ministry of Forestry] still go out there in their uniforms and with their guns.” The failure of many past projects had created antagonisms. The Forest Service wanted minimum downstream investments. Ultimately, they agreed to do downstream investments as an incentive for upstream investments. In the end, the forced cooperation of the two ministries enabled a more integrated approach.

In Egypt (1), the project targeted agriculture. Because the team’s skills were oriented toward agriculture, less attention was paid to environmental investments. As the TTL put it, “There could have been more addressing environmental needs, but the project had too much going on.” Also in Egypt (1), In phase 1, ICARDA provided technical assistance through a sub-contract. Their participation shaped many of the choices [also mentioned above]. “Choices were influenced by the expertise of those that intervened.”

It should be also noted that a teams’ perceptions or misperceptions can also influence how projects are structured. People from the Romania fund “...went traveling and they saw lots of damages to the environment—especially in these poorest communities. They have no [waste disposal] system. There were fields of plastic bottles. They cut wood and there are flooding of rivers. With poverty, they saw that there were bigger environmental problems. We had a discussion [about environmental problems], but the communities said we need roads and water.” “They do not perceive it [environmental decline] as a problem because it is not threatening their lives or associated with something extremely basic to them.” The TTL said that once the local people’s priorities were met and the communities proved themselves, lots of communities wanted environmental investments Even RSDF (Rumanian Social Development Fund) does not think that this should be the priority. He explained that they saw the problem and wanted to try to see if they could fix it.

### Financing mechanism

The China project required the Chinese government to forward project funds, using their own resources until The Bank reimbursed them. This requirement led to investments being made only by those ministries that could afford it, a situation that shaped the kinds of investments that could be made and when.

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<sup>39</sup> This is why only 26 of an originally targeted 40 Douars were reached and why the loan was reduced by 1 million.

APLs were mentioned by TTLs as a good mechanism for sustaining projects. Egypt had two stand-alone loans—not APL. The TTL felt an APL would have facilitated transition to the next phase. Mali will have an APL funding mechanisms since this project will have two phases.

### **What Subprojects do Communities Choose?**

Egypt (I) is a case where the environment was chosen by local people for investment. The project was trying to address soil erosion and land degradation. Sub-project ranking was 1) watershed management and water harvesting; 2) range management; 3) soil conservation. Some latrines were requested. People also requested education and awareness programs concerning the environment, biodiversity, flora and fauna. Water harvesting projects were also in high demand. The project did address local environmental needs. In addition, the community requested the documentation of their own indigenous knowledge. In response, the project implemented community schools, run by teachers from within the communities. The project provided textbooks and materials.

In most cases, however, if people are given a wide range of investment options, they do not choose NRM projects. In Niger, for example, under the program's pilot projects, communities were focused on short-term, immediate needs (interviews & PAD p. 28). Based on PRA, the project managers rarely saw priorities that included NRM, despite having instructed animators to speak of NRM in the PRA exercises. Only two NRM projects, one including a soil erosion measure and another involving pastoral management, were identified. In neighboring Mali, PGRN, a NRM-dedicated project, was scaled up at mid-term and the amount of finance per village reduced. Reduced per-village finances along with the obligation for communities to contribute to investments despite high prevailing poverty rates, "...have influenced communities to give preferences and higher priorities to social investments over natural resources conservation and management activities..." (Mali ICR 2001:14).

In Romania, the environment seemed to be a low priority. The TTL stated that environmental interventions are never a first priority for local communities. People did not choose environmental projects. But it is not clear that they were at any point encouraged to. In China, farmers never requested forestry, rangeland or watershed management. This is probably due to the scale of the problem, and that they were unaware of the possibility of requesting such sub-projects. Also, when people were informed about project operation and options, no NRM discussion was held. Therefore, there was no NRM on the menu. In China, the TTL explained, "There is an environmentalist on the project—but he spends most of his time getting project approval. His role is really to get projects through the environmental review."

In Romania, the TTL said that when villages are asked what they need money for, "they will first cite rehabilitation of the church or the cemetery." But architectural rehabilitation projects were excluded from the positive list. Therefore, the majority of projects chosen

were small infrastructure projects: “Roads; water comes next; then they go to income generation projects.” Community based services were not requested by rural villages. If ordered in a general manner, the priorities seemed to be 1) new infrastructure (roads then water), 2) income generation projects, 3) infrastructure maintenance projects, 4) social services. Repairs to roads and bridges get lower priority than income generation projects. Priority is to create infrastructure, not to repair it. Where infrastructure exists and needs repair, people lean toward income generation.

In the China project, most farmers asked for off-farm jobs. In addition, they wanted, if the opportunity was provided, to migrate out of the area. The project, however, did not want to encourage migration, so migration was not an option. In Chile, communities invested in agriculture although forestry investments were called for in the SAP and ICR. No reason was given for the fact that no forestry investments were made.[check].

In Morocco the project assumed that people wanted to make investments in downstream infrastructure and agricultural production, but not in the upstream areas where rangeland management was needed. They did find in practice that people did not want to do upstream work, especially since labor was voluntary and unpaid. Later the project paid people to do upstream investments—they introduced cost sharing.

Some communities in Morocco chose not to work with the project for a number of reasons that have to do with environmental investments offered by the project:

- Check dams get in the way of their range management and cereal growing. They reduce the area they can cultivate.
- They had to wait for benefits from trees planted on bunds.
- They also did not see that they would reap the benefit and they did not want to lose income while waiting.
- The worst areas according to the project team leader are where “individualism” has taken over. Here the communities have broken down and cannot organize and do not want to participate. These are the places with the worst erosion. Everyone sees the problem, but nobody wants to do anything. They all want to just work on their own.

In Morocco, people tended to ask for productive activities first. Requests for irrigation systems and roads were typical. Upstream investments needed community cooperation, which was garnered over time and by the project’s willingness to balance the package of activities.

In Armenia, although the project included a forestry component, nobody asked for forestry sub-projects. Secondary roads, water and schools were the high priorities. People did not choose forestry because they felt it was a long term, pre-existing problem, and that forestry problems were formerly managed by central government. NRM was a big problem, but it did not seem resolvable via collective action. People invested where they felt they could have influence, the TTL explained. “They invested in schools rather than health and forests.” Health services were also rarely asked for, in part because communities perceived these as too centralized for communities to be dealing with

themselves. The Armenia ICR (2001:5) notes, there was a “...very high priority of communities for rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities.”

#### **ARRANGEMENTS FOR INFLUENCING COMMUNITY CHOICES—REASONS AND INCENTIVES**

Sub-project selections reflect a preference for productive investment activities with quick returns. Communities appear to be focused on immediate needs rather than long-term investments. NRM projects rarely fit these criteria. The Niger team leader provided a few explanations for why people do not want to invest in NRM sub-projects.<sup>40</sup> Some natural resources are public goods. Some have diffuse and long-term benefits, whereas people are more focused on short-term economic returns. These arguments indicate that people are biased against many conservation oriented activities and longer-term investments in range, water or forest management.

People also appear in some cases to be biased against environmental investments because they are not sure to harvest the returns themselves. The resource may be a public good that they cannot prevent others from entering. Further, environmental management is often called for by outsiders who expect local people to work for free. In Morocco, people did not want to invest in rangeland management because the labor had to be voluntary. This view of environmental labor as somehow outside of the cash economy may be problematic for motivating local people to invest in national and international environmental priorities or even in long-term local productive endeavors. In addition, one project manager observed that some environmental investments require cooperation that can only develop over time. Such cooperation has transaction costs that projects may not be taking into account, but which local people know well from previous projects into which they have been recruited.

There are also a few ways in which environmental investments may be hidden or missed. First, many environmental interventions are already covered in requirements on all bank projects. Environmental impact assessments (EIA) require projects to take many environmental matters into account within other interventions. Hence, some environmental interventions may not be counted since they are already subsumed under other kinds of interventions. Other environmental interventions, such as soil erosion control, wind breaks, water gathering technologies, may be subsumed under agricultural intervention or may be hidden in a fuel substitution program that provides kerosene cook stove but is designed to reduce pressure on wood supplies. Definitions also make a difference. Is water harvesting an environmental, or an agricultural, investment? Clearly it is both. Many people, however, would not see it as an environmental investment and it may not show up when people are asked if they are investing in the environment.

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<sup>40</sup> It is worth noting that there are other sub-projects that people do not tend to choose. AIDS was treated with special consideration. AIDS needed proactive consideration because people would not talk about it. Also, for AIDS programs, smaller contributions are asked for. To get people to think of potential AIDS interventions, they needed to sensitize facilitators. There is no AIDS funding in the project, but The Bank has large AIDS projects in Niger.

In addition, just because people are not asking for NRM does not mean that they are not doing it. They may be engaged in their daily lives in multiple NRM activities. They also may be involved in other NRM projects, or NRM measures may be mainstreamed into existing projects where environmental standards and EIAs have built environmental components into the activities. How NRM is mainstreamed and defined may only leave on the menu the long-term, large-scale, high-risk, public-good projects—in which communities are not likely to want to invest. Further, people may not choose NRM projects because they know that other donors will fund, or are funding, them. They may choose to use CDD funds for investments less likely to be funded by others—a kind of fungibility incentive.

Many projects adopted incentive strategies to influence choices. The Niger team combined education, choosing hot spots, and lower co-financing for NRM. Morocco combined pairing of NRM and non-NRM sub projects with lower co-financing for NRM. These and other incentives are discussed below. Other projects reserved green funding windows—funds reserved for environmental investments. In Egypt, the project had separate NRM projects. This section reviews the incentives used to encourage the choice of natural resource management sub-projects in CDD.

### **Sub-project Encouragement Specified in PADs**

Clearly the list of sub-projects that are allowed will shape the choices communities make. Of the total twenty-two projects, two offered only NRM sub-projects, while twenty had a mix of NRM and other sub-projects (such as social, economic infrastructure, agriculture development, or education). Of the total twenty two projects, four have open menus; that is, no specific sub-projects are presented in the PADs. The rest have positive and negative lists.

Based on analysis of the PADs for these twenty-two projects, incentives and disincentives for communities to choose certain sub-projects are summarized in Table 5. Overall, four types of interventions were observed in the design of the PADs: provision of additional grants earmarked for NRM activities (Type I) , ENV education/awareness raising campaign/NRM related training (Type II) , negative lists (Type III), and ENV screening for certain types of projects (Type IV). The total number of projects with some sort of NRM interventions on their sub-project menus amount to fifteen, which is 68 percent of the total number of projects

**Table 5. Summary of subproject choices incentives/disincentives for CDD Projects**

Total No. of Projects	Sub-Project Type		Positive Lists for subprojects	Incentive/disincentives for environmental subprojects				
	NRM Only	Mixed NRM + Other		Incentives/disincentives	Type I. Earmarked Grants or Funds	Type II. Education/Awareness/Training	Type III. Negative lists	Type IV. ENV Screening
22	2	20	18	15	8	10	3	6
100%	9%	91%	82%	68%	36%	45%	14%	27%

The high number of projects with NRM-related interventions suggests that project designers are aware that, without interventions, communities do not tend to choose the NRM activities. It also suggests that the World Bank, GEF, governments, or donor countries have an interest in driving communities to choose certain NRM projects through these interventions.

The number for each intervention is presented as follows:

- 8 projects provide additional grants/funds if NRM is selected for subprojects.
- 10 projects have environmental education, awareness raising and training for communities.
- 3 projects include negative lists for certain projects (infrastructure, religious building etc.)
- 6 projects require environmental screening and safeguards for certain types of projects, which may discourage some communities, to invest in certain projects (disincentives for communities).<sup>41</sup>

Other methods were reported in interviews. The following assessment of the ways in which NRM was promoted by the projects is based on both PADs and interviews.

*Environmental information and education*

Many projects, including Egypt, Niger, Mali, Morocco, Panama, Philippines, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (roughly half the countries examined) conducted environmental education and discussed environmental investments with populations before sub-project choices were made. In Niger, the project discussed the links between poverty and environmental management with communities. The influence of these information campaigns is not clear. In China and in Chile, no information campaigns were carried out and no NRM projects were chosen. In Morocco and Egypt, the TTLs felt environmental information campaigns were relevant to choosing NRM kinds of investments.

<sup>41</sup> Some of these include “prioritization of critical subprojects rather than wish lists.” Here, the project will not have positive lists but the project will express some priorities for certain environmental projects considered critical. This approach is included in the category for environmental screening. Some also created criteria and standards for environmentally sustainable subprojects.

In Niger, although education campaigns were systematic, NRM was still not chosen. The Niger project is the follow-on to a NRM project (PGRN). Hence, the population had already had considerable awareness-raising on NRM issues. The Niger ICR (2003:12) for PGRN emphasized the importance of “sensitization/awareness-raising” for catalyzing collective action. Nevertheless, even under the PGRN (an NRM-dedicated project) project, “...preferences were for cereal banks, literacy training.... People wanted these added. PGRN was under pressure to add these.” In other words, although PGRN was a NRM program people still preferred other activities and readily expressed their preferences (CDD TTL interview).

#### *Weighing of environmental consequences*

Zimbabwe (PAD): The authors assumed that the poorest members of society would not necessarily see how investment in natural resource management benefits them (or, how environmental degradation hurts them); so, environmental problems were to be proactively targeted at the community level. The potential positive or negative effects of all proposed activities were explicitly considered in project planning (a kind of project-run EIA). This method could also be regrouped under education.

#### *Co-financing and matching funds as incentive*

The Niger CDD project offered an incentive to NRM by lowering the amount of community contribution. The economic justification for doing so is that natural resources are public goods. In this manner, the CDD principle of choice was maintained. Communities could exercise full choice with incentives to select NRM. The Niger ICR (2003:13) states that co-financing (which it also called “sweat equity”) was not a barrier to participation and that it had a strengthening effect on community “ownership” of sub-projects.

The proposed Mali CDD will co-finance projects. The level will differ among sectors. The environment is seen to be a public good and a social project. NRM will require the lowest co-financing, five percent, “because,” the TTL explained, “the benefits from [improving the] environment are long term and we want to [...encourage] these kinds of investments.” The percentage of co-financing will also differ by zones. Some zones are richer and can mobilize more funds. The proposed CDD will take this into account.

Morocco used co-financing to entice communities to choose upstream investments. The cost sharing was greater for downstream activities. This difference was justified by the fact that 1) downstream investment requires multiple individual investments and does not represent a community investment; and 2) upstream investment is more clearly a community investment. Cost sharing encourages investment in resources that are public goods.

The Armenia ICR (2001:29) notes in its Lessons section that “[t]he local contribution requirement provide[d] communities with incentives for choosing investments with high

public good value as well as motivation for operation and maintenance of micro-projects.”

### *Pairing NRM and non-NRM projects*

In Morocco, the project combined “matching” with “pairing” to assure the inclusion of NRM sub-projects. First, lower matching funds were required for NRM projects and, second, the NRM projects were paired with other projects that communities chose. If, for example, the community wanted to work on lowland projects they would also be required to include “upstream” highland management in their activities

Morocco’s Lakhda project established ten kinds of investments divided into three categories:

1. Upstream watershed management
2. Downstream investments in infrastructure, and
3. Downstream investments in agricultural production.

These categories were established as a “guide” for community investments. Each community had to divide their investments evenly among these three categories. The idea behind these categories was that, while people wanted to make investments in downstream infrastructure and in agricultural production, they did not want to invest in the upstream areas. The downstream investments served as an incentive for people to make upstream investments (The TTL later also said that upstream investments were the only ones in which the Forest Service showed interest).

At first, even when upstream investments were required along with the downstream investment, people did not want to work upstream. The labor was voluntary. Later the project introduced cost sharing to encourage more upstream activities. The project team leader also explained that if the investment is skewed among the investment areas--between downstream and upstream, agriculture, women, infrastructure--an attempt is made to achieve a balance. People tend to ask for productive activities first. Requests for irrigation and roads are typical. They want downstream investments. The guidelines are used as an inducement to get investments upstream.

### *Earmarking funds for environment—green windows/projects*

In Egypt (1), the communities agreed to earmark a portion of the overall funds for projects that addressed certain issues. Women’s needs (health, in particular) required special attention. The project asked communities to agree on a certain percentage of the project that would be dedicated to women. This mechanism could be used for environmental purposes. The proposed Egypt II project is also earmarking some funds for reserves. These will be managed as a separate project.

Because of the GEF funding in Phase II, the Egypt II project has a separate positive list and budget specially allocated for NRM. “Two reserves will be established in the project management area. Money for protected areas will not be included in community budgets.

The government wanted it this way. They have a GEF grant and we had to deliver!” (Egypt II). All communities will have access to a green window with its own menu (see PAD). (Egypt II). In the CAP, the community will be allowed to use the areas, but will then allow for regeneration. GEF funds will also be used for ranch management/grazing areas. They want to develop holistic range activities.

The Romanian Social Development Fund second phase project (RFDS2) TTL wanted to give ‘graduating communities’ a chance to secure funds for a second project, although they are usually limited to only one. Project designers wanted to restrict the second project to waste management, but because the projected costs were too high to satisfy EU environmental standards,<sup>42</sup> the restriction could not be imposed. The Ministry of Environment is stuck. Reflecting on the failed attempt, the TTL explained that while “communities were not requesting this [kind of project]....given the opportunity, if this were there the only choice... then many communities would agree. This [waste management] was never their priority.” Here earmarking ran into a wall due to the high cost attached to the investment.

In Mali, the project that preceded the current proposed CDD project, PGRN, had NRM dedicated funds. About eighty percent of the funding was earmarked for NRM. While this approach worked, it was not CDD. In the CDD project there will be no earmarking. The project will divide the funds: 1/3 for the *Collectivité* (local elected authorities); 2/3 for private investments. This division is justified on the grounds that many public sector efforts have already been funded. Hence, the project is trying to provide funds for private sector investments. The funds for the *Collectivité* are to complement the existing funds that are already available. The collectives will be asked to seek funding elsewhere when they propose a project for which funds already can be secured.

Among the earmarking approaches that featured in the PADs, only the one used in Egypt is consistent with CDD. Here, communities themselves were involved in determining broad categories of investment for which to earmark funds. Other approaches, while effective for channeling funds to NRM, are not consistent with the tenets of CDD—as noted in the Mali case.

#### *Demonstration effect—pilot projects*

In Egypt, the TTL felt that “...additional interventions...could be done in biodiversity—such as small eco-tourism...We need pilot projects. Medicinal plant conservation and sustainability pilot projects too.” There was a need, however, for pilots to show communities that such projects could support income generation. In Phase II, the program

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<sup>42</sup> Romania negotiated with the EU environment chapter that said that waste management can only be done in the “ideal” way. This means that the normal (second best) solutions used everywhere, cannot be funded in Rumania. Therefore people are throwing garbage at the end of the village. So, plastic and other things are building up. The EU does not allow cheap solutions—like pits with plastic layers that could be covered. But we are not allowed to do this because it is not 100 percent ecological.

will therefore support some pilots, and if communities request them, they can later become part of the CAP.<sup>43</sup>

The Morocco project reported lateral spread by the demonstration effect. When positive project outcomes were witnessed, communities that had not originally wanted to take part in the project asked to be included.

*Funding from non-CDD sources—going beyond positive and negative lists*

In the Niger CAP, communities are encouraged to include on their priority lists sub-projects that are not part of the project menu. “People are asked to rank their priorities independently of what the project can fund.” Their ranking does not have to be funded by the project. If they identify sub-projects that the project cannot fund, the project team has the option of putting the community in touch with other donors who do. Project organizers in Mali are now also designing their programs to draw on other projects funded in the area by The Bank and other donors. When programs want investments that the project does not fund, they will be encouraged to approach these other donors.

The Niger project also takes other existing projects into account when presenting their project to local people. The World Bank funds a big AIDS program in Niger that is not part of this CAP; facilitators were trained to sensitize people to AIDS issues as a potential area of intervention.

Nevertheless, donors do have an incentive to create demand for their particular areas of service. In addition, communities are likely to try to propose projects that they think most likely to be funded. Hence, team leaders reported a tendency—with both push and pull factors behind it—for the availability of funding to be at least a partial factor in choices local communities make.

We also note that complementary sources of funding do not always come from donors. In Rumania’s rural areas, a patriarchal social system that provides people with basic services is already in place. Hence people in the rural areas did not prioritize social services. In contrast, social services projects were in demand in urban areas.

Egypt II is also proposing to link communities with appropriate ministries or agencies to fund projects that are not on their menu.

*Mainstreaming environmental investments*

In some places, environmental concerns are mainstreamed into project design. In Mali, for example, funding proposals are reviewed by a committee that judges the proposals on eight criteria, one of which is the proposed project’s environmental effects.

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<sup>43</sup> GEF was very supportive of this because it was a good example of an integrated WB-GEF project. IFAD is also involved.

One TTL (Egypt II) stated that while people chose agricultural projects that respected the environment, they did not perceive these as environmental. In their case, prioritizing the environment simply makes sense. As the TTL explained, “They do not... want [to focus on] places where they expend labor with nothing coming back.”

The experience of project leaders with waste management in Romania, discussed above, illustrates the potentially negative effects of mainstreaming. Designers of the Romania project wanted to encourage trash management in their second round of projects. They could not do so because EU standards were so high that they made this kind of investment prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the waste disposal problems of villages remained unsolved. The project manager suggested that the standards could be relaxed so that people could institute the kinds of systems present in many places—although not the best, they are sufficient, and they are certainly better than nothing.

## **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES IN CDD**

Above we discussed some mechanisms that can be used to influence investments in natural resources. The following section discusses other, more complex, factors that, while they may not be design mechanisms, should be taken into consideration in project design and implementation, because they can influence investment patterns. These factors include influence exerted by project staff, particular national, institutional or political histories, the effects of learning by doing, a community’s legal status, the exclusion of women, elite capture and corruption, mid-level decentralization, monitoring, funding mechanisms, administrative issues, time given for a project to mature, scaling up, and sustainability.

### **Influence by Individuals**

Positive lists are often shaped by the composition of a project team. Implementation is also shaped by project team members. For example, in Chile, it appears that the vision brought to the project by the Team Leader may have shaped the ultimate investments. The project team leader in Chile was concerned that “population pressure and poverty causes pressures on these lands,” and saw intensification as “the environmental solution.” Although the SAP and ICR [check] called for forestry investments the TTL was not aware of any. “Very little,” he said, “was ultimately invested in NRM per se. Perhaps nothing.” He explained that the project’s “objective was to intensify cultivation of bottom lands and by doing so to reduce need to grow wheat on the slopes. This would turn hillsides into pastures. People wanted to do this, but [it was] difficult to intensify without irrigation. We needed small head dug wells with small pumps, [and] drip irrigation.” So, people ostensibly chose, and the project invested in, agricultural intensification. His causal theory informed how he targeted the project’s investments.

In Chile, the team leader also reported that the way commune level meetings proceeded depended on the personalities of those involved. Dynamic individuals could often influence a project's course.

### **Difficult Histories and Resistant Governments**

Most of the TTLs evoked the history of the government, the project predecessors, the region or the institutions involved in making and implementing the project as a major set of obstacles that must be attended to in establishing CDD. Here I will recount some of the stories. Their moral is that these issues must be addressed creatively.

China has a top-down planning system. As the Poverty I, II and IV TTL stated, in this context, "You cannot think you can go into a village and empower [...the villagers]." He explained that "The mind set in China is that you should use a 'scientific' approach to identify problems and then 'tell villagers what they should do'." The Chinese planners, he explained, "wanted to tell villagers to plant this tree over there." In China, the project had to work with the planners to convince them to take local needs into account. After getting the National Planning Commission to agree with their approach, they also needed to monitor the project's progress continuously to ensure that lower-level institutions did not just revert to their habitual top-down planning approach. In one instance, the China TTL explained the menu approach to a very progressive vice-governor/chairman of the ethnic autonomous region he was working in. The vice-governor's response was, "That is impossible. Farmers in this region never saw a menu. They do not know what they want. They need to be told scientifically what to do."

In China, the central government did agree to a participatory approach to sub-project choice in the Southwest Poverty Reduction project. This involved consulting local populations in order to compile a list of projects to be implemented. One county, however, did not follow instructions. The project's mandate was to do what the farmers and poorest members of the community wanted done. In this county, Puding, the county administration had invested in helping Chinese in nearby areas by building greenhouses for export crops and a university. They did not build village schools. When the Beijing central planning commission sent an agent to check up on the county authorities to see if their proposal was being made in the correct manner, the Beijing agent first visited the regional governor to get a letter stating that he had permission to remove the county head if he had not done his job well. The agent arrived in the county and found that things were not proceeding according to the mandate. The population was not being involved. The county head was so upset that he wound up in the hospital for three days. In the mean time, the county mobilized all of its public servants and conducted the necessary household surveys...The central government's commitment to the project's participatory character was a necessary element to guarantee that the community be involved in project design.

In Chile, the *Secano* (drylands) project emerged from a long history of activism in the region. Chile's INDAP (the National Institution of Livestock and Development) was seriously terrorized during the dictatorship, when INDAP was an old fashioned technical

service and credit supply institution. The military government was hard on them, and the Congress has been brutal to them. When the team leader took over the Small Farmer Project, INDAP's small farms loan portfolio was in disarray. When he attempted to investigate the Small Farmer Project, the team leader (who was meant to reform INDAP) found that the project—though it was supposed to be in operation—was non-existent. The Small Farmer Project had died. The *Secano* Project emerged from these ashes. Land reforms in the early 1970s that destroyed *latifundia* (large farming estates), the lack of support from the government (institutionalized by the military government), democracy reforms in the 1990s, and the absence of a history or tradition of cooperation or democratic decision making, all shaped the project's development and outcome in Chile.

The China project team found support in high enough places and was able to work with resistant government officials until they capitulated to project requests to the degree that they were capable. The project in Chile worked with the local government and forged on.

In Romania, where collective action has historically had a negative connotation, the project had to approach ideas of collaborative decision making and community action carefully. Following forced collectivization, peasants were suspicious of everything having to do with coming together. Voluntary work had a very bad connotation due to “forced voluntary work” during the communist period. When the project leader prepared the project, he talked about cooperatives. “But,” he said, “people did not want them. They associated cooperatives with communism.” He then found an alternate approach: “[W]hen I talked of producer groups, they were happy.”

Elsewhere, the Romanian team leader said that peasants often seemed passive and “just waited for people to do things for them.” “Now,” he said, “the situation has changed. Especially in the poorest regions, facilitators were used to help people to identify needs and establish priorities. Even though they mentioned income generation, people chose infrastructure as first priority—roads and water. These are the collective needs.” The TTL explained that these are very poor people with low qualifications. They have started, however, getting out of their villages to do things like opening bank accounts, talking to government, holding local authorities accountable—such as the local mayor. “There is a lot of ownership reflected in the quality and cost effectiveness of the projects. Now people see the value in voluntary work.” The team leader noted that “social capital is about getting people to talk to each other and to work together and engage in some forms of self help.”

The Indonesia KDP project (Indonesia ICR 2003:15) represented a radical departure from practices of government during years of authoritarian rule and centralized planning. In the authoritarian context the project observed that “consultants and facilitators needed additional training in community facilitation, in actively encouraging the inclusion of women and marginal groups, in field supervision, technical and civil engineering skills, project management and reporting. Most specifically, technical supervision for village infrastructure projects required strengthening, and communities needed better training in planning, financial management and construction skills. In short, the project learned that in such an oppressive context, more attention needs to be paid to human resource

development and that this training is effective when sustained over longer periods of time.

### **Learning by Doing**

In the SAP, PAD and ICR documents reviewed, learning by doing is discussed at the most-local scale of “everyday learning.” In the literature, however, learning by doing can also refer to the use of empirical research to learn from development experiences. The profound lack of empirical research on CDD observed by Mansuri and Rao (2003:3) is confirmed by a review of sixty project evaluations by Wassenich and Whiteside (2003:1-2). It was also evident from a reading of available CDD project documents. Much can be learned from these documents, but without baseline data, control cases and rigorous quantitative and qualitative methods, claims about project learning carry less certainty and weight (Wassenich and Whiteside 2003:iii).

Because most CDD projects are follow-ons to existing programs, the project managers in almost all interviews felt it was important to contextualize their projects with reference to previous interventions that had been made in the area. The CDD concept has become, for these project managers, a tool for re-interpreting and learning from past programs. While their past experiences with other projects varied considerably, in China, Egypt, Morocco and Mali the TTLs all stated that they learned the same thing from their involvement in previous programs: the projects would not succeed without the inclusion of local people. This is the fundamental concept behind CDD action. TTLs have thus been influenced by the new discourse on participation and on CDD, re-evaluating their own (varied) past experiences in light of what they have learned. This is an important example of learning by doing, and it shows that new ideas—like CDD—matter.

For example, the China Team Leader learned from the past that “if the farmers do not want it, it will not work.” Also, the TTL in Morocco explained that the Lakhdar project came from twin parents: 1) Morocco’s Natural Resource Management Master Plan, which focused on watersheds and treated priority watersheds perceived as needing action; and 2) Morocco’s Integrated Rural Development (IRD) Plan. These documents came together with their historical experience. What they had learned is that “if you don’t work through community, the project will fail.” These experiences fed into the “20-20 Rural Development Strategy,” which identified a participatory strategy.<sup>44</sup>

Many other kinds of learning also take place in these projects. Poverty 4 in China will continue to work with former generation project areas. The provincial Project Management Offices (PMOs) recognize that participation is critical to the project. The project has their intense commitment. Participation is now being designed under a one million dollar grant from DFID--unfortunately DFID gave it to a group that does not know anything about China and is not doing a good job. In the early years of the China projects, we did not know that more attention had to be paid to participation in the

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<sup>44</sup> This was a Bank-Financed FAO-designed effort. FAO proposed a strategy. The Government decided that the project was too big and divided it into several pilot programs. World Bank funded one—Lakhdar (\$5 Million).

implementation phases. This is critical. The project manager observed that The Bank's support falls off for this aspect of participation. An evaluation done by a Chinese scholar stated that participation was weak in planning and strong in implementation. The project manager disagrees and says it was the other way around. They failed in the implementation to really think through and follow through on participation.

The TTL feels that the most important way to design a participatory strategy is to ask the Chinese to explore what they are already doing, to identify the weaknesses and opportunities and to then design their intervention based on what is already there. He thinks that the Chinese want to use the Administrative Village as a basis of participation. They want the Administrative Village staff to learn participatory methods. But the hired team does not seem to see it this way.

In Egypt (1), Phase II of the project is aimed at involving larger numbers of beneficiaries, and not just through the *mandoubeen*, or traditional leaders. The TTL wants more community involvement in determining the criteria for who can benefit from the project. They learned that they needed to open the process up to a much broader cross-section of community. There were a number of problems encountered with chiefs, and these are discussed under chiefs. The new project will bring in a broader cross-section of the community by: announcing meetings in advance; sharing objectives with community; and taking steps to include women.

In Egypt, project design was innovative in that a community action plan had to be formulated with the local communities. But there were delays in the implementation, caused mainly by the staff, who hesitated to engage in planning and participation processes with the local population. The project did little in the first three years. When the project got started there was pressure to implement quickly. Subsequently, implementation was carried out in a top-down manner, without a full Community Action Plan (CAP) in place. In the last three years the staff gained experience, skills and the community's trust and they were able to work together. These positive conditions provide the starting point for the currently pending CDD program. The second phase of the project has been approved by The Bank board and was awaiting parliamentary ratification in Egypt at the time of the interview in January 2004.

In Morocco, many past failed projects created antagonisms. This led the project to work with the Ministry of Agriculture rather than Ministry of Forestry. *This project taught the ministries a lot about approaches.* Learning happens by doing. Ministries are learning: that sustainability is a function of inclusion; about participatory processes; and that participation is not inconsistent with good technical outcomes.

In Morocco, villagers are learning they can be powerful and can be decision makers. People are learning that the Administration is not just a source of oppression. Agencies are also development agencies. The project created working relations between villagers and project-defined communities.

The Morocco project team leader was surprised by:

1. Basic resourcefulness of the communities:
  - Intelligent Choices
  - Good at coping with contingencies IF given the resources!
2. Solutions to problems we did not expect to see as resolvable:
  - Investments upstream
  - Sustaining Committees—through registration
  - Direct committee funding—through relations with ministries and NGOs

Evidently, there was some learning here too.

What we have learned from TTLs is that the internal discourse on CDD and community participation at the World Bank and among development professionals has a clear influence on what people learn by doing.

### **Legal Status of Communities**

In Egypt, since communities do not have the legally recognized structures that can receive funds, the project cannot really proceed. This problem is also being negotiated in Mali for the proposed project—the *caisse unique* is a major problem for local management in states with a Jacobin tradition.

### **Women's Exclusion**

Because under-representation of women is a widespread problem, many of the projects reported a need for special attention to women's empowerment. The Egypt, Niger and Indonesia projects developed measures to overcome gender biases in representation and decision making. The Egypt project earmarked funds for "women's investments" (Egypt I interview).

KDP's (Indonesia ICR 2003:15-6) initial strong affirmative action measures were not enough to empower women. Women made up 32 to 37 percent of the participants in village and inter-village meetings, but were still a minority and generally a silent one. Women's representation at meetings and their presence as consultants did not translate into significant lobbying for women's empowerment or investments that benefit women. In most cases, men continued to make the decisions. To overcome the obstacles to women's inclusion, KDP went beyond women's representation to include gender awareness and women's leadership training. These efforts moved women's participation to between 26 and 45 percent in KDP village and hamlet meetings, and over time, women became 53 percent of the loan beneficiaries. They also benefited from improved access to markets, schools, health facilities, clean water and improved sanitation.

## Elite Capture and Corruption

In China, elite capture by higher-level authorities within government is a problem. In China Administrative Villages are observed to push benefits to villages they favor. Marginal villages got less of a share. This is partly due to geography, since marginal villages are harder to get to. Preference is also given to more easily accessible villages so that the village head can easily show the project to outsiders—a kind of showcase for their good work (TTL interview). The China ICR (2003:18), also pointed out that county technical bureaucrats used to top-down planning overruled more participatory approaches.

In Egypt, “elite capture was a problem in the first phase. Those who had more got more. Those with more land got more attention. In the second phase we need to get more into poverty targeting. The tribal structure was a problem. The system consists of tribe, sub-tribe and household. Because privatization was also going on, these folks were also able to get more resources proportional to their land and also their voices were louder. Heads of clans or tribal chiefs got their needs met. In the first phase the project worked with the chiefs. They approached the chiefs and asked who should be chief. *Mandubeens* made the choices of the sub-projects. They were also overseeing the implementation. They were involved in preparing the land and preparation and then we would send in engineers.”

The Niger ICR (2003:13) points out that “entrenched constituencies” including customary authorities and government officials at various levels “may jeopardize” community based projects. In the Niger PGRN project, these obstacles were overcome by vigorous intervention of ministerial authorities. The lesson they draw is that “full government support is an absolute requisite for such a project to succeed.”<sup>45</sup>

The Romania ICR (2002:9-10), provides evidence that a better informed target community and greater transparency concerning project procedures can prevent elite capture. The ICR states that “...the local public administration authorities were tempted to take advantage of the opportunities provided by this project, disregarding its community approach, its way of directly involving the beneficiaries in the identification of their own needs, the design and implementation of sub-projects. The RSDF [Romania Social Development Fund] policy toward minimizing this risk was the adoption of transparent eligibility criteria and broad promotion of campaigns which increased both the communities’ and the LAs’ [Local Authorities’] understanding of the Program’s participatory and partnership approach.” The ICR recounts a story in which this policy succeeded in preventing an individual from profiting by “facilitating” communities’ access to RSDF funds. Because communities were aware that they had the right to interact directly with the project, this infraction was reported by the beneficiaries to the RSDF and immediately stopped.

The Indonesia KDP project (Indonesia ICR 2003:10,16) found itself in a context with a significant risk of corruption. The project successfully reduced corruption by 1)

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<sup>45</sup> Note that Crook and Sverrisson (2001) also point out that serving the poor under decentralized conditions requires central government intervention.

simplifying financial systems and project procedures; 2) increasing transparency through sharing information and strong internal and external monitoring systems; and 3) investigating and following up reports of fund misuse.

### **Mid-level Decentralization**

It is problematic for the China project that the central government has decided to decentralize project management to provincial governments. Decentralization makes supervision more difficult. It also exacerbates the practical problems of management, since The Bank now must interact with more agencies.

In effect, because these mid-level governments are not local, they are not consistent with CDD. As they are also not central, they are difficult to manage and monitor.

### **Monitoring**

The Bank saw its role in China as disciplining the program to assure that the poor were targeted. Although they could only check project progress in random samples, their random spot checking did help. The story below of the strong state checking up is one case. In another county, Liuzhi, the project manager found that the project had not followed its mandate. The Agriculture Bureau had taken over, insisting on the planting of chestnut trees as a cash crop, when the farmers did not really feel that this was what they needed. The central government labeled this case “Liuzhi disease.” By the central state creating this iconic failure it managed to scare other county heads into avoiding being labeled as infected. This is an example where a small sample check up can be made to go a long way.

In the China project, there was adequate funding for design. But funding for implementation, which would require supervision, was inadequate. “Funding for design is significant. Funding for supervision in the World Bank, however, drops off precipitously.”

### **Funding Mechanisms**

Adaptable Program Lending (APL) appears to be a good mechanism for long-term continuity. APL in Romania is in its second phase. The first Phase has already been completed and evaluated. The APL in Romania is the second ever in The Bank. It had internal and external evaluations. The government was so pleased that they not only asked for the second phase, but “originally we planned to have the second phase for 10 million dollars and they asked for 20 million.”

In Chile the TTL noted that the big problem was that they are limited to a five-year project—in actuality only 4 by the time the project really got started. APL would have been a positive way to guarantee sustainability.

The Egypt ICR (2003:13) draws the lesson that “participatory project implementation requires flexible budgeting that is not constrained by predetermined outputs, but relies on a truly demand-driven identification of activities in order for participatory planning and implementation approach to be fully responsive to beneficiary demands.” This statement, however, appears to be the application of new CDD theory to this project, rather than a lesson drawn from the project’s experience.

### **Administrative Issues**

The Chile TTL was asked whether CDD was the same thing as IRD, and he said “yes.” But “under IRD, Ministries conflicted. Here there is no conflict among ministries.”

The Egypt ICR (2003:13) drew the lesson that “implementation through single sectoral ministries is inherently more challenging, and more emphasis should be placed on designing effective institutional set-ups to address multiple sectors and their successful interaction.” The ICR stated that multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary NRM and poverty-alleviation projects are more likely to achieve their objectives than are single-sector projects. It is not clear, however, whether this observation resulted from evaluation of the project or if it represents the application of more recent thinking from CDD to an evaluation process.

### **Time**

The Chile ICR (2001:16) pointed out that preparation for development strategies takes time and that the time allotted was too short. The lack of sufficient time “resulted in: (a) sub-projects of less-than-adequate quality being implemented during the first year; and (b) in a delay in the implementation of a proper participatory sub-project preparation mechanism....”

### **Scaling Up**

How do CDD projects spread? In Romania, word of mouth generated many new requests for projects. In Mali, where the projects work through the elected communes, the scale is larger than with the previous NRM project, and so they can scale up. In Morocco, the team leader was concerned with how to work with the whole watershed and how to include communities that do not volunteer. The problem was how to reconcile a master plan for the watershed with what villagers actually want. In Morocco, the big cost in scaling up is human and managerial. Project management teams consist of ten people. This is a big investment. IRD projects work through the commune. They will be required to have communal development plans. Working through the commune could help here. The commune has technical personnel, but they are not of very high quality.

### **Sustaining**

In Morocco, the team leader felt that one of the most critical issues was how to sustain and scale up the project unit. He explained: “we are concerned with how to maintain the

committee de *Douar* [a pre-existing non-administrative watershed-delimited grouping of hamlets for which the project facilitates the formation of a project committee] after funding and facilitators stop coming. This can be accomplished by encouraging a direct relation between the committee and line ministries or NGOs to demand their services. Also, we can encourage a relation with the Social Development Fund recently started in the area. The legal status for the committee de Douars needs also to be established to get them to create ‘associations de développement’ under the NGO laws. This allows them a legal status and they can then open a bank account. Eighteen Douars of the twenty six are already in the process of pursuing this objective.”

For Morocco, the APL mechanism also helps to promote sustainability and continuity. The next phase of this program will work in rain-fed areas. They will work with the commune. Forest areas will work with Comité de Massif. This will regroup mountain communities around a particular forest. In Chile, the project team leader explained that the CDD project was a pilot. “Sustainability [implicitly defined here as continued funding] depends on the powers that be. [Sustainability] could not continue since Chile was about to graduate from The Bank. Not much of the project is left. LDCs are gone.” He explained that “the big problem was that this was only a 5 year project. Really only 4 by the time it really got started.”

In Mali the TTL felt that “communality [local government] allows the continuity of the project.” It makes it sustainable.

## **LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The central lessons from this study can be divided into lessons concerning 1) the meanings of “community” in CDD, 2) the representation mechanisms through which communities drive CDD, 3) incentives for choosing environmental projects, and 4) scaling up and sustaining CDD.

### **Defining Community in CDD**

How community is defined varies greatly across projects. Projects include interest groups, beneficiary groups, or whole populations. Clearly there is a tension between serving whole populations and target groups when the whole population includes both target and non-target elements—such as when disadvantaged populations are mixed with better off groups.

Defining community as a particular interest group or the beneficiary population has the advantage that the project can more easily ensure that this population will drive decisions and reap the benefits of the project. The disadvantage is that the “community” must be represented through a mechanism constructed specially to include the target group. Criteria for inclusion and for exclusion are required and the body representing the group is not contiguous with the public writ large.

A broad residence-based definition of community has the advantage that representation can be institutionalized in elected local authorities and therefore may be more sustainable over time. Another advantage is that this approach strengthens democratic local government and can be implanted in existing “democratic” or “community driven” local institutions. Broad-based inclusion may also be less divisive since those to whom the benefits are not targeted are also included in weighing the costs and benefits of the project’s activities.

More discussion of the definition of community is needed with The Bank since this choice has implications for sustainability and replicability of the project over time and space.

### **Representation of Communities in CDD—Mechanisms and Stages of Representation**

*When are communities included?*

For CDD projects to be truly driven by community—however defined—community needs to be implicated in or oversee every stage of project development. Most basically, while communities cannot always be involved in choosing the projects’ zone of intervention, they do need the option to opt out of the project, as some communities did in Morocco. Communities must be represented in some manner in the development of the sub-project lists or the lists should be left opened. Sub-project lists drive community choices. They therefore diminish the degree to which communities drive their development decisions. Some projects have gotten around this problem by providing block grants and working with communities to develop detailed investment plans—including the determination of who implements and how that implementation is overseen. Clearly community should also be involved in monitoring and evaluation. But here, independent monitoring and evaluation is also beneficial.

Involve communities early on in the development of projects and involve them in all stages.

*How are communities represented?*

CDD is about representing communities in decision making processes. Unfortunately, CDD PAD documents rarely specify the form of representation of the community in a manner sufficient to guide the project later on in its implementation. Further, many of the TTLs do not know how people are represented in their projects.

Projects used a large range of mechanisms for inclusion such as surveys, participatory processes, appointed committees, elected committees, interest groups, associations, chieftaincies, and representation through existing elected local authorities. These different mechanisms of inclusion have great implications for the accountability of those actors making decisions on behalf of local populations. If the mechanisms are not specified and carefully chosen, then the project is not likely to be driven by community.

Project implementation agencies will use the easiest methods of community mobilization rather than the most representative and enfranchising.

Representation should, if it is to internalize externalities, match services to needs, and balance local interests, be based on the accountability of decision makers to the broadest cross-section of the population. To accomplish this requires a clear definition of the “community” and a clear process for accountably representing that community in decision making.

PADs should therefore specify in detail the definition of community to be used in the project and the process of inclusion or representation by which communities drive decision making. These definitions should be subject to broad discussion with The Bank during the project elaboration process.

PADs can also make accountability and representation into performance objectives with specific performance indicators as was done in the community Action Program in Niger.

### *Correcting representation biases*

Three biases emerge in representation: under-representation of women and other marginal groups (ethnic, poor, etc), and over-representation of elite. Even gender representation and proportional representation of disadvantaged groups are good indicators of the breadth of community inclusion. Women’s and disadvantaged groups’ inclusion generally needs some additional measures—beyond community meetings or elections—to ensure that their needs are taken into account in decision making. It has also been observed that additional measures are required to avoid elite capture. Some authors recommend central government intervention to avoid elite capture and to assure service to the poor (Niger ICR 2003:13; China ICR 2003:17; also see Crook and Sverrisson 2001).

Inclusion measures may differ depending on circumstance. In Egypt, for example, funds were earmarked for women’s activities. In previously authoritarian contexts such as China and Niger, for example, more attention is needed for human resource development and training so that people can participate in and voice their needs in public forums. In decentralization in India and Uganda (not discussed in any of the projects in this report) women have a guaranteed percentage of the seats on elected rural councils (Vijayalakshmi and Chandrashekar 2002; Bazaara 2003).

### **Incentives for Choosing Environmental Investments**

Projects used three CDD-consistent methods to incite local communities to choose natural resource management.

1. Environmental education aimed at showing communities the benefits of NRM. This method was used in Niger to inform rural people of links between poverty and environmental quality prior to sub-project choice.

2. Choice of sites where communities are more likely to invest in natural resource management. In Niger, for example, environmentally sensitive areas or “hot spots” were chosen. Areas where there had been previous successful NRM programs were also selected.
3. Pay for environmental labor. Treat environmental work as labor. In the Morocco project, for example, people initially did not want to work in uplands partly because the labor was voluntary. When the project began paying people for their labor, their interest was higher. Environmental work should be viewed as labor. Just as any other public labor, it should be remunerated.
4. Open-ended earmarking that requires use of funds for public goods versus private goods can steer funds toward public investments. For example, in Mali, open-ended earmarking was used to steer funding toward private investments since the public sector was seen as over-funded (ironically, perhaps this is a case where the community could have decided if public investments were a better choice).

Projects also used some approaches that force choices a bit, but are also relatively consistent with CDD principles. These include:

1. Lower co-payments and community contributions for NRM projects. This incentive is used in Niger and Morocco.
2. Pairing NRM with non-NRM projects. This technique was used in Morocco to encourage watershed management by downstream farmers.

In Egypt and Romania, projects have created separate funds for environmental investments.<sup>46</sup> But, as the Niger PAD suggests, the principles of CDD are violated by such an arrangement. The above incentives for encouraging NRM within CDD should be experimented with. Earmarking for natural resource investments is against the principles of CDD. It should be discouraged. Various techniques have been used in combination and some separately in existing projects. Their results are not yet known, hence projects using these innovations should be followed carefully.

The issue of environmental work as labor merits more attention. Many TTLs felt that people did not invest in environment due to its nature as a public good. In addition, people were often discouraged because they were not remunerated in cash for environmental labor. It appears that environment is not viewed as other public goods in the ways in which it is funded. Few projects would suggest asking a community to contribute labor or materials to construct a national highway that happened to go through their town. Labor for highway construction is paid. But people are expected work to maintain their environment without remuneration. TTLs do not view environmental work

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<sup>46</sup> The Romania TTL felt that “Someone designing a new project would try to link projects—so if they choose roads they would have to do waste management. This would be to condition it. I am reluctant, however, since if you impose something they do not need and they are not well organized, they will probably neglect the imposed project. But if they are given a choice to take or leave a second funding possibility that is earmarked for environment—after they are organized and have proven themselves—they may have more buy-in.”

as labor. This naturalized perspective on the work of local people must be reconsidered. Work on natural resources is labor and must be remunerated accordingly.

A mix of these mechanisms can be used to encourage environmental investments. But, caution must be taken not to create overwhelming incentives that override community priorities.

If public natural resources are to be maintained by communities, environmental labor must be remunerated.

Driving communities to choose NRM is counter to the principles of CDD. While structuring incentives to reflect real costs and benefits is important, attention needs to be paid so that communities are not being corralled into activities that they would not want themselves. The larger public values reflected in the incentives a project constructs should not exclude values held by local populations.

### **Scaling Up and Sustainability**

In short, demand for projects can spread by word of mouth. A potential extensive infrastructure for participatory projects seems to be elected rural government. This is noted by team leaders in Egypt, China and Niger.

Sustainability as funding: Some TTLs felt that sustainability is equivalent to continued funding from government or The Bank. APL seems to be a good mechanism for Bank continuity.

Sustainability as an independent and institutionalized project unit: A sustainable project unit seems to depend on having legal status to manage funds or through direct relations between committees and line ministries. It may also come from basing participation on permanent institutional infrastructure such as local government.

The Niger ICR (2003:13)'s assessment was that the project's sustainability was greatly enhanced by an approach that "augmented social capital accumulation and reinforced community ownership of the process."

The Mali ICR (2001:15) implies that capacity is the basis of sustainability at the community level. The authors do not, however, provide evidence of this nor do they state how they measure capacity.

In the Armenia ICR (2001:21), sustainability was also implicitly linked to community involvement, suggesting that: "involving communities in micro-project design and implementation so that their interest and commitment for the work and maintenance is ensured." The Armenia ICR (2001:26) emphasizes the lesson that it is essential to have "...participation and financial contribution by involved stakeholders at all phases of the

project, from identification to maintenance, in order to ensure ownership and sustainability of the project.”

### **Additional Lessons and Recommendations**

#### ***PADs provide insufficient information to guide projects***

It is not enough to just use the words “Community” or “Community Driven.” Most PAD documents do not give sufficient information to determine who the community is or whether a project is really drive by community.

Project designers should spell out in the PAD how community is defined and how it is represented.

#### ***Local authorities need legal status to receive funds***

Local authorities’ lack of legal status has been problematic in several places. The local elected authorities in countries with central coffers—like most former French colonies—need to be given revenue raising and revenue management authority.

Local authorities designated to drive CDD should have the legal status to receive funds.

#### ***Avoid elite capture***

Community representation is a complex matter. Multiple accountability measures are needed to keep any community spokesperson—whether traditional leaders, committees, or elected authorities—accountable to the local people. Central government intervention may be necessary to help avoid bureaucratic takeover of projects.

Develop multiple accountability mechanisms to ensure broad-based representation.

#### ***APL appears to be a positive advance in guaranteeing long-term commitments and more-sustainable projects***

TTLs spoke highly of this mechanism. Several TTLs mentioned that learning by doing is a function of length of program—APLs enable a longer learning period and a chance for project re-design in which learning can be incorporated.

Use APL for projects whose benefits are long term. This applies to many NRM projects. Use APL where projects are complex and will benefit from an iterative internal learning processes.

***CDD differs from Integrated Rural Development in that there is less conflict among ministries***

Moving the focus of integration from the central planning exercises to the local arena may be responsible for this observation. More research on this question would be helpful.

Experiment with local level integration of inter-sectoral decision making through CDD.

***Everyone learns by doing***

Ministries have learned about participation. Villages have learned they can be powerful actors. Team leaders have learned that communities can make intelligent choices and are good at coping with contingencies and solving problems. Project staff learned about working in a participatory manner. Project team leaders learned that if farmers don't want it, it may not work.

It was clear from the interviews that TTLs had learned from their projects based on the circulation of new ideas within the World Bank and development community. Everyone seemed to learn similar lessons that are already reflected in the current language of CDD and community inclusion. In short, learning is strongly influenced by internal Bank discourse and ideology.

The lesson is to encourage debate at The Bank on the details and mechanisms of community inclusion. The second lesson is to forge ahead and take risks by encouraging TTLs to be innovative in their project designs.

***High environmental standards can make environmental investments prohibitive***

This was the case for waste disposal in Romania. Tendler (1980) noted that high standards could reduce the extent of service for rural electrification in Bolivia in the early 1980s. This is a matter that may help explain why some environmental projects are less desirable.

More work is needed to explore standards as barriers to environmental investment.

***Mid-level decentralizations are problematic***

It is problematic for the China project that the central government has decided to decentralize management of the project to provincial governments. Decentralization makes supervision more difficult. It also makes the practical problems of management more difficult. The Bank has more agencies it must interact with. Mid-level is not decentralization.

It seems that decentralizing to the lowest level and keeping major planning tasks central may be the solution.

***One project cannot fund everything—getting things that are off the menu***

Because one project cannot cover all contingencies, one manner in which projects in Niger and Egypt have maintained the CDD concept is to ask communities what they want and need, tell them what the project can offer and also tell them that they will help them to find other ministries and agencies that can fund other projects outside of their project's menu.

Encourage inter-donor and inter-agency cooperation to enable greater local choice.

***CDD is not enough***

In Senegal the people acquired new rights to harvest and use charcoal, vegetables and honey, but they cannot take these things to market. They are now complaining about market access. Without market access, they cannot profit from the products they now have rights over.

Access to markets is an important complement to decision making rights and funding in CDD.

***Environment is mainstreaming itself out of existence***

One TTL stated that people will choose agriculture projects that respect the environment. This kind of choice is not seen as constituting an environmental project. "They do not, however, want places where they expend labor with nothing coming back." Another (Morocco) said that people do not invest in environment per se because it does not pay.

Environment is incorporated when it is in the productive sphere and it is marginalized when it is outside of the productive sphere. Once it is productive, it is no longer viewed as environment.

**Further Research**

The justifications for creating incentives to encourage NRM investments contain some implicit assumptions. The first is that investments in natural resource management are in fact worthwhile and that the disincentives to them are due to their nature as public goods and their long-term payback. But, the idea that people do not want to invest in this arena because it is not worthwhile is not entertained. The idea that people have accurately judged that natural resource management is not worthwhile, not necessary or not effective must also be considered. People may be accurately weighing the current investments against long-term paybacks. Many environmental problems are also not caused by humans or are caused by people from outside the immediate area. Hence, there may be a sense by local people that they cannot affect these problems or that they are

being blamed for and saddled with correcting problems caused by others. There is good reason to do field based research on why people do or do not invest in NRM.

Community project plans with annual work programs and budgets seems to be one of the directions that community driven rural development planning is taking. Many of the projects use planning processes as their principal integrative mechanism—even where representation is not democratic, as in the Egypt projects (see Egypt ICR 2003:15). Some use planning processes as a tool for representatives to determine the use of community funds. Plans have always been important rural development tools—from the days of Integrated Rural Development through to the present. More attention needs to be paid to the implications of using the development of management and implementation plans where there are no representatives. Is this an adequate means for integrative community inclusion where there are no representatives?

CDD is not likely to get people to demand research—which may be what they need. There is still a need to assess the need for research in CDD project areas—both on CDD itself and on matters that would facilitate projects and people to meet local needs.

## **ANNEX A: ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK**

Based on the definitions, theories, and expected outcomes of CDD, this study applied an analytic framework designed to identify the basic institutional elements necessary for CDD to be effective. CDD is based on theories about the causal relation between certain institutional arrangements and certain outcomes. This section summarizes definitions of CDD, and the basic elements of CDD that theory indicates will result in improved development outcomes. Based on this discussion, the section below outlines an analytic approach.

### **Defining CDD**

The definitions of CDD available in the literature are consistent. Alkire, et al. (2001 as quoted by Mansuri and Rao 2003:2) define CDD as a process by which "...community groups are given 'control over decisions and resources' often in conjunction with 'demand-responsive support organizations and service providers.'" Most authors argue that CDD emphasizes community empowerment (Mansuri and Rao 2003:2; Kumar 2003:9; Dongier et al. 2002:303; Binswanger and Aiyar 2003:4). Dongier et al. (2002:303) "...With 'empowerment', the communities themselves identify and prioritize their own needs and take responsibility for implementation" (Kumar 2003:11).

Most current CDD projects evolved from community based development (CBD) projects (Kumar 2003:vii). The design of CDD has been affected by a move from "participation in development toward empowerment and collaboration" (Kumar 2003:viii).<sup>47</sup> Kumar (2003:vii), in a review of CDD projects from the Sahel, indicates five changes that represent the move toward CDD:

- A move along the participation continuum toward increased emphasis on empowerment and collaboration
- Increased emphasis on building a sustainable enabling environment within the country for supporting participatory projects, along with devolving more control over project activities to the local level
- Increased emphasis on flexibility in implementation combined with more concern about knowing where resources are going (increased emphasis on M&E [Monitoring and Evaluation])
- More focused attempts to reach the poor
- A somewhat more definite and clearer long-term time horizon.

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<sup>47</sup> "...There is increasing consensus within The Bank that projects with higher levels of participation—those that give control over resources and decisions to communities (that is, those that collaborate and empower or are substantially 'driven' by the community)—are now understood to be CDD and distinguished from CBD, which confers less control over decisions and resources but is nevertheless participatory" (Kumar 2003:2).

The CDD Group Anchor<sup>48</sup> at the World Bank classifies six kinds of participatory approaches: community based development, social funds,<sup>49</sup> and four kinds of CDD projects. The Anchor considers empowerment key to CDD categories. The first category of CDD is “enabling environment” projects. These include “policy and institutional reforms oriented toward increased control over decisions and resources by communities.” Second are “community control and management of investment funds,” where community groups make decisions on planning, implementation, operation and maintenance (O&M), and manage investment funds.” The third category “community control without management of investment funds” includes projects where “community groups make decisions on planning, implementation, O&M, without directly managing investment funds.” The fourth category, “local governments” is when “democratically elected local governments make decisions on planning, implementation, O&M in partnership with different community groups.” (Kumar 2003:5.)<sup>50</sup>

In short, enabling environment and empowerment interventions are the two main elements of CDD projects. They empower local groups or local democratic government. The powers they involve local groups in are planning, implementation, operations and maintenance. Some empowerment ostensibly also takes place through enabling-environment reforms.

### **Expected Benefits**

CDD, as participatory and decentralized approaches to local development, is sometimes justified on the failure of central government to deliver services in an efficient and timely manner (Conyers 2000:8; Wunsch and Olowu 1995; Mahwood 1983; Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999:4,30; Rondinelli et al. 1989; Bhagwati 1982). It is also promoted on the belief that involving and empowering communities in the process of their own development is expected to have a variety positive effects on equity and efficiency (Dongier et al.

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<sup>48</sup> The CDD Group Anchor is a group within the World Bank’s Social Development Department that is charged with understanding the role of CDD in poverty reduction and in the overall quality of lending programs that use CDD techniques. They are also charged with finding ways to scale up CDD. (Kumar 2003:5.)

<sup>49</sup> Social funds are another mechanism that provides funds for projects identified by communities. Social funds provide a more limited menu of projects than do CDD projects. These are typically for public goods such as schools, clinics, roads, water and sanitation. To access social funds, a community representative, often with assistance from an NGO will propose a project to a centrally located agency and will be funded based on criteria such as feasibility, community involvement, and the community capacity for collective action. (Mansuri and Rao 2003:13-4.) While they are in a separate category in the taxonomy, Kumar (2003:3) considers social funds to be “a subset of community driven approaches.”

<sup>50</sup> In all of the definitions of CDD, participation is based on “community groups.” In the strongest statement of which local institutions are appropriate for CDD, Dongier et al. (2002:305) argue that CDD is based on Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). Dongier et al. (2002:305) define a CBO as “a membership organization aimed at furthering the interests of its own members.” In contrast, they define NGOs as having a broader scope of activities that might assist CBOs and pursue commitments that do not directly benefit the NGO’s members. All CDD programs then must operate through CBOs. For example, in the Anchor group’s (Kumar 2003:5) taxonomy, above, even the inclusion of elected local democratic government is constrained to the sub-set of projects in which local government partners with community groups. In other words, following Kumar’s (2003) logic, direct empowerment of representative authorities is not included as CDD—a curious exclusion of democratic local institutions.

2002:306), poverty reduction (Mansuri and Rao 2003:12-3), development and environment (Dongier et al. 2002). One survey of 60,000 poor people conducted by Narayan and others (cited in Dongier et al. 2002:304), justified it on the basis that local people want community to drive decision making processes. The study found that poor people want 1) organizations to enable them to negotiate with government, traders and NGOs; 2) direct development assistance in order to “shape their own destinies”; and 3) control of funds in order to end corruption. They also wanted “NGOs and governments to be accountable to them.” These authors argue that CDD is a mechanism for achieving all of this.

Further, CDD is believed to improve targeting of services and targeting of resources toward the poor in particular (Mansuri and Rao 2003:12-3). As Dongier et al. (2002:303) argue, “CDD has the potential to make poverty-reduction efforts more responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective than traditional centrally led programs.” It is also believed to be effective for the creation of public goods (Dongier et al. 2002:307; Mansuri and Rao 2003:12-3), strengthening civic capacities and building social capital (Kumar 2003:9; Mansuri and Rao 2003:2). New institutionalists see CDD as a way of providing essential services where markets fail, such as in poverty reduction—CBOs can complement NGOs and governments in filling this gap. (Dongier et al. 2002:305). It is also argued to be more sustainable than other forms of intervention (Dongier et al. 2002:305; Kumar 2003:9). In short, CDD is supposed to lead to: higher quality of public goods than those provided by government; better management of public goods than those provided by government; empowerment of marginalized groups; reduced exclusion of marginal groups; reduced elite capture; increased capacity for collective action and increased social capital (Mansuri and Rao 2003).

In NRM, many similar arguments have been made. Theorists believe that local benefits derive from increased popular participation leading to increases in efficiency and equity (see Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2002). Like CDD proponents, NRM theorists and practitioners also have emphasized the need for local participation as a means for increasing management effectiveness and equity. They have argued that greater local knowledge is needed in natural resource management to understand both the complex physical characteristics of resources and the culturally specific patterns of resource management and use. Because natural resources sustain local livelihoods and are also an important source of national wealth, they are the locus of potential conflict and tension that requires extra sensitivity to local livelihood strategies and political dynamics in the making and implementation of any environmental interventions. Further, given the need for local labor and knowledge in implementation, many authors have argued that local people must be included at every stage in order to build their sense of “ownership” of reforms to garner local support and to prevent sabotage and disaffection.<sup>51</sup> Also, because natural resources are a source of wealth, many authors have argued for participation as a way of increasing local incomes. (See Ostrom 1990; Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Baland

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<sup>51</sup> The Armenia ICR (2001:28) asserts that “Under ASIF [Armenia Social Investment Fund], steps were taken to encourage decentralized decision making at the local level—which has proven to help make projects demand driven and to strengthen project ownership.” This assertion could be taken to draw causal links between localism and ownership.

and Platteau 1996; Western, Wright, and Strum 1994; Poffenberger 1994; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; PMA Grant Study 2001:28.)

### **The Logic of CDD: Why CDD is Believed to Work? What are the Causal Mechanisms?**

Expected outcomes of CDD are predicated on a number of hypotheses about the role of power (resources or empowerment); the effects of proximity, local voice and input (localism); and the role of social capital. These factors are discussed below.

#### *Transfer of powers: resources/empowerment*

CDD expands the resources available to the poor, via credit, social funds, capacity building and occupational training (Mansuri and Rao 2003:2). Making such powers available transfers enables investments in local needs and the development of capacities. These resources are invested directly by projects in producing public goods directly, or projects can enable communities to obtain public goods from other providers via social mobilization. When powers are transferred to local people, civic capacities and skills are strengthened. The Harnessing and building of social capital is believed to be a mechanism by which local potential is realized in development outcomes (see discussion of *social capital* below).<sup>52</sup>

In short, CDD works through Powers: Increasing the financial and technical Resources available for “target communities” to work with; and Empowerment: “...it is believed that when communities are in charge of their own development, the considerable potential and social capital at the grass-roots level can be harnessed to improve the livelihood of people” (Kumar 2003:2).

It should be noted here that while the need for power is recognized, participation in these powers is less theorized in CDD. It seems to be assumed that “community” will exercise these powers and that there will be “participation.” These terms come up often and are discussed later among the elements of CDD.

#### *Localism*

Local control and decision making is argued on numerous grounds to lead to better outcomes. Ribot (2002) sums the causal arguments. Theory links better outcomes to the following mechanisms:<sup>53</sup>

1. Information: Information is emphasized by many theorists as the operational element that makes CDD work. By being local, CDD is seen as a mechanism for eliciting local priorities (i.e. gathering

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<sup>52</sup> Agrawal (2001) also argues that the transfer of regulatory powers over natural resources to local people and the exercise of natural resource management regulatory powers produces environmental consciousness—hence, the holding of powers itself leads to the production of “environmental subjects.”

<sup>53</sup> See for example: World Bank 2000:108; Conyers 2000:8; Huther and Shah 1998; Sewell 1996; Romeo 1996; Baland and Platteau 1996; Schilder and Boeve 1996: 94-117; Parker 1995; Cernea 1989; Selznick 1984 [1949]; Tiebout 1972; Oates 1972:11-12.

information on local priorities) of “target communities” concerning actions and beneficiaries within “target communities.”

2. Accounting for costs in decision making: When communities and their representatives make resource-use decisions, they are believed to be more likely to take into account (or “internalize”) the whole array of costs to local people. Resource waste may result when outsiders or unaccountable individuals make decisions based on their own benefits without considering costs to others.
3. Increasing accountability: By bringing public decision making closer to the citizenry, local decision making is believed to increase program accountability and therefore effectiveness. Accountability is a mechanism that helps ensure the match between needs and investments.
4. Reducing transaction costs: Administrative and management transaction costs may be reduced via the proximity of local participants, access to local skills, labor, and local information.
5. Matching services to needs: Bringing local knowledge and aspirations into project design, implementation, management and evaluation may better match actions to local needs. Bringing government closer to people increases efficiency by helping to tap the knowledge, creativity and resources of local communities.
6. Improving coordination: Decentralization is also believed to increase effectiveness of coordination and flexibility among administrative agencies and in development/conservation planning and implementation.

While the above arguments come from the broader literature on community involvement in decision making, some of these arguments are present in the CDD literature. For example, Mansuri and Rao (2003:2) argue that CDD can reduce information problems that face both the social planner and potential beneficiaries by eliciting development priorities directly from target communities and allowing target communities to identify projects as well as eligible recipients of private benefits, like welfare or relief. The literature also implicitly argues that local decision making is more responsive and flexible with respect to local needs when it argues that CDD is more flexible and responsive (Kumar 2003; Dongier et al. 2002). Examples of efficiency and effectiveness increases are given by Dongier et al. (2002:306) in which efficiency has improved through lower costs and more productively employed assets, and through greater management accountability.

### *Social capital*

“The CDD approach puts communities in charge of their own development in order to harness their considerable potential and social capital to improve the livelihood of the people” (Kumar 2003:vii). CDD is expected to strengthen the civic capacities of communities by nurturing organizations which represent them and by enabling them to acquire skills and organizational abilities that strengthen their capacity for collective

action. Mansuri and Rao (2003:2) CDD differs from non-CDD programs in that it involves local communities in the identification of local targets and the means to achieve them through local consultation and participation. This difference is expected to mobilize social capital and therefore to lead to more sustainable outcomes (presumably because social capital remains behind after projects leave). (Kumar 2003:9.)

In short, CDD is supposed to operate through civic action: building civic capacity for representation and collective action.

Sustainability as a result of Social Capital: is often identified as a benefit of CDD (Kumar 2003:9; Dongier et al. 2002:305). Because of participation and consultation, CDD differs also in that it is likely to “harness local social capital to ensure that the current investments made in the natural resource system in the community are maintained and future development needs are also locally handled.” In this manner, CDD is expected to “put in place elements of sustainability.” (Kumar 2003:9.) Dongier et al. (2002:305) make the argument that responsiveness to needs and flexibility make programs more sustainable. They assert that that this is the case empirically. The operational logic here is not explicit. The relevance that being dealt with responsively and having their needs matched has to communities is key.

These are the main theoretical causal arguments for how CDD will lead to improved outcomes. These arguments in turn imply a set of elements that must be present in order to have effective CDD.

### **Elements of CDD**

Following from the theoretical background of CDD, certain components are self-evident: transfer of resources, powers or empowerment; being local; and focusing on the building of social capital are key components of a CDD strategy. Other concepts that are often invoked in the literature as essential to CDD, and which are closely linked with these terms, include participation and community. Elements of CDD also frequently mentioned in the literature include “institutional arrangements,” “community based targeting,” “learning by doing,” “access to information,” and complementary service provision such as credit, extension, and “demand-responsive support.” In this section each of these elements will be briefly discussed.

Together, these make up an important list of CDD keywords. While we may be able to define them based on the literature, CDD handbooks use concepts such as “participation,” “community” and “social capital” uncritically and without definition, “assuming that they are widely and uniformly understood” (Mansuri and Rao 2003:7). This section gathers some of the definitions and issues that are available concerning these key terms.

## *Participation*

Participation is the main mechanism for incorporating information into decisions.<sup>54</sup> Participation is supposed to ensure that projects are well designed, benefits are well targeted and equitably distributed, costs are lower, services are timely, and that corruption losses are reduced (Mansuri and Rao 2003:7).

The down side of participation includes high transaction costs 1) in time, and 2) in psychological, social and even physical duress for marginal groups who must express positions that may be contrary to interests of powerful groups. It is not obvious that the benefits of participation outweigh these costs. They may just shift some of the service delivery costs to the beneficiaries. Further, while participatory approaches may deliver benefits to recipients and implementers, it is not clear what can be attributed to participation itself (Mansuri and Rao 2003:8-9).

## *Community*

Community is the functional unit of CDD. Community is often used to mean a political-administrative jurisdiction such as a village or local government territory, a tribal area, a neighborhood. It may also refer to a specific religious, ethnic or gender identity group. It is also often used to mean a particular interest group, such as beekeepers, fishers, pastoralists or charcoal producers. The term is used with the implicit assumption that the unit has some coherence or is internally harmonious. Territorial definitions may be problematic where there are migrant farmers or nomadic groups. Identity and interest group definitions are also problematic in that they may not include everyone who has a claim or interests. Further, in all but exceptional cases, these categories are internally stratified with economic and social asymmetries of power that will influence participation and outcomes.

It is important to understand how the categories used in a given project are constructed. The existence of a group may be tied to identity or it may be constructed around a given purpose. So, “communities” as well as belonging within a “community” may be ephemeral or permanent. They may be constructed from the outside by project necessities or from within existing divisions or categories of the local populations. They may be defined by existing structures of power—that can include and exclude people from a given group. Power structures within groups shape outcomes of participation (Mansuri and Rao 2003:9-10).

Kumar (2003:2) derives three characteristics of “community” implicit in the CDD literature: 1) community is understood to be a group of people with shared broad

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<sup>54</sup> Method of participation can include open public meetings, interest group meetings, stakeholder meetings, consensus building exercises, open voting (e.g. hand raising), secret ballot voting, participation through representation. Representative systems need to be further broken down to distinguish suffrage, candidacy, voting method (from lining up behind candidates in full view to secret ballot elections) and electoral structure. Electoral structure includes forms of electoral system ranging from party list candidacy to independent candidacy.

development goals; 2) their behavior and relationships are shaped by norms that are expected to produce solidarity; and 3) those that do not belong are excluded.

For the purposes of this study, we need to identify: the characteristics of groups chosen by projects as “community,” who chose the grouping, and some sense of the group’s internal divisions and power structures. Three different bases of inclusion in community are helpful for categorizing the kinds of groups targeted by CDD: 1) political/administrative territorial where inclusion is based on political/administrative territorial boundaries (residence-based citizenship), 2) identity-group where inclusion is based on social categories (ethnic group, religious group, gender, age cohort, profession, class), and 3) interest group where inclusion is a matter of some kind of collective objective (professional group, specific project, specific objective, the most excluded group, the poor). Professional groups or “the poor” can be identity groups as well as interest groups.

### *Social capital*

Social capital is defined by Putnam (1993 cited in Mansuri and Rao 2003:10) as “features of organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” “In particular, it refers to the ability of individuals to build ‘bonds’ within their own group and ‘bridges’ that link them with other groups, and is deeply tied to the belief that the quality and quantity of group activity is a key source of community’s strength and its ability to work for its own betterment” (Mansuri and Rao 2003:10). But, the causal link from bonds and bridges to self betterment may be inverted. Fine (2001 cited in Mansuri and Rao 2003:10) suggests that this concept of social capital ignores class distinction and power, and that the causality also goes from wealth and self betterment to more group activities, bonds and bridges.

Bourdieu argues that social capital also maintains hierarchy. Elites have better access to internal and external networks, and they use them to maintain their position of privilege. The networks of the poor are less influential. Differences in social capital can therefore play a role in the reproduction of inequality. In short, the function and use of social capital depends on the power relations and social stratification it is embedded in. (Mansuri and Rao 2003:11.) Hence, measuring the role of social capital in facilitating collective action must account for the ways that social capital is located in an existing political economy. The embeddedness of individuals, groups and communities in stratified power relations is most critical for CDD precisely because CDD attempts to invert existing hierarchies by giving “voice and choice” as Mansuri and Rao (2003:11) put it, to the under privileged.

This review should be suspicious of any measure of social capital or changes in social capital. Bonds and bridges or networks are difficult to measure—whether they have positive or negative effects on society as a whole. But, it is possible to register the kinds of resistance and support that programs receive and from where within the political-economic strata this support is emerging. We need to decide if we will measure any social capital variables, which and how. Some indicators of the relation between a project

and social capital may include: 1) the status of who participates, 2) where conflicts arise in the project, 3) who benefits from the project. But, all of these are difficult to identify and difficult to interpret once identified. Participation by the rich could mean success or failure, depending on how they participate. More conflict may indicate success—it may indicate that hierarchies are being disrupted. Resistance from the poor may indicate failure. More groups forming may indicate fragmentation of society, the presence of too many projects (which in recent years have favored committees as a preferred mode of intervention), or it may represent the thickening of civil society (Fox 1996).

Kumar (2003:9) sees CDD as a means for harnessing the social capital of a community to improve livelihoods by “putting communities in charge or actively engaging them in their own development.” Implicit in Kumar’s (2003:9) discussion is the notion that social capital boils down to individual and institutional capacity, such as capacity to “monitor and control wood product flows,” “improve efficiency of household fuel use,” “plan and manage their own infrastructure and service needs,” and “to mobilize and use transparently the resources necessary to finance [infrastructure and services]....”

### *Institutional arrangements*

Institutional arrangements of CDD are very important. Dongier et al. (2002:308) see CBOs as the local institutional element of CDD. They identify three elements kinds of arrangements. First, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) partner with elected local government. Second, CBOs partner with private support groups including NGOs and private firms. Third, CBOs partner with funders from higher levels of government (presumably including donors). Dongier et al. (2002:305) define a Community Based Organization as “a membership organization aimed at furthering the interests of its own members.” In contrast, they define NGOs as having a broader scope of activities that might assist CBOs and pursue commitments that do not directly benefit the NGO’s members.

With their focus on institutional arrangements, according to Dongier et al. (2002:303-4), CDD support usually includes:

- strengthening and financing accountable and inclusive community groups and CBOs...;
- facilitating community access to information through a variety of media, and increasingly through information technology, and
- forging functional links between CBOs and formal institutions and creating an enabling environment through appropriate policy and institutional reform, often including decentralization reform, promotion of a conducive legal and regulatory framework, development of sound sector policies and fostering of responsive sector institutions and private service providers.

### *Learning by doing*

“Learning by doing” is also often mentioned as a key element of CDD, making projects more flexible (Kumar 2003:11). The first aspect of flexibility is in community choice of projects (hence the logical connection to a multi-sector approach). The second aspect is

changes in project with changes in circumstances allowing for experimentation. (Kumar 2003:12.)

### *Complementary service provision*

Providing demand-responsive support in CDD is important. The quality of services provided by external agents (government, donors, NGOs, project facilitators) affects quality of participation and therefore outcomes. Front-line project implementation staff and facilitators may be affected by 1) their skills at being culturally and politically sensitive, their charisma as leaders, ability as trainers, anthropologists, engineers, economists and accountants; 2) the degree to which the incentives that drive them are aligned with the project needs (due to their rush to show results or contradiction to personal incentives); and 3) the degree to which they are open to manipulation due to their embeddedness in elite circles, age, lack of experience or poor pay (Mansuri and Rao 2003:28).

Central state bureaucrats also play a role in CDD. CDD may increase the need for a responsive state apparatus. But the state's incentives may not go in that direction. Central states tend to inhibit project effectiveness. CDD requires more decentralized central state infrastructure and distribution of power. The effectiveness of CDD then, can be shaped by: 1) responsiveness of central agencies, which itself may be a function of the resources they have and the incentives these agents face at all levels; 2) the degree of decentralization of powers and functions of the central state; and 3) competition between community based and state organizations, which can lead to the state withdrawing support and pose a challenge to community organizations.

### *Community-based targeting (CBT)*

CDD is believed to reduce poverty through empowerment and by better targeting the poor. Dongier et al. (2002:307) points out that CBOs empowered in CDD can voice the concerns of the poor and vulnerable groups, making the development process more inclusive. They also state that targeting poor populations also favors the poor in CDD. They argue that, following Sen 1999, empowerment is also one of the elements of poverty reduction. Lastly they feel that building social capital is another element of CDD that leads to poverty reduction.

Mansuri and Rao (2003:11-14) argue that the targeting of public goods to the poor and Community Based Targeting (CBT) are key mechanisms that people believe make CDD important for poverty reduction. They argue that identifying poor communities is facilitated by poverty mapping. Identifying the poor within communities is a more difficult task. Central targeting systems are better at the former than the latter (Mansuri and Rao 2003:12). Hence, Community Based Targeting is often a part of CDD to enhance service to the poor. Studies by Alderman (2002) and Galasso and Ravallion (Forthcoming) and Conning and Kevane (2002) show that specialized information available in communities is better than surveys and questionnaires administered by outside organizations (all cited in Mansuri and Rao 2003:12).

CBT is a function of 1) the ability of communities to engage in information mobilization and disbursement monitoring, which can affect the cost efficiency of community based targeting and the opportunities for elite capture or corruption; 2) the community's preference for equity—that is whether or not they want to target the poor; and 3) multiple and conflicting identities in heterogeneous communities, which can present competing incentives. (Conning and Kevane 2002 in Mansuri and Rao 2003:13) The effectiveness of CBT was also found to be lower in communities that were more stratified, lacked schools or had low aggregate funding (Galasso and Ravallion Forthcoming in Mansuri and Rao 2003:12). In sum, the effectiveness of CBT appears to be a function of : 1) information, 2) community preference for equality, 3) open and transparent decision making, 4) clear rules for determining who is poor.

### *Multi-sector options*

While many CDD projects are single sector, the multi-sector approach is more consistent with the CDD approach, allowing communities to choose from a wider range of options (Kumar 2003:11). Manor (forthcoming 2004) discusses the shortcomings of shifting toward more instrumental single-sector approaches. One of the strengths of CDD is that it allows local people to set their priorities for local investments. If a project is single sector, this immediately pre-chooses for the community in question the limits of their domain of intervention. Hence, this limits the degree to which the project is “Community Driven.” But multi-sector approaches have their drawbacks as well. Some investments are less appealing to local communities because they are public goods or they have long-term paybacks—such as many NRM investments. Hence, the multi-sector approach is biased toward investments where the paybacks are short-term and economic in nature (see first interviews from this CDD study).

**ANNEX B: PAD INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE**

**PRE-INTERVIEW AND PAD INFORMATION**

**Interviewer and Interviewee Information**

Name of reviewer: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of review: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of interviewee \_\_\_\_\_

Position of interviewee \_\_\_\_\_

Role of interviewee in project \_\_\_\_\_

**Basic Project Information from PAD**

Country: \_\_\_\_\_ Region: \_\_\_\_\_

Project ID: \_\_\_\_\_ Name of interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Project document: \_\_\_\_\_

Project Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Major sector: \_\_\_\_\_

Sub-sector: \_\_\_\_\_

Project Type: A [ ] B [ ]

Lending Category: IDA [ ] IBRD [ ] IDA/IBRD [ ] Grant [ ]

Loan/Credit (US\$ millions) \_\_\_\_\_

Total Project Cost (US\$ millions) \_\_\_\_\_

Number of people affected by project \_\_\_\_\_

Principal foreign co-financiers, if any in order of importance: \_\_\_\_\_

Indicate in the Table below the components as described by the PAD:

Component	Total cost \$m	%

	Total baseline cost	100%

**PAD Analysis [Many of these do not appear to me to be answerable from the PAD. But I will let you decide which can. Some may have to be asked in the questionnaire.]**

**General Project Design Questions**

- 1) Is the project a multi-donor project?  Yes  No
- 2) Is the national government democratic?  Yes  No
- 3) Is the local government democratic?  Yes  No
  - a. Please describe how local democratic government is set up. (Are there independent candidates, party list elections, universal suffrage, secret ballots, etc.)

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- 4) What is the size of the target population? \_\_\_\_\_
- 5) What is the density of the population, settlement size, settlement pattern?

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- 6) How are the boundaries of population or target group defined?

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- 7) What are the principal livelihoods in program area?

- a) What are the principles sources of income

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- b) What are the primary professions/livelihoods

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- c) Is the community primarily subsistence or market oriented?

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d) Are there alternative income generating opportunities in the area? If yes, what are they?

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e) What opportunities are there for work outside of area? Do people migrate for work seasonally or leave permanently?

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f) To what degree is community natural resource dependent? What portion of local livelihoods depends on natural resources?

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8) What is the average per capita income in country? \_\_\_\_\_

9) Is the target community:

a) Stratified  Yes  No

b) How stratified? (along lines of caste, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, allochtone, authochtone, etc.?) \_\_\_\_\_

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c) Uniform (egalitarian)  Yes  No

10) What mechanisms are in place for the effective M&E of the project?

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11) Was there a negative or positive list?  Yes  No

What are its contents?

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Were specific resources targeted?

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12) What forms of community representation and participation are used in the project? [Representative, Stakeholder, PRA, etc.]

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13) What institutions were involved in the process of choosing sub-projects?

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14) Who was involved in the sub-project-selection process? How were they organized? (Was there one group, many groups, stakeholders, were people disaggregated by age, gender, livelihood profile?)

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15) Were the local institutions involved in implementation the same as those involved in choosing the sub-projects?  Yes  No

If no, which institutions are responsible for implementation?

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16) What role does the most local level of government have in CDD?

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17) What role do other levels of local government (between national and most local levels) have a role in CDD? Specify which level of government.

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18) What role does national government have in CDD?

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19) How did local people contribute to the sub-projects (labor, cash, material, land)?

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20) How is poverty being addressed by the project?

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21) How are marginal groups being included in program?

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### **NRM Questions**

1) Does the project contain non-community driven NRM investments?

- Yes       No

If Yes, what are they?

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2) Were there any NRM investments outside of the program financed by other donors? Please describe.

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3) Are there specific educational interventions targeted at encouraging NRM sub-projects?  Yes       No

If Yes, what are they targeted at (civic education, environmental awareness, etc.)?

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When were educational interventions conducted in the project process?

- Before pre-project assessments?
- After pre-project assessments but before the sub-project selection process?
- After the sub-project selection process but before implementation?
- During implementation?

4) Are the natural resources considered in this project :

- Privately owned  or publicly owned   
on private land  or public lands

5) **Are specific NRM indicators included in M&E?**

Yes  No

**QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Questions that concern project design process and the PAD**

- 1) How were the positive and negative lists in PAD arrived at? [Criteria, People involved (local involvement, national government involvement), Studies conducted? Process followed?]

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- 2) What initial assessments of community needs were carried out and what was learned from these assessments?

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- 3) How did these assessments inform the process of establishing a positive and negative list?

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- 4) How was target community chosen?

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- 5) Who is the target community? Describe who is included in and excluded (socially—i.e. is the target community defined by residency in a particular place, by profession, by ethnicity, by age, by gender, by interest, by caste, by self selection?)?

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- 6) What are the boundaries of the community (geographically)?

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- 7) Any other project design questions that we could not answer by looking through the PAD.

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**Questions that concern the choice by the community of sub-projects to be implemented**

1) How was community participation in the choice of the sub-projects organized?

a) What kind process was used for community participation in decisions? How were decisions made in this process? Please describe the steps.

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b) Who participated? [Which individuals, which institutions?]

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c) Were participants disaggregated in the process by age, gender, ethnicity, caste, livelihood profile, residency, etc? If so, why?

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2) How and by who was it decided that this form of organization or process should be the means of bringing community into decision making?

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3) How representative of the community was this method of inclusion?

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Did the process, individuals or group in question represent the community as a whole , or a subsection of the community , or stakeholders in and out of the immediate community ? Please explain who was represented.

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How was the process, individual or group participating held to represent the community? Through what mechanisms were they accountable to the community?

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4) Was elected local government involved in the process? How?

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- 5) Were the sub-project selection process and the actors involved accountable to:
- |  |                              |                             |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| elected local government                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| other levels of elected local government | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| deconcentrated administration            | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| line ministries                          | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| the project staff                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |

6) How were they accountable to these bodies—through what mechanisms?

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7) Was government involved in the decision making?  Yes  No

Who was involved and how were they involved?

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8) Was the project personnel involved in decision making?  Yes  No

How were they involved?

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- 9) Did the choice go through an approval process after the community made their priorities known?  Yes  No

Who was involved? How did it operate?

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- 10) After the community made its decision as to which sub-projects to pursue, were there conflicts between the PAD positive or negative lists and the final choices by communities?  Yes  No

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- 11) What criteria were applied by communities in sub-project choices? [i.e. resource characteristics, expected outcomes (benefits, costs and their distribution), social and political-economic context, the characteristics of the population?]

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- 12) What sub-projects did the community choose? Please list them. [give ranking if the sub-projects were ranked.]

Project	Rank:

If ranked, who ranked them? How did they rank them?

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13) Which of these sub-projects were ultimately included in the program?

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14) Who decided this final selection—if different from community choices? Why?

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15) Were there:

a) Sub-projects that communities chose that were not pursued?

Yes  No

Which? \_\_\_\_\_, Why? \_\_\_\_\_

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b) Sub-projects chosen that were not on the list and were pursued?

Yes  No

Which? \_\_\_\_\_, Why? \_\_\_\_\_

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**Questions concerning the implementation of sub-projects: who was involved in decision making and powers and problems**

***Representation in Decision Making***

1) In the implementation phases, was the community represented through the same mechanisms as in section II?  Yes  No

➔If Yes, please skip to Questions III.9 marked with ➔:

2) Who within the local community participated in sub-project implementation decision making? [Here we are not interested in participation in labor, etc.]

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3) How were these individuals or groups chosen?

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4) How was it decided that the above should be the means of bringing community into implementation decision making?

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5) How representative of the community was this method of inclusion?

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6) With regards to the group selected to represent the community in implementation decision making:

a) How was the group held to represent the community? How were they accountable to the community?

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b) Did the group in question represent the community as a whole   
or a subsection of the community   
Please explain which subsection of the community? \_\_\_\_\_

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7) What process did they go through in sub-project decision making? How was community involved? What steps were taken?

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8) If implementation involved participatory processes:

a) Who was involved in the process [local, non-local, all or part of the local population, which “stakeholders”]?

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b) How did the decision making process operate?

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9) → Who executed sub-project implementation? What individuals or groups did the work of implementing, managing, monitoring sub-projects?

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**Transfer of Responsibilities and Powers**

1) Please enumerate which powers and obligations were transferred to local implementing institutions or authorities for sub-projects.

NB: Ask the interviewee to go through this exercise for one or two NRM and one or two non-NRM sub-project that they felt were good illustrative examples of how local people participate in implementation. [Include four copies of this section in the Questionnaire.]

<b>Sub-Project _____</b> <b>Powers: What decisions were they allowed to make? (i.e. when were and how much resource will be exploited? who has rights to exploit resource, who gets benefits, etc.)</b>	<b>Who exercised these powers?</b>
<b>Responsibilities and Obligations</b>	<b>Who was charged</b>

	<b>with these</b>

2) What resources were available to the community for implementing sub-projects?

a) Financial

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b) Technical Assistance

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3) Who managed sub-project funds? Who decided their use? Please describe any approval process?

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4) What conditions are applied to a group before they can exercise Responsibilities and Powers?

Studies or assessments  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

Elaboration of management plans  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

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Capacity Development  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

Fund Raising  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

Other  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

5) Are transfers made to local bodies secure  or  
can they easily be taken back

7) Who has the authority to rescind powers transferred to communities?

\_\_\_\_\_

**NRM Questions**

1) How was NRM considered in the project design and in the elaboration of negative and positive lists?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2) Was baseline data on natural resources collected?  Yes  No

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

3) What were the incentives or disincentives for people to choose NRM sub-projects?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4) Do the project objectives consider poverty-environment linkages?  
 Yes  No

5) Did conflict arise from changes in control over natural resources?  
 Yes  No

If yes, how was this addressed?

\_\_\_\_\_

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6) Did tenure system have an effect on choice? How did it have an effect?

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7) Please elaborate the kind of tenure system in place for each resource.

**Resource:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Tenure:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Resource:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Tenure:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Resource:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Tenure:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Resource:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Tenure:** \_\_\_\_\_

8) If people did not choose NRM sub-projects, why did they not choose them?

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9) Was there an effort to solicit demand for NRM? Please describe.

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### **CDD Outcome and Benefit Questions**

#### **Outcomes**

1) What were the expected outcomes from the CDD component of the projects?

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2) Did you get the outcomes you expected? Please explain.

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3) Were there surprising positive or negative outcomes of the CDD components of the project?

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- 4) Can you directly attribute these outcomes to the CDD approach? Please explain how.

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**Benefits**

- 5) What were the benefits and what are the costs of the CDD component of the project?

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- 6) Who benefits from the program and who bears the costs [how are the benefits and costs distributed]?

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- 7) Did CDD shape the benefits (and costs) of the project? How do you explain the causal link between CDD and the benefit?

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- 8) Did CDD shape the distribution of benefits (and costs) of the project? Please explain the causal chain.

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**Conflict**

- 9) Was there conflict during the project—over decisions, over benefits and costs?

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- 10) Was there conflict or cooperation between local elected authorities and the project?

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**Ownership**

11) Did local people make claims concerning their right to be part of the project?

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12) Did local people make claims concerning their right to benefits from the project?

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**General CDD process questions**

1) What problems arose in implementation processes?

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2) What worked and what did not work based on your experience with this CDD project?

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a) What are the key components of effective CDD?

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b) What kinds of institutions should be involved and why?

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c) What kinds of power should they hold?

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d) What kinds of obligations should they have?

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e) To whom should they be accountable?

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- f) What enabling conditions are important to take into consideration? Why? What did the project do to shape the enabling conditions?

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- 3) How sustainable is this institutional approach? What guarantees its continuity after the project is completed?

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- 4) Can this approach be scaled up? How? What, if any, steps are being taken to facilitate the eventual scaling-up of the project?

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- 5) Was learning by doing important in this project? How?

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- 6) Did social capital play a role in the project? Did the project affect social capital?

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- 7) How are the project and its participants held accountable for project objectives?

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- 8) Were other funds available to the community from outside of your project? For what?

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**Background Material**

- 1) Please provide any assessments or studies that have been done of this project—its design, implementation, outcomes? Please include any pre-project baseline studies or any research done on the site that you are aware of.

**ANNEX C: LIST OF PROJECT DOCUMENTS STUDIED**

	Region	Country	F Y	Project Title	Type		Lists for subprojects (Positive lists)	Incentive/disincentives for particular subprojects			
					NRM	Mixed		Type I. Grant etc.	Type II. Education/Awareness/ Training	Type III. Negative lists	Type IV. ENV Screening
1	AFR	Ghana	97	Village Infrastructure Project	.	.	.				
2	AFR	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	97	Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project	.	.	.				
3	AFR	Mali	92	Natural Resources Management Project	.	.	.				
4	AFR	Niger	03	Community Action Program in support of the First Phase of the CAP	.	.	.				
5	AFR	Niger	96	Natural Resources Management	.	.	.				
6	AFR	Zambia	97	Environmental Support Program	.	.	.				
7	AFR	Zimbabwe	98	Community Action Project	.	.	.				
8	AFR	Zimbabwe	0	Land Reform Support Project	.	.	.				
9	EAP	China	97	Qinba Mountains Poverty Reduction Project (QBPRP)	.	.	.				
10	EAP	Indonesia	98	Kecamatan Development Project	.	.	.				
11	EAP	Philippines	97	Agrarian Reform Community Development Project	.	.	.				
12	EAP	Philippines	98	Community-Based Resources Management Project	.	.	.				
13	ECA	Armenia	96	Social Investment Fund Project	.	.	.				
14	ECA	Rumania	99	Social Fund Development Project	.	.	.				
15	LAC	Argentina	1	Indigenous Community Development LIL	.	.	.				
16	LAC	Brazil	90	Land Management II Project	.	.	.				
17	LAC	Brazil	96	Parana Rural Poverty Alleviation and Natural Resources Management Project	.	.	.				
18	LAC	Chile	96	Secano Rural Poverty Alleviation and Natural Resource Management Project	.	.	.				
19	LAC	Mexico	0	Rural Development in Marginal Areas Project- APL II	.	.	.				
20	LAC	Panama	97	Rural Poverty and Natural Resources Project	.	.	.				

21	MNA	Egypt	93	Matruh Resource Management Project		.		.			
22	MNA	Egypt	3	Second Matruh Resource Management Project		.	.	.	.		.
					2	20	18	8	10	3	6

**ANNEX D:  
LIST OF PROJECTS FOR WHICH INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED**

	Region	Country	F Y	Project Title	Type	
					NRM	Mixed
1	AFR	Mali	92	Natural Resources Management Project		.
1	AFR	Mali	-	Projet d'appui aux communautés rurales. Concept note only		.
2	AFR	Niger	03	Community Action Program in support of the First Phase of the CAP		.
2	AFR	Niger	96	Natural Resources Management		.
3	EAP	China	97	Qinba Mountains Poverty Reduction Project (QBPRP)		.
4	ECA	Armenia	96	Social Investment Fund Project		.
5	ECA	Rumania	99	Social Fund Development Project		.
6	LAC	Chile	96	Secano Rural Poverty Alleviation and Natural Resource Management Project		.
7	MNA	Egypt	93	Matruh Resource Management Project		.
8	MNA	Egypt	3	Second Matruh Resource Management Project		.
9	AFR	Senegal— not CDD		[****Fill in title] This project did not turn out to be CDD.		!

## ANNEX E: M&E INDICATORS AND THEMES

Country	Year	Indicators	(Monitoring) Theme
Mexico	1999	Adoption of new technology, Increases in yields and income, and Better food security	Production/Poverty Reduction
Mexico	1999	Communities participation in the project is facilitated through capacity building, better organization and management plans.	Community Inclusion
Mexico	1999	The promotion of off-farm activities and employment opportunities	Production/Poverty Reduction
Mexico	1999	CRDSs operate in every region w/ the balanced participation of institutions, producers' organizations, community representatives, and NGOs recognized by beneficiaries and institutions.	Community Inclusion
India	1998	Change in household income, Quality of Life indicator change	Poverty Reduction
India	1998	Reduction of waterlogged and sodic land, production increased on sodic lands, improved quality of biodiversity, & soil quality improved	Production
Tunisia	1997	Rural income increase & number of households w/ access to drinking water.	Poverty Reduction
Tunisia	1997	Ratio of community participation/Total works & Number of staff trained.	Community Inclusion
Niger	2003	Existence and use of transparent, accountable, demand-driven decision making processes	Accountability
Niger	2003	Broader representation of hitherto marginalized groups in local affairs.	Community Inclusion
Philippines	1998	Incidence of rural poverty in the project area is decreased & incomes of 25% of beneficiary households are increased.	Poverty Reduction
Philippines	1998	Increase in reforestation, increase in vegetation cover, fish sanctuaries are increased.	Production
Morocco	1998	Initiation of public administration reform, indicating movements towards decentralization.	Decentralization
Argentina	2000	Indigenous communities participating in capacity building activities & local indigenous social organizations legally recognized and functioning by the end of the project.	Community Inclusion
Egypt	2003	Rural well-being increased, poverty rates reduced, literacy rates, & daily calorie intake.	Poverty Reduction
Egypt	2003	Project meetings attended by sub-regional level representatives (#), local community w/ an official status (#), & women informed about the planning process (in %).	Community Inclusion
Egypt	2003	Vegetation cover (%), community conservation areas established (#), & protected areas established (#).	Improvement of Biodiversity
Egypt	2003	Community gross revenue for off-farm activities (amount), average farmer yields of improved barley vs. average farmer yields of traditional varieties (%), & people involved in growing medicinal and herbal plants (#).	Production

## ANNEX F: SUB-PROJECT RESULTS FROM AVAILABLE ICRs

### Chile: Secano Rural Poverty Alleviation

- Off farm income generating activities

The project financed 186 sub-projects.

About 27 percent of the selected sub-projects failed and a further 21 percent did not obtain adequate return to their investment. The main reason seems poor project design and project proposals.

Successful subprojects include agricultural equipment services, bakeries, the preparation of fruit conserves, mushroom drying, plant and trees nurseries and flour mills (US \$3.6 million).

Difficulties lie not only in selecting feasible proposals for these sub-projects but also finding groups of potential beneficiaries willing to work together in poor rural areas.

- Rural Infrastructure

Total investment for feeder roads was US\$1.2 million which is 60 percent of what had been indicated at appraisal.

6 sets of market facilities were built to improve marketing systems for small farmers but only two entered into operation. The main reasons are lack of organization of potential users, some legal problems, and the lack of proper coordination with municipal authorities.

### Brazil: Land Management II

- Soil Conservation Fund

<b>Collectively owned subprojects</b>	<b>Unit</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Actual</b>
-Various equipment	Unit	5952	11385
-Toxic waste disposal pits	Unit	520	384
-Agrochemical mixing water points	Unit	520	382
<b>Individually owned subprojects</b>			
-Animal waster fermentation tanks	Unit	3985	5694
-Green manure seeds	Ton	1742	1213
-Soil conservation works	Ha	156000	111200
-Commercial reforestation	Ha	40780	7746

## **Indonesia: Kecamatan Development Fund**

- Public Infrastructure
  - 16700 roads built or upgraded
  - 3500 bridges built or reconstructed
  - 2800 clean water supply units built
  - 1300 sanitation units built
  - 5200 irrigation systems built
  - 400 public market structures built 16 rehabilitated
  - 260 rural village electrification activities
  - 35 million estimated number of beneficiaries
  - 25 million workdays generated from infrastructure projects
  - over 2.8 million villagers earned short-term employment through infrastructure works
- Economic activity outputs
  - 18000 economic loan activities
  - 280000 loan beneficiaries (average of 53 percent women)
- Social activity outputs
  - 140 village health posts supported
  - 285 new schools built, 190 rehabilitated, 380 scholarships distributed
  - 85 grants to provide school equipment and materials

## **China: Southwest Poverty Reduction Project**

- Land and Farmer development

At least 80 percent of project households received assistance for a very wide variety of field crops, tree crops, and livestock activities.

Several factors constrained the component from achieving its full potential.

- Outreach of the project to the very poorest and most remote households was delayed
- Many of the program activities were taken over by the country technical bureaus who were interested in implementing country plans for agricultural development than providing poor households what they really needed.
- The benefits from heavy investments in a number of tree crops in the early years of the projects were not realized because
  - The quality of the planting materials was unsatisfactory
  - The markets for most of these tree crops were in a state of severe decline or complete collapse due to heavy saturation of the regional or national markets for these projects

## **Zambia: Environmental Support Program**

- Pilot Environmental Fund

The community based initiatives appraised 112 community environmental micro-project from 8 pilot districts. It committed funds to 71 micro-projects out of which 66 were funded but none completed due to the suspension of IDA credit.

Typical micro-projects focus on traditional and modern beekeeping, fish farming, sanitary improvements, citrus growing, spring protection, tree nursery establishment, afforestation and agroforestry and soil improvement. The micro-project activities generated strong demand and anecdotal evidence suggest that they inspired replication in neighboring non-target communities.

## **Niger: Natural Resources Management Project**

- CBNRM plans

Some 1300 micro-projects were realized to help rehabilitate natural resources and improve land management. These include agro-pastoral and forestry income – generation activities and value-added social and economic infrastructure development

- 70000 ha of forest were either planted or rehabilitated
- 10900 ha of pastoral areas were restored
- 1100 km of livestock transhumance corridors developed
- 320 wells and boreholes were constructed, both for human and livestock use
- 133 cereal banks were established
- Over 100 tree nurseries were created
- Dozen of income generating activities and collective infrastructure (health centers, cattle vaccination and storage facilities ) were built and supported
- 460 literacy training centers were opened to the benefit of more than 10000 community members
- 300 community midwives and emergency care health assistances were trained
- 2300 carts were distributed

## **Mali: Natural Resource Management**

- Community Natural Resources management

A total number of 844 villages and 58 communes were reached and completed the first three main phases of the approach.

Investments in the area of NMR involved water harvesting and erosion control, soil conservation, vegetation rehabilitation, production improvement.

Social economic investments included market gardens, livestock improvement, vaccination parks, small irrigation schemes, grain storage facilities, mills, water supply, village schools, health units etc.

#### Types of investments

Investment	Number of villages
pond cleaning	12
pastoral upgrades/development	59
forestry upgrades/development	74
mini dams	109
vegetable Garden	163
reforestation	165
large wells	200
village tree nurseries	230
small field plantations	247
earth bunds	262
literacy centers	314
Firebreaks	339
filter canals and barriers	369
fodder crop cultivation	371
improved stoves	574
live hedging/fencing	583
small equipment	633
organic fertilizer	687
stone borders	729

#### **India: Uttar Pradesh Sodic Land Reclamation Project**

- Land Reclamation

Farmer-organized Water User's Groups (WUGs) carried out on-farm development works and applying gypsum. As a result, 68,414 ha of Sodic lands were reclaimed. About 36,000 ha (C class barren land) area brought under green cover for the first time. About 2,460 km of main drains were rehabilitated with extended influence within the catchments area of 400,000 ha. Some 2,500 km of link drains, connecting farm-drains with main drains, were constructed/rehabilitated. In total, 10,930 new borings were drilled, developed and made functional, resulting in the generation of additional irrigation potential of 47,422 ha.

#### **Romania: Social Development Fund Project**

- RSDF Sub-project

1000 sub projects were expected to be appraised for grants awards. Of these, about 500 sub-projects were estimated to be awarded grants, implemented by the recipients and supervised by the RSDF in three categories: small-scale infrastructure sub-project (more than 300) with a grant ceiling of US\$75,000; community based social services sub-projects (more than 85) with a grant ceiling of US\$20,000 and income generating activities and sub-projects supporting employment opportunities (more than 85) with a grant ceiling of US\$20,000.

Given the delay in the availability of funds from the parallel financing of the Council of Europe Development Bank by more than a year and a half, a joint decision was made to de-link the two loans for evaluation purposes and refer to performance indications reduced to a half so as to correctly assess the project outputs based on the available resources excluding the CDB loan.

The RSDF has exceeded its targets

- 2273 subprojects proposals were received
- 1794 applications were eligible
- 1388 applications were desk appraised
- 753 applications were field appraised
- 524 grants were approved
- Of this number, the total number of Bank finances sub-projects 283
- 188 infrastructure subprojects (135 rural roads, 39 water supply systems, 7 bridges, 5 community centers, 2 other works)
- 39 community based social services (16 day care centers, 11 shelters, 4 information and counseling centers, 5 home care for elderly , 3 health promotion centers)
- 56 income generating sub-projects (46 processing raw materials, 6 handicrafts, 3 solar tents, 1 community bakery).
- The remaining grants which were approved at later time are finance under the CEB loan.

Sub projects development Grants (*US\$ million)	IBRD	CED	Total
Small scale infrastructure project grants	9.4	2.0	11.4
Community based social services grants	0.6	0.1	0.7
Income generation activity grants	1.0	0.2	1.2

### **Armenia: Social Investment Fund**

- ASIF Micro-Project

ASIF received 726 micro-project proposals of which 334 were approved and 259 micro-projects completed. Demand for micro-projects was very significant and

demonstrated the very high priority of communities for rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities.

Of the total 259 micro-projects,

- 35 percent were small-scale school rehabilitations,
- 32 percent were potable water projects
- 11 percent were minor irrigation works
- 5 percent were health facilities
- 17 percent includes works on community centers, pension homes, sewage and waste, roads, landscaping and other.

### **India: Integrated Watershed Development Project**

The project has proven highly successful in promoting vegetative means for soil and water conservation. The total area treated by the project is over 352,000 ha or 43 percent higher than the 246,000 ha planned at appraisal.

- Treatment of non-arable land (forest and village community land) accounts for about 45 percent of total project investments
- Arable area treatments covering 286,000 ha include introduction of improved inputs as well as better husbandry and soil and water conservation practices
- Rainfed horticulture has been successfully promoted with some 7,500 ha being planted with fruit trees, most commonly mango
- Livestock development has been supported through breed improvement by both.
- Drainage line stabilization using a mixture of engineering and vegetative means has been successful in protecting the banks and income cases reclaiming part of the bed for agricultural use.
- Water harvesting

### **Egypt: Matruh Resource Management Project**

The rural finance pilot program was cancelled at the MTR. Prolonged negotiations between the project and the locally established banks.

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